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PERVERTING THE CONCEPT OF CHILD

DISSERTATION

Iuliia Reshetnikova

Mentor: prof. dr. Alenka Zupančič

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Declaration of Authorship

I hereby declare that this thesis has been generated by me as the result of my own original research. Where other sources of information have been used, they have been acknowledged.

Iuliia Reshetnikova

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1   Introduction

A certain word or concept, once emerged, experiences various transformations: it might become more definite or more blurred, it might begin to cover more extensive part of reality or it might lose its power over previously possessed territory.

The history of each concept begins with the fact that at a certain moment of time it appears as a gradual hardening of the general flow of language generation. Although the concept is a solid formation, at the same time its solidity is just a dome that covers a diversity and infinite variety of meanings, as well as a great potential of sense formation. Every word makes an impression that its meaning is stable, but this impression is only a screen that conceals the word's groundlessness and instability.

This can be stated in other way. Two constitutive elements coexist in every word: a solid element and a flexible element. Both are nothing more than a mask of a concept and that is the reason why those two mutually exclusive constitutive elements can coexist with each other.

How we see the concept while dealing with it depends on which of its constitutive elements we are taking into account. The concept may seem to be complete, delineated, reliable, precise, and such that interacts with reality in a clear manner; but it can also be seen as incomplete and unformed, and such that has indeterminate type of interaction with reality.

Courageous philosophical view is capable of revealing that second constitutive element in any, even the most stable concept. Such view indicates the ability to reveal the abyss behind every, even the most solid ground and the capability to doubt even the most obvious and undeniable.

Common sense way of thinking, that is, the usual way of thinking in everyday life, is based on a confidence in the stability of the concepts. Throughout most of our lifetime we are hiding in this stability, rarely taking the risk of questioning the obvious meanings.

Courageous philosophical way of thinking is grounded on the ability to reveal each concept as a lie. Such thinking involves a spirit of adventure, and precisely by this it differs from the commonsensical way of thinking, that presupposes a belief in truth and transparency of words.

Philosophical way of thinking corresponds to the playful perception of reality. Such perception denies any necessity, it postulates contingency and possible plurality of meanings. Accordingly, within such perception any concept becomes potentially multifunctional, that is deprived of necessary and stable meaning.

In contrast, common sense way of thinking perceives entities of reality as such that have ultimate meaning, and therefore presupposes that concepts have necessary and stable meanings assigned to them.

Perception different from the commonsensical one does not presuppose that concepts have purpose. The rejection of imputation of a purpose and of a stable meaning of concepts provides the possibility of affirmation of plurality of possible meanings.

Playful perception, unlike common sense, does not assert that the correspondence between a word and what it denotes is necessary. Within such perception, any concept functions as a toy, that is, as a thing which is withdrawn from the field of imposed responsibility.

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As with any other concept, there are two possible levels of perception of the concept of child. Within the commonsensical way of thinking the concept of child is perceived as taken for granted and does not raise any questions: it is all so clear what a child is, there is nothing here to discuss.

Doubts about the obvious indicate transition to such a way of thinking that is capable of detecting in any obviousness the point at which it does not coincide with itself.

Although this type of thinking is essentially the opposite to the commonsensical thinking, to occur it still requires the common sense. The latter one is used as the material for the new kind of thinking, and in the very merciless processing of this material the new kind of thinking manifests itself.

Accordingly, to reveal the point of uncertainty of the modern concept of child means to make it suitable to serve as a material for the practice of philosophical thinking.

Motivation, goals and methods

For the first time the obviousness of the concept of child was questioned in 1960 in Philippe Aries's book Centuries of Childhood. Unfortunately, Aries was only a historian and not a genealogist of history. His greatest contribution was to venture to doubt that child is more than a historical construct. Analysing medieval and modern societies, he came to the conclusion that childhood as an idea has changed over time. Philippe Aries studied the differences between the modern concepts of child and childhood and their previous versions. However, he hasn't fully revealed the potential of such historical research: he did not recognize that it could modify the present concept of child. In other words, exploring the history of childhood, Aries exposes the plasticity of the concept of child, but he does not actually reflect on it.

Subsequent studies of childhood have focused on the development of three major lines of thought: on the postulation that the child is not a social construct (as it was claimed by Aries), but a part of natural reality (Hugh Cunningham, Linda Pollock, Nicholas Orem); on a statement that over time the concept of child is evolving, which implies that practices arising from this concept become more adequate in relation to children themselves (Lloyd de Mause, Lawrence Stone), on a claim that the modern concept of child is a constitutive element of the mode of functioning of the repressive society (Zornado).

Philippe Aries is respected or criticized predominantly for his historical findings, however, no-one ever appreciated to its full extent the main discovery of Aries: his method. Even if some historians of childhood agree that the

concept of childhood is a historical phenomenon and it is essentially changeable, they either condemn or support historical variations of the concept of child without making any further large-scale conclusions about the potential of its flexibility.

In my work I will to a greater extent rely on the very methodology of Aries, on his way of working with the concept of childhood, and less on the conclusions of historians of childhood. Since it was Philippe Aries who discovered the instability of the concept of child – even if some of his historical summaries are ambiguous, what is most valuable about his way of research is his general and fundamental doubt about the concept and the phenomenon of childhood and precisely that doubt was a source of inspiration for my work in all respects.

As Nikita Elizarov, a brilliant critic of contemporary social reality, states:

> Whether the concept of childhood existed before modernity or not, childhood was not widely recognized as a concept prior to Aries's work. He brought it from the unconscious of culture — an ideology mistaken for nature — into the spotlit public space for scrutiny, reflection, and doubt. Hence any book, whether fighting or defending Aries's position, since then contributes to the articulated body of the childhood concept. (*Elizarov*)

In case of Aries's methodology, the point is not so much whether there existed or not the medieval understanding of child which is identical to ours, the point is rather to make an attempt to conceive the modern concept of child as once non-existent and as arising at a particular stage of history, namely, to imagine that there was a period in history when the contemporary understanding of a child did not exist. In such a work of imagination lies the source of Aries's productivity, for the reason that nothing can be explored and transformed if it was not previously called into question.

Understood in such a way, Aries's methodology, therefore, concerns not so much the past as the future: what can be done today with the concept of child, in what ways it can be interpreted, and how can we modify it.

Once there are doubts about a certain part of symbolic reality, it is useless and impractical to make attempts to dispel these doubts; it is more practical to use them as the impulse and the means of research. In the case of the concept of child, it should be explored to what extent there is a possibility to transform it.

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The mutability of each concept is more important than the concept itself. In the genealogy of the concept each mutation is a record of how it was inscribed in the thought of a certain epoch, representing the way people used to understand themselves and the world around them.

The change of historical epistemes does not imply the replacement of the words with new ones: words remain the same — what changes is the whole reality in which words are involved. If we trace the shift of epistemes through the example of one word, we will find out that this word is an ethereal, ever changing matter of which dissimilar fabrics of meaning were weaved at various times.

The word 'child' functioned in different ways in different historical epochs. It was part of different epistemes and was captured by different discourses. Today it is a part of settled common sense, which is trapped in the illusion of immutability of the mode of existence of the word 'child'.

The void within the word 'child' allows this word to exist within different epistemes and diverse types of discourses. The fact that there is no such objective reality, which can be represented by the word 'child', allows this word to become a part of dissimilar worldviews.

To disclose this diversity one should work at the generative point of the concept. It is the point at which the meaning of the concept does not coincide with what it represents and where, therefore, a space for the formation of its new meanings is open.

* * *

In my dissertation I will work with a concept of child on two levels. On the first level, by studying the concrete example of the word 'child' and the underlying notion, I will trace how concepts in general are changing in history. The concept of child is a part of the common worldview, therefore, through its analysis one can trace the principles according to which thinking operates today: in what forms it interacts with reality, and how it changes over time.

On the second level of my work with the concept of child, I will look into the means of concept processing: mainly, how to recognize a concept as a collection of remnants — both of its former meanings and of its present day common sense after the 'common' part of it has been rigorously questioned. This view discovers what potential lies in this word.

Put simply, first level describes how the concepts shape human thinking, while the second one shows, conversely, how the particular way of thinking can willingly influence the concepts themselves, mutating them into something new.

Correspondingly, I will make an attempt to transfer the concept of child from its everyday order of functioning into the philosophical perception field, that is, from the mode of the passive consumption of the concept into the mode of its active interpretation.

For this purpose I will use the concept childhood as it is understood in everyday life, i.e. within the common sense. Concept of child does not exist outside of common sense since there is no reality external to common sense. It is impossible to go beyond the boundaries of common sense, and accordingly, it is impossible to withdraw the concept of child from the common sense. The only thing that could be done is to change your position in relation to the concept from the passive attitude to the active one. That is to say, to move from the position of perception of a word 'child' as known and well-understood to the position within which its meaning is yet to be discovered.

2   Perception of age: from medieval to post-classical episteme

2.1   Medieval perception of childhood

In his book on a history of childhood, Philippe Aries investigates the specificity of division of life cycle into ages in medieval and early modern societies. One of the intentions of such investigation was to detect a difference between today's attitude towards the ages of life and that of the Middle Ages. Aries states:

> In the Middle Ages the Christian name had been considered too imprecise a description, and it had been found necessary to complete it with a surname, a place name in many cases. And now it has become advisable to add a further detail, the numerical character, the age. The Christian name belongs to the world of fancy, the surname to that of tradition. The age, a quantity legally measurable to within a few hours, comes from another world, that of precise figures. (*Aries* 15)

The personal importance of the idea of age gradually became an integral part of self-awareness. It took time for the rigor of modern identification to become part of everyday life. It was only in the eighteenth century that the parish priests began keeping their registers with the attempted exactness, which it is required by the conditions of modern society (see *Aries* 16).

As Aries puts it: "A man's 'age' was a scientific category of the same order as weight or speed for our contemporaries"(*Aries* 19). Aries explains that this category was a part of a system of physical description, which means that 'age', 'ages of life', 'ages of man' corresponded to positive concepts. Gradually they passed from the realm of science to that of everyday experience.

Analysing medieval scientific environment, which was the sphere of functioning of the categories of ages, Aries indicates some important features of this environment, but the general impression is that he is not capable to comprehend what is happening on a more general level.

One of the important features Aries mentions is medieval commonplace

> idea of the fundamental unity of Nature, of the solidarity which exists between all the phenomena of Nature, phenomena which could not be distinguished from supernatural manifestations. The idea that there was no opposition between the natural and the supernatural derived both from popular beliefs inherited from paganism and from a science that was physical as well as theological. (*Aries* 19)

Out of this Aries draws a conclusion that the concept of the unity of Nature and the idea that there was no opposition between the natural and the supernatural are responsible for the delay in scientific development, in view of the fact that in order to exert any influence on an element of Nature, there has to be a possibility to adequately isolate each element of it.

This isolation was not possible in medieval scientific environment; the Knowledge of Nature was the knowledge, which can foresee but not modify.

> A single rigorous law governs at one and the same time the movement of the planets, the vegetative cycle of the seasons, the connections between the elements, the human body and its humours, and the destiny of a man, with the result that astrology makes it possible to discover the personal effects of this universal determinism. (*Aries* 20)

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The concept of the ages of life was functioning as part of the universal system of correspondences. For example, ages were presented as correlated with the planets in *Le Grand Proprittaire de toutes choses* (see *Aries* 21) or as a part of a correspondence with other 'fours': consensus quatuor elementorum, quatuor humorum (the temperaments), quatuor anni temporum et quatuor vitae aetatum (see *Aries* 16); or as connected with the scenes of the calendar:

Aries is conscious of the great difficulties of interpretation of medieval idea of life. It is not easy to comprehend because "today we no longer have this idea of life: we see life chiefly as a biological phenomenon, as a situation in society" (*Aries* 23)

Probably the processes mentioned by Aries took place in reality, but it is possible to do more extensive analysis of the perspective depicted by him, and thereby to understand a cut or representation of what exactly general transformation was described by Aries.

When Aries declares that the concept of age was a scientific category, and science has not yet been divided into the natural and the supernatural, it is not enough just to indicate this 'not yet' if we want to comprehend the specificity of the phenomenon of medieval science, and thus to understand the environment in which a notion of age was functioning.

To put it another way, to comprehend this it is not sufficient to point out that the medieval knowledge was not yet divided into rational and magical, it is much more important to discover the episteme in which medieval knowledge was constituted.

There has to be considered the type of positivity, which was possible in the Middle Ages. To understand the functioning mode of the category of age in that period, we should try to look at it through the net of perception of that time.

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Thus Aries' considerations on the age as a medieval scientific category, needs some substantial refinements. First of all, when speaking of the age as scientific category, he does not indicate the specificity of medieval science, and understands it as the earlier incomplete form of modern science. This vision cannot grasp the specificity of the medieval concept of age.

Secondly, because of not seeing and not taking into account the specificity of medieval science, Aries uses the concept of age in its contemporary sense, he is trying to detect its beginning in a studied period, not seeing the crucial difference between the medieval concept of age and the contemporary one and thus, not distinguishing between the ways of their functioning.

Aries, examining the category of age in the Middle Ages, is actualizing the current understanding of the age. And that is precisely what should not be done. In point of fact, there is a rupture between the contemporary and the medieval understanding of the age - the rupture, connected only with the word 'age'. This rupture is presented by the difference between particular historical epistemes in which the concepts of age functions. It can be stated that epistemes are the different ways of functioning of the same word.

Because Aries doesn't see this rupture, the only way in which he is capable to perceive the medieval concept of age is to perceive it as an initial stage of the process of its development which necessarily had to lead to contemporary concept of age, that is to say, Aries presupposed that there was a necessity for biological and some other aspect which know define the concept of the age to capture this notion and to become the only possible reality for it.

Namely, Aries was not able to grasp something that differs from the product of ready-made perception – another understanding of the concept of age, the one in which it is perceived not as a zero degree of the todays understanding of it, but as concept which belongs to a totally different way of its perception.

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To clarify the specificity of medieval knowledge production, we should call to mind some Foucault insights on this point.

First of all, Foucault refutes the widespread understanding of medieval science, in which Aries can be accused as well – the understanding in accordance to

which medieval science is perceived as not yet well structured mixture of magic, cultural heritage and glimpses of sovereign rationality, in which we can now recognize ourselves. Foucault insists that medieval science was not a free space for the encounters of these elements. It is much more adequate to perceive it as rigorously structured. "It is this very rigour that makes the relation of magic to erudition inevitable – they are not selected contents but required forms" (*Order* 32)

So magic is not something that was brought into this knowledge from outside (as it is convenient to think for us today), it was a necessary form of knowledge and the integral part of its body. "The form of magic was inherent in this way of knowing" (*Order* 33)

In order to further refine foucauldian understanding of medieval knowledge we should consider the notion of resemblance. Foucault states: "Up to the end of the sixteenth century, resemblance played a constructive role in the knowledge of Western culture" (*Order* 17) This knowledge did not presuppose the distinction between reality and reflected image. Medieval outlook was based on the comprehensive configuration of relation of the microcosm to macrocosm: there was nothing but correspondence between microcosm and macrocosm.

"The universe was folded in upon itself: the earth echoing the sky, faces seeing themselves reflected in the stars, and plants holding within their stems the secrets that were of use to man" (*Order* 17)

Accordingly, the concept of age referred to one of the points of corresponding of the microcosm (human level) and the macrocosm (divine level), the point out of which the whole meaning of the human being could be revealed. It is in vain to search for a meaning of the medieval concept of age that will differ from this.

Foucault distinguishes four ways of the development of resemblance, that is to say four ways to explain the way the world must fold in upon itself, how it duplicate itself and reflect itself. Those four ways of explanation are: convenientia, aemulatio, analogy, and sympathy. (*Order* 17) The most

interesting for us here is sympathy and the movement which is defined by the sympathy-antipathy pair. It is this movement that manifests and clarifies other types of resemblance.

> The whole volume of the world, all the adjacencies of 'convenience', all the echoes of emulation, all the linkages of analogy, are supported, maintained, and doubled by this space governed by sympathy and antipathy, which are ceaselessly drawing things together and holding them apart. By means of this interplay, the world remains identical; resemblances continue to be what they are, and to resemble one another. The same remains the same, riveted onto itself. (*Order* 25)

Here is another illuminating passage on the meaning of sympathy:

> And here, no path has been determined in advance, no distance laid down, no links prescribed. Sympathy plays through the depths of the universe in a free state. It can traverse the vastest spaces in an instant: it falls like a thunderbolt from the distant planet upon the man ruled by that planet; on the other hand, it can be brought into being by a simple contact - as with those 'mourning roses that have been used at obsequies' which, simply from their former adjacency with death, will render all persons who smell them 'sad and moribund'. But such is its power that sympathy is not content to spring from a single contact and speed through space; it excites the things of the world to movement and can draw even the most distant of them together. It is a principle of mobility: it attracts what is heavy to the heaviness of the earth, what is light up towards the weightless ether; it drives the root towards the water, and it makes the great yellow disk of the sunflower turn to follow the curving path of the sun. (*Order* 25)

Now it becomes clearer in what way the category of age is related to the interplay of resemblances that define this category. Initially the category of age was defined by the bound-free correlation with, for example, planets or the signs of the zodiac or the cycle of the four elements and it did not exist outside of this correlation, it was present only as a part of it. Only in the seventeenth century, this bound–free correlation, the groundlessness of it (from the point of view of

rationalized knowledge) was forgotten and the category of age began to be represented in isolation from the functional space in which it has appeared. It started to be mediated by the representation and later on it will reappear as a rationally based category, which was deprived of its bound-free initial meaning.

That is to say, in the seventeenth century the initial 'groundless' criterion of correlations within the interplay of resemblances will be replaced by a rational criterion, by which the former type of criterion will be excluded. Or it is better to say that the 'groundless' criterion of correlation will be discovered as a criterion retroactively in the seventeenth century. And as a result of this discovery it will lose its groundlessness.

For each of the concepts the groundless interplay of resemblances gave a mark on the ground of which the further functioning (in the frame of rationalized knowledge) of those concepts took place.

Consequently, the groundlessness of the mark will be forgotten, and it will start to be perceived as a mandatory indication which constitutes the basis of the concept.

This is what happened with the concept of age – the groundlessness of its foundation was disregarded and it started to function as an objective category. The word 'age' was taken out of the world of language as prose of the world, out of the world which was

> The great untroubled mirror in whose depths things gazed at themselves and reflected their own images back to one another is, in reality, filled with the murmur of words. The mute reflections all have corresponding words which indicate them. (*Order* 25)

Thus, it can be said that the word 'age' ceased to be a correspondence, which indicates mute reflections.

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It the language of pre-classical episteme (which functioned till the seventeenth century) word was an indication of similitude, not the independent sign that represents the thing and unfolds its meaning. The language was

> rather an opaque, mysterious thing, closed in upon itself, a fragmented mass, its enigma renewed in every interval, which combines here and there with the forms of the world and becomes interwoven with them: so much so that all these elements, taken together, form a network of marks in which each of them may play, and does in fact play, in relation to all the others, the role of content or of sign, that of secret or of indicator. (*Order* 34)

Words of medieval language should be understood as such that are initially inscribed into what they denote and at the same time as containing the feature of what is denoted. The relation of language to the world was not the relation of signification but rather of analogy.

Within the classical episteme language was the place of representation. It is throe that in order to define the principle of language it should be indicated the way signifier is connected to signified (through the representation in classical episteme). But the essence and principle of the language of pre-classical episteme lies in totally different dimension. It is almost impossible for us today to grasp that principle because of how our approach to the language was historically transformed.

Pre-classical language was an unbroken surface in which there were no distinction between what is seen and what is read. Language was a place of revelation, a part of the space in which the truth is manifested

Heidegger states: "In the Middle Ages a system is impossible, for there a ranked order of correspondences is alone essential and indeed this as an ordering of whatever is in the sense of what has been created by God and is watched over as his creature" (*Question* 141). Names were inscribed in things; they were transparent sign of them.

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If we try to understand medieval texts without taking into account stated above, even if in its content we will recognize some analogies of the words from our today daily usage, this language will still seem strange and foreign for us. By putting in those words our current meaning of them we will still not be able to comprehend what was said, because even the same words in different times function in different spheres of meaning. And the word 'child' is an example of such discrepancy of meaning. The one who utters it at the same time utters specific relationship of words and things – relation which is usual within our episteme. It is not possible to understand the meaning of the medieval word 'child' from within our episteme and the way it functions in it. There is no place in suitable for us relationship of words and things for the medieval one. There is no such understanding of a child that we can take and use to explain the medieval concept of a child.

 When we appeal to the history of the Middle Ages with a view to detect the notion of the age or the notion the child, we are trying to find elements of the system, which did not exist in that period. It is true that there were words 'child' and 'age' – the same words that we use today. Despite the apparent obviousness and self-evidence of the task that should be set for the historians, it's not that simple. These words, like other components of language were taken out of their original realm, and have become a part of system that was not familiar to them before. This system started to possess them and made them its own by replacing with itself the original realm of the functioning of those words.

Therefore it is not sufficient to try to find out how the reality, which is denoted by a certain word, was changing from the Middle Ages to the present day. It is much more important to examine how was changing the very way of designation, or in the words of Foucault: how words and things are connected.

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To summarize points appearing above, Aries looks for what was known and how it was known in the wrong place. That is because he perceives it from within contemporary episteme, he cannot get out of it because he doesn't see that his research is conditioned by it. Aries doesn't recognize medieval notion 'child' as self-sufficient, because he doesn't see episteme in which it functions. For this reason he can't comprehend the phenomenon of a childhood in Middle Ages, he can only say that it didn't exist in that period (in the sense we understand this notion today). And he actually right – there was no childhood understood in that way.

In other words, the only thing which Aries was able to detect was the absence of a childhood, and this discovery is much better than some of the later studies of historians of childhood, which impose its presence on Medieval Age and by this closed the possibility to see that period in its uniqueness.

Absence of it is at least the possibility to start the appropriate research, to move the point of view of the study from its position. It also gives a possibility to study medieval phenomenon of a childhood not as a zero degree of today's variant of it, but as its occurrence.

My claim is that despite the fact that there is insurmountable gap between the medieval and contemporary concept of child, yet the notion of the child, as we know it nowadays, still keeps something that existed before the familiar to us notion of a child started to arise.

Today we can try to open this prior meaning of notion 'child' – and in this way to find out what is named with that word today. That is, to reveal another form of its potential, to see the conflation of the word with what it is signifies avoiding imposed from the outside mediations.

2.2   Transition to the classical episteme

To understand better specificity of pre-classical episteme we have to think over the transformation that occurred in the seventeenth century (when the classical episteme replaces the pre-classical). By discovering what precisely has changed, we will find out what should be 'enclosed in brackets', excluded from the field of view in order for us to become able to see the pre-classical episteme.

In other words, to undertake the archaeological journey to the pre-classical episteme first we have to turn to the classical one (which to great extent determines the framework of our today's common-sense worldview). And if by taking later one as a point of departure we will try out of that perspective to look at the pre-classical episteme it will allow us to see the difference between those two epistemes – the space where it is impossible to bring them together. This discrepancy would be a guiding light in the exploration of the medieval concept of age and childhood.

Foucault, referring to the transition to the classical episteme, states:

> This involved an immense reorganization of culture, a reorganization of which the Classical age was the first and perhaps the most important stage, since it was responsible for the new arrangement in which we are still caught - since it is the Classical age that separates us from a culture in which the signification of signs did not exist, because it was reabsorbed into the sovereignty of the Like; but in which their enigmatic, monotonous, stubborn, and primitive being shone in an endless dispersion. (*Order* 43)

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One of the ways to explain this transformation (the transition from the pre-classical to classical episteme) and the most significant element of this transformation - the way type of the words relation to reality changes – is to trace changes in the phenomenon of madness (and thus in the word denoting this

phenomenon) which it undergoes after the sixteenth century. That is what Foucault describes in History of Madness.

> The cosmic, tragic experience of madness was hidden by the exclusive privileges of a critical consciousness. For that reason the experience of the classical age, and by extension the modern experience of madness, cannot be considered as a total figure, which would thus finally reach its positive truth. It is rather a fragmentary figure that is erroneously taken as complete, an ensemble unbalanced by all that it lacks, or rather all that obscures it. Behind the critical consciousness of madness in all its philosophical, scientific, moral and medicinal guises lurks a second, tragic consciousness of madness, which has never really gone away. (*History* 27)

When a critical consciousness becomes privileged, some crucial integral part of the phenomenon which is denoted by a word wipes out as non-core or secondary. As a result of this process, the phenomenon that was transformed seems to have reached its positive truth. But this is an illusion, it excludes the ability to recognize something that started to be hidden in the denotation of the phenomenon, something that initially was its constitutive presence.

What started to be hidden is still there – behind the cover of critical consciousness which has appropriated the phenomenon – it just has to be found a way for us to become capable to perceive this excluded presence.

Critical consciousness, increasingly absorbing initial way of functioning of the words, transforming the meaning of words by changing their potential, and transforming the sense of denotation, obscure the initial sphere where things and words were conjoined, but it still cannot eliminate it completely.

Critical reflection absorbs and tries to shape something that could not fully belong to it, by this it deprives the processes it is transforming of their initial place (only here it maintains its self-creative force), but being unable to absorb it fully, it can only change the mode of its endless displacement, but cannot completely eliminate it, since by losing it, it will lose its own constitutive force.

As a result of a privileged position of a critical consciousness "that darkness into which man stared and made out impossible forms has slowly begun to retreat" (*History* 41) .The darkness is dispersed by light of knowledge and the impossible become impossible.

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To further acknowledge the specificity of pre-classical language and the way it is seen by Foucault it should be mentioned that according to him, throughout the nineteenth century, and till nowadays ("from Holderlin to Mallarme and on to Antonin Artaud") the raw being of language that had been forgotten since the sixteenth century was revived in the literature. In other words, literature, starting in the nineteenth century, to certain extent might be taken as a representation of that way of functioning of the language which determined its existence in Middle Ages. Literature withdraws the language from its representative or signifying function and by this it forms a sort of 'counter-discourse' – bastion of a culture against discursivity.

> There is nothing now, either in our knowledge or in our reflection, that still recalls even the memory of that being. Nothing, except perhaps literature - and even then in a fashion more allusive and diagonal than direct. It may be said in a sense that 'literature', as it was constituted and so designated on the threshold of the modern age, manifests, at a time when it was least expected, the reappearance, of the living being of language. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the peculiar existence and ancient solidity of language as a thing inscribed in the fabric of the world were dissolved in the functioning of representation; all language had value only as discourse. (*Order* 43)

Literature should not be analysed using those modes of decipherment which belong to a Classical situation of language – the situation that was predominant since the seventeenth century. In that kind of analysis "One would be searching for it outside the ground in which, as regards our culture, it has never ceased for the past century and a half to come into being and to imprint itself". (*Order* 80)

It is not possible to enter this ground by analysing literature from the point of view of what is signified (of what it is trying to say) or from the point of view of that which signifies – both variants belong to the level of its significant form. To catch the essence of literature it should be thought on a different level – the level of what it says.

By analogy with this line of thought, we can also point out that to analyse the meaning of medieval words (including the word 'child') by using the methods that belong to a Classical status of language – would mean not to be able to discover them on the ground on which they come into being.

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So, what has changed in the seventeenth century? What has forced out the language of his raw historical being? Why language has ceased to be the prose of world?

Foucault answers: "… language breaks off its old kinship with things and enters into that lonely sovereignty from which it will reappear, in its separated state, only as literature". (*Order* 49)

He warns that it is not acceptable to use ready-made concepts in the analysis of that kind of transformations, even those concepts which seems to be the most reliable one:

> This new configuration may, I suppose, be called 'rationalism'; one might say, if one's mind is filled with ready-made concepts, that the seventeenth century marks the disappearance of the old superstitious or magical beliefs and the entry of nature, at long last, into the scientific order. But what we must grasp and attempt to reconstitute are the modifications that affected knowledge itself, at that archaic level which makes possible both knowledge itself and the mode of being of what is to be known. (*Order* 54)

Following Foucault, in our analysis we will explore this new configuration by trying to reconstitute the very transformation of the knowledge itself and at the same time to avoid ready-made concepts.

To embody that aspiration we can state that in the seventeenth century magic ("which permitted the decipherment of the world by revealing the secret resemblances beneath its signs") (*Order* 48); the total system of correspondence of microcosm and macrocosm, specific manifestation of which was each particular similitude, were substituted for analysis. In a Classical episteme each resemblance started to be subordinated to the proof of comparison and it had a right to exist only if the test of comparison has detected its identity on the ground of a common unite, and if it was recognized as suitable to be included in a general order. From now on the complete enumeration and an exhaustive count of all the elements constituting the envisaged whole started to be possible.

On the contrary in the pre-classical episteme the possibility to discover new similitudes was infinite, the structure of similitudes was never certain and complete and was always open to new alternatives.

The knowledge of Classical episteme will no longer consist in drowning things together, but on the contrary, in discriminating, the main function of which is to impose upon comparison investigation of difference. From now on to know means to discriminate.

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In the Classical episteme the necessary condition for the capacity to talk to exist was the affirmation of a relation of identity or difference. Language could be functional only inside the framework of this relation. But for this relation to appear there must be "a murmur of analogies rising from things, perceptible even in the most immediate experience; there must be resemblances that posit themselves from the very start". (*Order* 119). If there were no resemblances everything would be absolute diversity. This is why it would be impossible to

determine identical features of things and to join them by giving them a common name. There would be no language if there were no basis containing natural resemblances below the relation of identities or differences. "Discourse dissipates the murmur, but without it could not speak" (*Order* 120).

Been excluded from knowledge since seventeenth century, resemblance proceeds to be a condition of language, it constitute the outer border of it – the border which surrounds the domain of that which it is possible to order and to analyse.

By remaining present it gives the opportunity to get the words out of the scope of order and to transfer them into a different mode of functioning.

2.3   Word 'child' within the language of representation

"Knowledge breaks off its old kinship with divination" (*Order* 59). Knowledge was the divination, and the object of its divination was divine. "Its task was to uncover a language which god had previously distributed across the face of the earth" (*Order* 59).

After the knowledge broke up with divination

> There is no longer any divination involved - no insertion of knowledge in the enigmatic, open, and sacred area of signs - but a brief and concentrated kind of knowledge: the contraction of a long sequence of judgements into the rapidly assimilated form of the sign (*Order* 60).

This kind of knowledge gives and presupposes at the same time a possibility for the world to be ordered.

In the Classical age, it is no longer the task of knowledge to reveal the ancient divine Word, its task now is to construct a language.

Starting in the seventeenth century the language begins to be something that should be transformed into the science and the science was a not yet well-made language. Language was therefore that which must be renewed and readjusted in accordance to analytic order.

"… the prescriptions of grammar at that time were of an analytic and not an aesthetic order" (*Order* 87) Grammar was not something that was imposed in order to make the language more refined and beautiful, it was prescribed as a condition of possibility of ordering a representation which results in the possibility of speech (or which is necessary for the speech to be possible).

By renewing, language becomes that which expresses knowledge and at the same time that knowledge is possible due to the renewing of the language.

The word 'child' as any other words moved into the sphere which functions in above described way. It started to be something that is placed in the encyclopaedia, and that which has been given a strict definition constructed in accordance with rules of analytic order. Accordingly, such historical conditions caused the emergence of knowledge about a child.

This knowledge appeared as a part of categorization into child and adult. Child was seen as not yet an adult, as something that should become an adult or transformed into adult. The word 'child' started to be determined by the word of opposite meaning – that is 'adult'. The opposition child/adult became the framework in which the word 'child' attains its meaning, the only reality of this word.

Or, if we look at this process from the other perspective: the word 'child' had to leave the space of the symbolic, in which it existed before - had to lose all the infinite possibilities of associative lines of sense in which it could be woven into and to become the notion with a certain definition and the denotation of dissected reality.

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Hence, child has become part of a certain classification, or, it can be said, the consequence of classification – it has become something that occupies a certain place in the general table, hence positioned in relationship to its other parts. These other parts of the table have similarities and differences with the name 'child', something common and something different, but both such types of relation could only be detected if preceded by a clearly defined rules. Those rules are the condition for the detection of any relation.

In the seventeenth century to name meant to place in the table. Minimum version of table content consists of two categories (for example, child/adult), that is to say, at least two categories must be given by a table.

> To name is at the same time to give the verbal representation of a representation, and to place it in a general table. The entire Classical theory of language is organized around this central and privileged entity. All the various functions of language intersect within it, since it is by nomination that representations are enabled to enter as figures into a proposition. It is therefore also through nomination that discourse is articulated upon knowledge. (*Order* 116)

Foucault explains that the striving movement that carried the whole experience of Classical discourse was naming:

> One might say that it is the Name that organizes all Classical discourse; to speak or to write is not to say things or to express oneself, it is not a matter of playing with language, it is to make one's way towards the sovereign act of nomination. (*Order* 117)

Within the Classical discourse in order to give a name one must move with the means of language to the place where things and words a conjoined in their common essence which allows a name to be given. But once the name is given all the movement of language that has led to the name is reabsorbed into it and dissolves. This is why name is the end of discourse, because it destroys the very

possibility of speech by completely exhausting it. Classical experience of language moves in the constant expectation of the name. Classical discourse is

> linked with rhetoric, that is, with all the space that surrounds the name, causes it to oscillate around what it represents, and reveals the elements, or the adjacency, or the analogies of what it names. The figures through which discourse passes act as a deterrent to the name, which then arrives at the last moment to fulfil and abolish them. (*Order* 117-118)

Foucault claims that all classicism tended towards accurate naming, towards naming things by their name. "The fundamental task of Classical 'discourse' is to ascribe a name to things, and in that name to name their being. For two centuries, Western discourse was the locus of ontology". (*Order* 120)

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From the seventeenth century language started to be something that represents representation. That is to say, the being of language was entirely reduced to its function within representation. The main feature of language started to be its ability to provide a representation with the signs by means of which it can unfold itself in obedience to a necessary order.

Not just a language starts to be represented as encyclopaedic dictionary, but the world starts to be perceived as an encyclopaedia.

Thus language started to be something that requires an efforts of ordering and the word 'child' is the result of such an effort – an effort which makes it a part of the dictionary.

Only such a shift has made it possible for the concept of a child to become grounded on the representation, and for the word 'child' to become an abstract entity which is determined as a general concept and which in a clear way denotes some part of reality.

This new way of functioning of the notion of the child is reflected in the following passage from Aries:

> Churchmen or gentlemen of the robe, few in number before the sixteenth century, and a far greater number of moralists in the seventeenth century, eager to ensure disciplined, rational manners. They too had become alive to the formerly neglected phenomenon of childhood, but they were unwilling to regard children as charming toys, for they saw them as fragile creatures of God who needed to be both safeguarded and reformed. (*Aries* 132-133)

For the moralist child was something that represents a part of reality that should be formed in accordance with norms of morality – something that has to be educated. That is to say, moralist represents such a standpoint and such direction of the look, which detects a child in its new sense. Simultaneously the condition of possibility of such standpoint and such direction of the look is that the child has become a part of representational thinking.

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Philippe Aries indicates indifferent mixing of ages in medieval society. He states: "children mingled with adults in everyday life, and any gathering for the purpose of work, relaxation or sport brought together both children and adults". (*Aries* 37)

Later, out of that mixture, the child was allocated as that which is opposed to the adult. As a result, in everyday life children became separated from adults. It was no longer desirable that children should mingle with adults, especially at table. (see *Aries* 131)

This separation of the child from the adult was the result of crystallization of the child as the general notion, the notion that provides knowledge about the reality, which it represents and dictates certain rules with respect to this reality.

From the general mixture of ages the child was allocated already for some reason, already with a certain purpose: since from the very modern notion of child follows that she is not yet an adult, it means that into the concept of child is already inscribed a correct way to behave with regard to her, and this inscription provides an answer to the question why the child was separated: what one should do with a child is to form an adult out of her.

Modern notion of the child appears as a representation of reality which should be transformed – the child is the one who has to be turned into the adult. Modern child was invented as that which is imperfect, incomplete and coarse in comparison with adults.

> The child was no longer regarded as amusing or agreeable: 'Every man must be conscious of that insipidity of childhood which disgusts the sane mind; that coarseness of youth which finds pleasure in scarcely anything but material objects and which is only a very crude sketch of die man of thought' […] 'Only time can cure a person of childhood and youth, which are truly ages of imperfection in every respect'. (*Aries* 131-132)

When the modern concept of child together with its structural element – the incompleteness of a child - started to gain ground, the common position was not to adapt to this incompleteness, but to study it and to correct it.

Texts of the late sixteenth century and the seventeenth century provide many comments on child psychology. Children started to be an object of special attention, "this interest calls for the development in them of a faculty of reasoning which is still fragile, a determined attempt to turn them into thinking men and good Christians." (*Aries* 132)

The general socio-moral position of that time was expressed in attempts to reconcile sweetness and reason:

> the Abbe Foucault, a counsellor at the High Court, writes in Le Portrait d'une honnete femme: 'Familiarizing oneself with one's children, getting them to talk about all manner of things, treating them as sensible people and winning

them over with sweetness, is an infallible secret for doing what one wants with them. They are young plants which need tending and watering frequently: a few words of advice offered at the right moment, a few marks of friendship and affection given now and then, touch them and bind them. A few caresses, a few little presents, a few words of cordiality and trust make an impression on their minds, and they are few in number that resist these sweet and easy methods of making them persons of honour and probity. (*Aries* 132)

In the late seventeenth century the process of final separation of the child from the adult was completed. Children were placed in a kind of quarantine which preceded their release into the world. This quarantine was school.

This practice was the embodiment of the great process of moralization. And this process determined the emergence of adult and child in the modern sense of these words.

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The division into child and adult and the emergence of the concept of child which is constructed in accordance with the shift I have described here (this concept of child is the only we are capable to perceive today) became possible only with the substitution of the knowledge which is grounded on connections for the knowledge that is looking for the differences.

In this transformation, one can see the transition from the concept of child, which we cannot comprehend today (because historically infused modification of the way we think prevents us from this) to the one which we are capable to grasp, the one which is usual for us – that which is determined by the opposition adult/child; and the significative functioning of which is habitual for us: the word 'child' is a signifier, which denotes it's signified – a real child; and that which can be the part of the dictionary.

But besides all this, that is to say, besides that which today constitutes the frames of our concept of child and from what we do not feel the need to withdraw it, there is something else within this concept.

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The way in which the concept of child was conceptualized in the classical age, until now is the most familiar to us way of its understanding and usage; and the coordinate system within which this concept was defined at that time, up to our days forms it and makes it understandable to us.

As it was stated previously, in the classical episteme the word 'child' was a meticulous form of nomination that was indicating a representation.

That is to say, now the word 'child' belongs primarily to that layer of language which can become the object of classical science, but that potential of this word, which belongs to something existence of which is a necessary preconditions of any division of language into layers, is mostly neglected. According to Foucault such preconditions were preserved in a literature ("from Holderlin to Mallarme and on to Antonin Artaud"), in which they continue to fill the meaning of words.[1]

> It is probably because it (language) is arbitrary, and because one can define the condition upon which it attains its power of signification, that language can become the object of a science. But it is because it has never ceased to speak within itself, because it is penetrated as far as we can reach within it by inexhaustible values, that we can speak within it in that endless murmur in which literature is born. But in the Classical period the relation was not at all

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[1] However, my claim is that they can be revitalized and articulated in today's everyday consciousness.)

the same; the two figures fitted over each other exactly: in order that language could be entirely comprised within the general form of the proposition, each word, down to the least of its molecules, had to be a meticulous form of nomination. (*Order* 103)

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In order to understand the way name functions outside the table of representation, we have to recall an important passage from Foucault where he explains the role of Sade in our culture. It will also help us to clarify how Foucault sees literature when he claims that it is the area within which names continue to function in the mode different from the Classical one.

> […] the name ceases to be the reward of language; it becomes instead its enigmatic material. The only moment - an intolerable one, for long buried in secrecy - at which the name was at the same time the fulfilment and the substance of language, its promise and its raw material, was when, with Sade, it was traversed throughout its whole expanse by desire, of which it was at once the place of occurrence, the satisfaction, and the perpetual recurrence. Hence the fact that Sade's works play the role of an incessant primordial murmur in our culture. With this violence of the name being uttered at last for its own sake, language emerges in all its brute being as a thing; the other 'parts of oration' assume in turn their autonomy, escaping from the sovereignty of the name, and ceasing to form around it an accessory circle of ornaments. And since there is no longer any particular beauty in 'retaining' language around the frontiers of the name, in making it show what it does not say, the result will be a non-discursive discourse whose role will be to manifest language in its brute being. This proper being of language is what the nineteenth century was to call the Word (le Verbe), as opposed to the Classical 'verb', whose function is to pin language, discreetly but continuously, to the being of representation. And the discourse that contains this being and frees it for its own sake is literature. (*Order* 118-119)

Thus, Foucault supposes that with the emergence of the classical episteme, the only precedent of functioning of language outside of the classical modus was the usage of language in Sade's works. That was the place where the name again become the raw material for the language. Sade used the name for its own sake, not as a reference to reality, which is exterior to the name. This allowed the language to be manifested in all its brute being as a thing. That is, as self-sufficient phenomenon, not as a representation.

Based on these reasoning, further I will try to explore the potential of the words 'child' and 'childhood': the possibility of transforming their frames and discovering new modes of their usage.

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We must once again return to the history of the formation of the modern concept of child to consider another important constitutive element of it.

I have pointed out that the notion 'child' was part of a moral discourse, that is the name ' child' represented reality which should be formed. Another source of the constitution of the concept of child familiar to us today, was its involvement in the biological discourse.

To be more precise, the opposition child/adult that appeared in the classical age later on will be transformed by the biological discourse, out of which our today's understanding of a notion 'child' was formed. In other words the way we nowadays perceive the concept of age is inscribed in biological discourse. But initially it was free from these discourse because till the end of eighteenth century there was no biological discourse (see *Order* 127). However, there was the notion of age but it was not referring the to inner historicity of a human being because the historicity was not yet introduced into the realm of living beings, which means that life was not yet divided into phases.

Throughout the classical age, life was the field of an ontology. In post-classical period biological being becomes regional and autonomous. Before that period there was no biological discourse because there was no life: "if biology was unknown, there was a very simple reason for it: - life itself did not exist. All that existed was living beings, which were viewed through a grid of knowledge constituted by natural history" (*Order* 127-128) The biological discourse appears only with the advent of anatomy.

Thus, there was no such phenomenon as a child in today's understanding, because there was no allocated phase of life within which it would be possible to map the contours of the body of a child.

With the appearance of anatomy the homogenous and identical space of a table was shattered and the supposed continuity of time was broken. In its place there was constituted a new space of identities and differences. This new space deprived of essential continuity and from the very outset exists in the form of fragmentation.

By this classical experience of difference was completely transformed. Classical experience of difference functioned in the ontological context. The act of naming was defining the border of the being of the thing, the border that differentiates it from another thing the borders of being of which are defined by another name. Difference filled the gap between those two named beings and played a role of a link between them.

Now, however, the difference becomes more diverse:

> it multiplies itself, adds up diverse forms, reverberates and is diffused throughout the organism, isolating it from all the others in various simultaneous ways; for it no longer resides in the interstices between beings in order to connect them together; it functions in relation to the organism itself, so that it can 'integrate' with itself and maintain itself in life. (*Order* 272)

Thus a problem of linguistic differentiation transformed into as a matter of an anatomic disarticulation. (*Order* 269)

The concept of a child, which was formed as part of the identical space of the table - in the end of eighteenth century moved into the fractional space of a biological discourse.

This shift of the discourse can be seen in what Aries says of the eighteenth century concept of child. He concludes that by this time the concept of child was constituted by settings of moral discourse (which postulates the demand of education) and by newly appeared need to 'coddle'. With the shift from the discourse of representation to the biological discourse, another component of the concept of a child appeared, that is the care of child health and of the safety of her life.

Aries states:

> In the eighteenth century, we find those two elements in the family, together with a new element: concern about hygiene and physical health. Care of the body was not ignored by seventeenth-century moralists and pedagogues. People nursed the sick devotedly (at the same time taking every precaution to unmask malingerers), but any interest shown in healthy bodies had a moral purpose behind it: a delicate body encouraged luxury, sloth, concupiscence - all the vices in fact!

> General de Martange's correspondence with his wife gives us some idea of a family's private life and preoccupations about a century after Mme de Sevigne. Martange was born in 1722 and married in 1754. He shows great interest in everything concerning his children's life, from 'coddling' to education; he watches closely over their health and even their hygiene. Everything to do with children and family life has become a matter worthy of attention. Not only the child's future but his presence and his very existence are of concern: the child has taken a central place in the family. (*Aries* 133)

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Summarizing, we can denote overall changes that occurred in the discourse within which and out of which the notion of age functions.

In the space of pre-classical episteme the concept of age functions within another form of historicity. Until the early seventeenth century there existed a different from today's temporality of history. Foucault points out that until the time of Aldrovandi (beginning of the seventeenth century), history was the unitary fabric of all that was visible of things and of the signs that had been discovered in them. As Foucault states, discussing the perception of history in pre-classical period:

> The history of a living being was that being itself, within the whole semantic network that connected it to the world. The division, so evident to us, between what we see, what others have observed and handed down, and what others imagine or naively believe, the great tripartition, apparently so simple and so immediate, into Observation, Document, and Fable, did not exist. And this was not because science was hesitating between a rational vocation and the vast weight of naive tradition, but for the much more precise and much more constraining reason that signs were then part of things themselves, whereas in the seventeenth century they become modes of representation. (*Order* 129)

The classical episteme placed the concept of age in a space of a table, which is guided by the representations, and a relevant temporality and understanding of history corresponds to this placing. History was something external, and living beings were a part of a classification table. The following passage from Foucault clarifies the specifics of the historicity of classical episteme:

> The temporal series cannot be integrated into the gradation of beings. The eras of nature do not prescribe the internal time of beings and their continuity; they dictate the intemperate interruptions that have constantly dispersed them, destroyed them, mingled them, separated them, and interwoven them. There is not and cannot be even the suspicion of an evolutionism or a transformism in Classical thought; for time is never conceived as a principle of development

for living beings in their internal organization; it is perceived only as the possible bearer of a revolution in the external space in which they live. (*Order* 150)

As it was mentioned above, our today's understanding of an age is inscribed in biological discourse, the beginning of which was indicated by the appearance of anatomy.

The inclusion of the concept of age in this discourse means that this concept refers to the inner historicity of living being. In other words only in the post-classical episteme appears the space of temporality out of which today's concept of age is perceived.

2.4   Putting all together

To sum up general observations mentioned thus far, medieval discursive space was not a space of representation. World of words and things was homogeneous, words and things were not yet separated. Only from the seventeenth century it will become heterogeneous: words will start to represent reality.

It can be said that in the Middle Ages words were material, they were of the same nature with things, for this reason words and things were identical to each other, they were directly correlate with each other and even used interchangeably (word as symbol). In classical episteme words and things were deprived of direct similarities and started to be relate only indirectly – through representational thinking; they became part of the language of representation. But the materiality of the words has not disappeared, it remained in the gap of discrepancy of representation with what it represents. Materiality of the words is always there as a generating point of their unfolding into the representation.

As we pointed out, the word 'child' existed in the Middle Ages, and Aries says, that it had the different meaning from the one it has today. That is to say, the

word 'child' didn't signify that which it signifies now – human in early stage of life. Within the medieval perception of ages of life, word 'childhood' functioned as that what today we would call a metaphor, that is, not as something that points directly to a certain reality, not as something that names these reality, but as that which operates as a allegory, therefore, as that the interpretation of which requires a different course of thinking in comparison with our common sense way of thinking, that is, a way of thinking, which was constituted as a thinking of representation.

Wrong to think that word 'child' as a metaphor has emerged as a result of inspiration from the word that represents a real child, or that word that represents a real child was modified and transferred to the register of figurative metaphorical language.

On the contrary, there first appeared word 'child' as a metaphor. What is now perceived as a real child emerged only afterward – as that predetermined by the metaphor. The metaphor served as a material for the forming of words for that discourse which took advantage of this material. As a material it has been limited by this type of discourse, it started to be a representation. What we call real child today is a metaphor that was modified by transferring in a certain type of discourse.

In other words, not the word 'childhood' (as a signifier of the stage of life) have preceded the appearance of metaphor, but the metaphor has led to the emergence of childhood as a stage of individual life.

To be more precise, in the Middle Ages the word 'child' was a part of an opposition child/adult, this opposition functioned as a metaphor – it was a shifting point in multilevel interpretation (regardless of biological discourse and other contemporary discourses and regardless of the classical discourse of science, as there were no such discourses at that time).

From the seventeenth century, within the shift of the episteme, the concept of a child was captured by two newly emerged types of discourses: by a moral

discourse and by classical scientific discourse. It ceased to exist outside of those discourses.

Within this episteme the metaphorical binary opposition became a binary opposition of two presences (child/adult), one of which replaces another in time (opposition of two representations that mediate objective reality and perception).

These two presences, two representations (more precisely, the transition from one to another: from childhood to adulthood) represent the process of moral development of the individual and unfolding of biological life. This transition of presences displayed the classical view of time as a linear progression connected to the certain purpose and goal.

Today the way of perception that creates this scheme (in which one presence replaces another in the linear progress of time) is a part of functioning of common sense. That is to say, the common way of understanding what child is, is under the jurisdiction of common sense.

To recapitulate, in the Middle Ages the word 'child' existed as a metaphor (to be precise, from the perspective of today's worldview we call it a metaphor) – it was a part of a binary opposition child/adult. This binary opposition was a shifting point in multilevel interpretation – the point which existed before the appearance of individuals and their lives in the modern sense of those words.

With the appearance of the classical episteme the word 'child' was captured by such kind of discourses in which this empty, unfilled binary opposition was filled with certain content, it started to be a part of the new worldview and of language-as-representation. At that time appeared 'child' and 'adult' as words that signified a certain objective reality. They started to exist as a part of common sense, that means as that which represents some ultimate truth.

Today any usage of the word 'child' as a metaphor is perceived as a derivative of the signifier 'child' that delineates a real child. But if one modifies the part of common sense which is responsible for concepts of child and adult, she will

discover the core of this duality – the absence-presence structure, a discrepancy of representation from what it represents. That is, if one through the archaeology of this concept will return to its origins – to the place where the word 'child' was not yet a representation, which means to the beginning of this presentation out of its absence, in these case it will become possible to generate the new meanings of the concept of a child.

3   "Let us pervert good sense"

> *It is good sense that reigns in the philosophy of representations. Let us pervert good sense.*
>
> *Michel Foucault*

Good sense presupposes the existence of ultimate truth: within the religious consciousness it is a god who is the final instance of truth, within a classical scientific discourse it is an objective reality that one needs to explore in order to find out how things really are. The morality is based on the same principle – one should do a right thing, which means there is a 'right thing'.

Common sense presupposes the Outside reality which is per se unreachable but determines the existence of human beings.

Commenting on Deleuze's ideas Foucault makes a call to "pervert *good* sense" (*Theatrum* 183*)* Perverting good sense may be the only way out of the worldview that appeals to common sense. Common sense does not need to be overcome. Instead it should be perverted. The need to find a way out, to overcame it, is a need dictated by common sense, thus the need, realizing which we assert our presence within the common sense. Hence, paradoxically, the only 'way out' of common sense is the way in.

This can be explained in a different way. The requirement to go beyond the framework of common sense is determined by common sense itself. Therefore, what can be done is to get to the point of its generation, within which it is based on the lack of itself.

Here it is necessary to resort to a trick: to comprehend that there is nothing but a common sense, there is no outside of it. And in this way to pervert it from the inside, to make a breakdown in it or, more precisely, to join the rupture within the common sense, that rupture out of which it generates. And at the end to get not simply a common sense, but a perverted common sense.

3.1 Deleuze on good sense/common sense

To take a closer look on what is common sense, namely, on what is that which has to be perverted, we should start with the rethinking of Deluge's delineation of the nomadic distribution from the settled.

Common sense is the settled distribution, it implies the unambiguity of meanings, clear and precise denotations and strong boundaries between the entities. This type of distribution is carried out by means of employing fixed definitions.

In contrast, nomadic distribution is characterized by the absence of definite fixed content and clear boundaries between entities. Such distribution refers to the capturing by each entity of as much space as possible. Capturing the space – is the contrast principle in relation to the declaration of clear boundaries.

In the worldview that employ nomadic distribution there is nothing what could be perceived as an issue of life importance, nothing that would entail seriousness and as a result attaching of fixed denotations. In this worldview everything is a space of game.

The settled worldview insensibly imposes on the world strict allocation of space, while the nomadic distribution does not establish any particular meaning

for each entity[2]. Thus, within the worldview that employ this distribution human does not have any universal role. She is just one of many centres of subjectivation that are conquering space.

The fact that within the nomadic principle of distribution borders of entities are blurred, does not mean that those borders exist as a static formation, the remark that they are blurred means that the process of subjectivation is primary in relation to the borders of entities. Each entity exists through subjectivation, that is, through setting boundaries. To see that borders are blurred, means to see entities as a process and not as a static condition.

In nomadic distributions entities are measured not in accordance to their degree of proximity from a certain principle, and not it accordance to their limits. Here they are measured from the point of view of power – in accordance to which forces could take possession of an entity.

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For Deleuze, good sense and common sense are the constitutive elements of doxa. Common sense is the norm of identity, it contributes the form of the Same, while good sense "determines the contribution of the faculties in each case". (*Difference* 134) He criticizes the classical philosophy for being grounded on doxa: it tends towards the imposition of a certain pattern of the thinking process and of a certain 'correct' line of thought.

Thinking of ordinary consciousness, which is the part of doxa, is thinking of representation which is based on recognition: "this is a table, this is an apple, this the piece of wax, Good morning Theaetetus" (*Difference* 135)

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[2] In words of Deleuze: «The nomos designated first of all an occupied space, but one without precise limits (for example, the expanse around a town) whence, too, the theme of the 'nomad'» (*Difference* 85)

To the thinking of recognition Deleuze contrasts thinking of difference – the ability to awaken in thinking forces that are not the forces of recognition.

While relying on Deleuze's reflections on doxa, I would still like to direct the course of his ideas in a bit different direction, saying that the kind of philosophical thinking that it is desirable to obtain is not the one which will go beyond the common sense, and not the one which will be essentially opposed to it – such way of thinking would still remain a part of the unmodified everyday consciousness, which always presupposes certain beyond and outside. The way of thinking that does not presuppose and does not rely on any beyond and outside, that would be a true philosophical thinking.

This could be explained in the following way. Although no other meaning is possible except the common, there are possible different attitudes towards it: it is possible to have active or passive position in relation to common sense.

Passive position corresponds to the employment of meanings without them to be processed, that is, without awareness of the possibility of their processing.

Active position corresponds to the processing of commonly accepted senses as a material, which presupposes the presence of awareness of possibility to use it as a means for creativity. Such an active position embodies philosophical thinking.

Speaking about the need to overcome common sense, Deleuze, however, makes a remark which is very worthy of our attention: discussing the possibility of new faculties, he suggests that they may be revealed as that which was previously embodied in the form of common sense. That is to say, they may be revealed not in overcoming of common sense, but as the disclosure of its forms.

> For nothing can be said in advance, one cannot prejudge the outcome of research: it may be that some well-known faculties - too well known - turn out to have no proper limit, no verbal adjective, because they are imposed and have an exercise only under the form of common sense. It may turn out, on the other hand, that new faculties arise, faculties which were repressed by that form of common sense. (*Difference* 143-144)

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What is more, speaking of good sense, Deleuze suggests that: "Perhaps good sense even presupposes madness in order to come after and correct what madness there is in any prior distribution". (*Difference* 224) In other words, if one would reach the base of good sense, one would find there the madness that is the instance of its generation. I would claim that to accomplish this discovery means to pervert good sense.

"How can the unthinkable not lie at the heart of thought? Or delirium at the heart of good sense?" (*Difference* 227) Unthinkable generates thinking, and delirium generates good sense.

In relation to the delirium, good sense is always secondary (it emerges as that which corrects madness of distribution), however delirium permanently constitutes the base of good sense. Delirium in the ground of good sense – in the similar way as an unthinkable is the ground of thinking, unthinkable is that which is "absolutely different from thought which nevertheless gives it thought, gives to be thought". (*Difference* 227)

To understand the logic of discrepancy of good sense with itself, we can recall here in what way for Deleuze the paradox is opposed to good sense. The paradox is a passion, it places each faculty (elements of common sense) before its own limit: thought before the unsinkable, sensibility before the imperceptible. It also links faculties with each other: it blurs their boundaries and makes them flow into each other. The paradox is the difference within a good sense, which can not be cancelled for the sake of good sense.

Considering this reasoning of Deleuze, perversion of good sense might be described as turning it inside out: one needs to think it in such a way that will lead to the detection of its discrepancy with itself, that is, to the revealing of a space that retains the capacity of being actively processed.

Revolution in the theory of thought should be expressed in the transition to the understanding of thought as deprived of image – that is to say, thought that thinks only by means of difference, around the point of ungrounding.

Thought as abstraction, in contrast to the thought as representation, does not perceive entities as stable forms, it thinks with regard to its base, generative absence. Thought as abstraction goes beyond the traditional conjunction of words and things.

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The same general logic is at work when Deleuze discusses I and the Self. He states: "both the I and the Self each begin with differences, but these differences are distributed in such a way as to be cancelled, in accordance with the requirements of good sense and common sense". (*Difference* 257)

In this context, Deleuze reminds us about a great discovery of Nietzsche's philosophy which goes under the name will to power. I and the Self must be replaced by an undifferentiated abyss, thus they must be overcome but not through the elimination of individuation. Deleuze states that what cannot be replaced is individuation itself. Such overcoming takes place as a result of returning to the foundation of I and the Self, thus of discovering of beginning of individuation, when it is still a difference capable of generating.

According to Deleuze, Individual doesn't find her psychic image in the organization of the self, but rather in the fractured I and the dissolved self, and in the correlation of the fractured I with the dissolved self. In other words we should not think about I and self as of a solid entities, rather as of a process of individualization which as its basis has dissolved self.

Those Deleuze's thoughts from the *Difference and Repetition* are summarized in the following passage:

> It is the empty form of time which introduces and constitutes Difference in thought, on the basis of which it thinks, in the form of the difference between

the indeterminate, and the determination. It is this form of time which distributes throughout itself an I fractured by the abstract line, a passive self produced by a groundlessness that it contemplates. It is this which engenders thought' within thought, for thought thinks only by means of difference, around this point of ungrounding. It is difference or the form of the determinable which causes thought to function - in other words, the entire machine of determination and the indeterminate. The theory of thought is like painting: it needs that revolution which took art from representation to abstraction. This is the aim of a theory of thought without image. (*Difference* 276)

3.2   An Outside that is right here

The basis of scientific methodology is premised on the thinking as representation (Vorstellen). In this respect science presupposes the particular way of pursuing knowledge.

In order to function science should explore something internal as that which is outside and extraneous to it. To recognize the internal science should see it as an external: internal should be extracted from the inside and putted in front of the scientist, and only in such a way it can be explored. It might be called a mistake (the exploration of internal as external), but even if it is a mistake, it's the only way for science to start its exploration.

This principle started to be visible to the science itself and the contemporary development of science is guided by its understanding of that principle of its functioning. For example, we might claim that the difference between quantum mechanics and classical mechanics is that concepts of quantum mechanics no longer functions as the notions that describe objective reality which is not dependent on the position of the observer, within the quantum mechanics framework there is no observer-independent objectivity, the observer and that which is being observed are inextricably linked, thus, observer is the one who in

a way participate in 'formation' of new reality. That means that quantum mechanics already functions on the basis of understanding of the principle that what science explores as outside is something internal, something to generation of which it is directly involved.

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Reflections on the necessary fallibility of the scientific method are also applicable to the explanation of functioning of common sense.

Great Outside is not something that doesn't exist. Yes, it is a fantasy, an illusion, but that doesn't mean that something illusion of what it is does not exist. Great Outside is the only possibility to see and to articulate the real that is right here. It can be articulated only as something distanced and only as a fantasy.

Common sense is an appeal to something that is outside. If we assume that there is no any other sense except the common (there is no other possible sense except the sense which functions as a representation) there would still remain a possibility within it to discover that something that is perceived as located outside - is nothing else but something that is within (right here), namely to discover that this outside is a way of articulating what is right here.

For this reason, it might be worth not to deny the great Outside (toward what philosophy of postmodernism tends) but to make it itself a common sense active and movable – to generate new senses, not to deny the old ones, not to negate meanings affirmating nothing in return.

3.3 Passivity and activity of common sense

Thus, there is no need to get rid of common sense. The possibility of an active position requires common sense. For the one who is in the active position,

common sense is the material with which she works. It is something passive, working on which the active constitutes itself as active. Something passive must necessarily exist as that against the background of which and through which the active can generate itself.

The active, creative is not a work with nothing. The work of active at the initial stage transforms something into the material (reveals something as passive). As a result of this transformation, the active starts to be able to work with the passive, that is, to use it as the material to work with.

Thus, the common sense is the material for the work of recycling. We don't have another material to work with. Therefore, common sense is not that which has to be overcome, but something that needs to be perverted from within.

The difference between common sense and perverted common sense is that in case of the former meanings are related to that what they denote in a certain prescribed manner, while perverted common sense questions this manner through returning into the layer where the relations are not set, where they still are in a state of development. Perversion of common sense is an immersion into "the context of living thought" (*Difference* 154), but also in the space of uncovering of the novel sensibility.

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Common sense is the sense which seems to be the changeless given of verbal reality, that is, the sense that plays role of immediate natural knowledge, it is already constituted sense, accepted, and recognizable in the society. To put it simply, common sense is the mode of meaning in which senses seems to be obvious. The common sense is the only possibility for realism. To be a realist means not to look for the way out of the common sense.

There is nothing else except or beyond the common sense because sense is something recognizable, i.e. social, if it is not socially recognizable, it is a non-

sense. Thus, to be a socially recognizable is the only possibility for sense to function.

Yet there is also a process of becoming socially recognizable meaning. This does not imply that the new meaning, which becomes common, initially goes beyond common sense or is not covered by it. That which becomes a common meaning, arises out of the initial lack of its social recognition. That is to say, the very lack of initial acceptance within the common sense constitutes the possibility and the material for the new meaning.

Generating power of the common sense, through which it annihilates itself, allows common sense to overcome its passivity. Perversion of common sense is still the same common sense, it is just perverted. It can be claimed that any perversion is always a perversion of common sense, it is not that which go beyond common sense. Even if it annihilates common sense, by this it activates common sense, it returns it the point of its generation. If perversion is strong enough to exist, it attains the form of common sense, in other words, it materializes as constitutive element of common sense.

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It is possible to distinguish several dimensions of existence of words. In a dimension that is most consistent with the nature of language, words exist in a chaotic state: they are mixed, liquid and unstable, they flow into each other and form accidental unities. Common sense renders words in a dimension that is characterized by certainty and clarity.

These two dimensions co-exist not in such a way that words initially are present in the first dimension and with time are transferred to dimension of common sense. Words actualize their existence only in this second dimension, in a dimension of chaos words exist always only retroactively.

Retroactivity of their presence in their natural chaotic state is the ontological

condition of their existence in the dimension common sense, the only dimension of their actual existence.

The meaning of words is not determined by the will of the individual. Rather, the individual is involved in the movement of language and interacts with it: she serves its interests and uses it to her advantage. Words mutually determine each other, their meaning depends on with what words they form linkages. This implies that language functions in accordance to its own internal rules, and not in accordance to the rules that the individual has invented.

Therefore, development of a new meaning of the word does not mean taking an active position of assign a meaning to it, it rather means taking simultaneously passive and active position of involvement in the generational movement of language through which the individual simultaneously transforms into someone who is capable of joining the natural process of decomposition of the formed meaning of the word (takes a passive position) and, as a result of passive position, enters into active interaction with generational flow of language, that is, becomes the supportive force for the process of generating of the meaning of the word (takes an active position).

To be able to join the generational flow of language means to be able to become a part of the universal game, that is, of the play of active forces against the forces of decomposition. This means to abandon seriousness, which is a barriers separating us from the play.

This also means to transform the most serious concepts into toys, thereby returning them to the sphere where they are in their natural state, that is, the state in which there are no ready-made meanings of words, the state where those meanings are always only appearing as always only provisional. In this state words exist in a condition of a free motion and their meanings are determined by their contingent encounters with each other.

3.4   Material and form

Work of philosophy and thinking process in general may be considered in a similar way, as the structure of the narrative is understood in in the theory of literature. Two basic elements can be distinguished in the narrative: material and form[3]. Material is something that is taken from 'real life', that which is ready-made. The form is a special way of arrangement of material.

Philosophical texts and the process of thinking is the work of processing of the given material, that is, of that, which was obtained by practical experience. This is so because there could be no other nutrition for thinking and philosophizing. Therefore thinking and philosophizing do nothing else except distribute in a new way already given material. Common sense is the embodiment of that material, that is to say, concepts and practices that it is filled with (for example, the meaning of a concept of child as it functions in everyday sphere and practices associated with it) are the material for philosophical processing. The work of philosophy is only to draw special lines in the material that is already given.

There is no form outside of the material. Form is a special distribution of material through finding in itself the potential for transformation.

Vygotsky schematically shows material as a straight line and the material that was processed into a literary work as a curve. (see *Vygotsky* 145-65)

To work with the material means to curve a straight line (which represents the source material: what happened in 'real life'), thus the curve (which represents that which was 'invented' in the story) is not simply something added to the straight line. Curve is a very transformation of a straight line.

It is possible to transform the material only by finding in it the state of its inconsistency with itself, which constitute its emptiness, and by entering into

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[3] Here I rely on Vygotsky's view on theory of literature.

interaction with this emptiness: to be transformed the material should resist and vibrate.

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Theological consciousness tends to such kind of perception that divides everything into form and its content, at the same assuming that the form is primary and determines the content, thus the content is the medium through which the form is affirmed. While the philosophical outlook is based on the understanding that all that is are material and form, and in this division material is primary, and form is an intrinsic characteristic of the material, or better to say its condition.

Theological consciousness thereby imposes simplified interpretation of the world, trying to bring everything under certain clear categories. On the contrary, scientifico-philosophical consciousness is governed by no indisputable ready-made categories, moreover, it is guided by the research, and does not know in advance to what output this research will lead. It does not impose ready-made forms on the material, asserting their primacy and sacredness. It explores the possibilities of material to generate forms, and through this becomes the participant of this generation.

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The work of common sense consists in operating with representations. Representational thinking masters reality by breaking it into sections in accordance with pre-existing forms

The material is the unpresentable, shapeless, formless, it is the boundary of representable. However, that unpresentable is a possibility of any representation, in the same way as material is a deformation of the form, which is at the same time the ground of its formation. Material is the level at which there is no

clarity, on which it is always just starting to appear. Once it appears, it means that the work of representational thinking was accomplished – material was shaped into the form.

Representational thinking is thinking with solidified forms, it is not capable to recognize the form as an emerging. The state of incompleteness of the form and of formlessness of the material is unknown to it. Within the representational thinking the relationship of words and things is always already definite, it does not see it as a changeable and flexible. Representation thinking relies on the illusion that the true is not emerging, but exist.

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Every act and every activity is an expression of relationships of material and form, each interaction is a manifestation of this relationships. It is so in case of words and in case of things, in case of human interaction with the word and in case of interactions of things regardless humans.

Such division of reality on material and forms does not imply the necessity of relation to any transcendent factor, whether divine or platonic. On the contrary, it is intended to show immanent capability of material to generate forms. Material has inherent morphogenetic potential: it is a material that produces forms, however forms are not merged into one with it. There is no essence of a form. Form is a certain patterns of stability of the material. Such pattern could be applied on different levels of its transformation.

Forms are homogeneous layers in material. Form is such a state of the material, within which it started to be stable enough for the difference to be set between that state and more unstable states of material. Moreover, forms may themselves serve as a material for other forms.

The form appears when the material gains integrity, when some part of the material form the integrity that transcends the compound of it's elements.

Being formed, material does not cease to be the material, it only becomes more stable. Integrity is a state of stability. Destruction of stability means that the material returned into a state of plasticity.

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The way in which I use the term 'plasticity' in some crucial points parallels with Catherine Malabou's understanding of it. She explains plasticity by indicating the same instances, to which I appeal in this work.

> […] plasticity signifies the general aptitude for development, the power to be moulded by one's culture, by education. We speak of the plasticity of the newborn, of the child's plasticity of character. Plasticity is, in another context, characterized by 'suppleness' and flexibility, as in the case of the 'plasticity' of the brain. Yet it also means the ability to evolve and adapt. (*Future* 8)

In the most general sense she interprets plasticity as the plasticity of Being. In Heidegger's footsteps Malabou states: "Being is nothing but its plasticity" (*Plasticity* 36)

She declares that existence is not inoffensive grammatical or logical category, it reveals itself as plasticity, as the very material of presence. It is capable of receiving any kind of form and it has power to give form to itself. It is the stuff of things – it has the power to shape and to dissolve contours of individuality. It is a mobility of identity. Plasticity is that what is in the middle between an excess of reification (the congealing of form) and an excess of fluidification. (*Plasticity* 81)

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Plasticity is a passion within apparently calm and ordered space. It is simultaneously a level of decline and of generation, disappearance and appearance, of blurring and tracing limits.

What escapes from the perception of the settled common sense is the base network of conceptualization: such level of intensity of plasticity, on which everything exists in undifferentiated way, and on which their appearing as limited and differentiated is only a potential.

Formed entities and concepts lose their memory about how they emerged, they turn into representation and are no longer capable of stimulating the generation. Only returning to them this memory (memory that once they didn't exist) can open the access to the level of generation and production of new meanings.

To accomplish this, common sense should be deformed, that is deviated from its inertial motion. Each concept should be absorbed by the element of uncertainty to become only something vague, only the centre of subjectivation that produces its borders. In other words, for the possibility of new content to appear, word should lose its contents, that is, should become deformed and undifferentiated.

3.5 Within the problem field

To return to the concept the memory that once it didn't exist - means to perceive it as an opening of a certain problem field, and not as self-sufficient and self-identical phenomenon.

Questions are usually perceived as less important than answers, as that which is just a transitional stage on the way to possessing answers. However, the question may be perceived as by itself a positive and assertive phenomenon – as the opening of the problem field and decision for the active research.

Therefore, to doubt the notion of a child, to put it under question – that is, to detect some problem field – is not a negative, but positive venture.

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Erroneousness of the concept is corrected when concept is perceived as a question rather than as an answer, as a problem statement. That is, as something false, which is the mode of searching for the true.

To see the concept as a question, to return it from the form of an answer to the form of a question and maintain it in this state – means to keep it in the form of empty space which is not yet filled.

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Deleuze argues that the questions and problems belong to the unconscious, and the answers and solutions belong to the conscious (see *Difference* 106-108). Unconscious is not characterised by limitation, no opposition. It is serial, problematic and questioning. The unconscious concerns problems and questions which can never be reduced to the great oppositions or the overall effects that are felt in consciousness.

The unconscious knows no negation, since its existence is the existence of the problem field, it does not know distinction between 'yes' and 'no', and there is nothing in it with what the form of contradiction could be filled. Only consciousness, because it deals with the answers can either deny or affirm, and only consciousness can make contradiction.

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The problem field is an area of generating the truth in thinking. While solutions are movements on defined tracks, they do not generate only cover with themselves an area of generation. Thus, the problem can not be exhausted by its solutions.

Thinking as an active processing of reality can only begin with the destruction of the "I" (with the "fractured I", to use the terminology of Deleuze), that is, it can only start from the point of powerlessness and passivity, which is at the same time the point of generation.

Deleuze suggests that fractured I is the unconscious in thinking, thus, it represents the domain of question. Consciousness corresponds to domain of solutions that only partially can actualize the potentiality of questions.

Thinking originates from the point of dissolution of thinking. Fracture is what is primary in thinking, in other words, thinking can only start with the destruction of the system of thought.

> Thought is primarily trespass and violence, the enemy, and nothing presupposes philosophy: everything begins with misosophy. […] The conditions of a true critique and a true creation are the same: the destruction of an image of thought which presupposes itself and the genesis of the act of thinking in thought itself. (*Difference*, 139)

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What is necessary is to invent tasks themselves - that will retain dialectical movement answer/question, thus will not let the questions to be exhausted by answers.

To protect the problem field from its exhaustion by answers means to effectively confront the moral vision of the world (thus, the unperverted

common sense), which is expressed in the endeavour of common sense to explain everything to the end. To suspend the problem field is to assume that something can be completely understood, while a perverted common sense is an abstinence from excessive explanation.

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The employment of the concept of the problem, understood in a deleuzian sense, fundamentally transforms the notion of education – henceforth it is no longer a process during which learners solve problems, while the teacher is the one who knows the answer and monitors the progress of its solution. From now on the insufficiency of solutions itself and the inexhaustibility of problems constitutes a process of education.

The transformed understanding of education points out the appropriate place to draw distinguishing line between the process of attaining knowledge and the process of learning. The confidence in the existence of correct and final solutions corresponds to the process of attaining knowledge, while the confidence that what is important is the problem itself and there are no exhaustive solutions to it, corresponds to the process of learning.

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To learns means to enter the world of problems, to find yourself in the unknown situation and make an attempt to adjust yourself to it. This adjustment results in a change of the body and language. It is insufficient to talk about it in terms of the transmission of knowledge as information. Knowledge physically changes the recipient, thus, it is impossible to be unbiased carrier of information.

The understanding of education as of transmission of information corresponds to the logic of settled common sense: it presupposes the existence of invariable truth and the possibility of its transmission from the carrier to the recipient. The

understanding of education as of learning corresponds to the logic of perverted common sense: within it the knowledge itself (the sum of which forms the common sense) is considered insufficient and consequently is recognised as such that needs its further processing.

3.6   Pedagogical model in our society

Foucault, commenting on Deleuze's Difference and Repetition, speaks of the pedagogical model in our society:

> We all possess good sense, we all make mistakes, but no one is dumb (certainly, none of us). There is no thought without goodwill; every real problem has a solution, because our apprenticeship is to a master who has answers for the questions he poses; the world is our classroom. A whole series of insignificant beliefs. But in reality, we encounter the tyranny of goodwill, the obligation to think "in common" with others, the domination of a pedagogical model, and most important, the exclusion of stupidity (bêtise) - the disreputable morality of thought whose function in our society is easy to decipher. (*Theatrum* 181)

Using this logic it is possible to explain infantilism of our society. The domination of a pedagogical model means that it is commonly presupposed that there exist a certain knowledge, those who can learn and those who can teach – model that defines the meaning of childhood spread throughout society. Society as a large classroom.

If we are to pervert commonly accepted model of childhood (the child is someone who needs to be educated, because she does not know something), the modified version would be: the child is someone who herself has the ability to learn and realizes it. Society, which will function mirroring this version of the concept of childhood, will cease to be infantile in the ordinary sense of the word.

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With this transition, the situation is changing in such a way that there is only thinking that remains, there is no object, which is imposed as a compulsory for the process of thinking. It remains only learning, however there is no one who teaches, no one who learns and there is no something, which is learned. Learning without the ultimate goal, thus it could not stop, cannot be accomplished.

Therefore here the buck-passing is impossible and it is impossible to appeal to the ready-made knowledge and proper answers on question 'What to do?'.

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In respect to the quoted passage from Foucault it is also important for us to understand what does expression "the exclusion of stupidity (bêtise)" means. Stupidity (bêtise) is excluded, hence only a mistake is possible – that which is contrary to good sense, something that should be pointed out because of goodwill, something we need to get rid of, something against which the conventional good sense is in revolt.

Neither true nor false stupidity does not fit into the frameworks drawn up by representational thinking. Representational thinking avoids stupidity, because stupidity is not just a mistake, not just a discrepancy with knowledge and with a good sense, not the mere fact of society and character, but rather the structures of thinking as such. (*ÜberReader*, 275) Stupidity not only doesn't violate the laws of logic, but is relying on them, eager to master the truth.

As Deleuze explains:

> Stupidity can then be no more than an empirical determination, referring back to psychology or to the anecdotal — or worse, to polemic and insults — and to the especially atrocious pseudo-literary genre of the sottisier. But whose fault is this? Does not the fault lie first with philosophy, which has allowed itself to be convinced by the concept of error even thought this concept is

itself borrowed from facts, relatively insignificant and arbitrary facts? The worst literature produces sottisiers, while the best (Flaubert, Baudelaire, Bloy) was haunted by the problem of stupidity. By giving this problem all its cosmic, encyclopaedic and gnoseological dimensions, such literature was able to carry it as far as the entrance to philosophy itself. Philosophy could have taken up the problem with its own means and with the necessary modesty, by considering the fact that stupidity is never that of others but the object of a properly transcendental question: how is stupidity (not error) possible? (*Difference* 151)

Pedagogical model can only work on the basis of the concept of error, it diminishes the phenomenon of stupidity to mere facts. It is so because the stupidity is connected with thinking, though as something that is opposed to it; and an error is connected with the search for the right answer that already exists somewhere, as something, which is opposed to it. Already existing correct answer, which is in contrast to an error is a good sense.

Good sense has nothing to do with thinking, unlike the stupidity. To answer the question 'What is stupidity?' is to answer question "What it means to think?". "Reformulating the question of stupidity is another way of stating the interrogatory challenge, 'Was heißt Denken?'. What calls forth thinking, or why is it that we are still not thinking?". (*ÜberReader* 257)

Pedagogical model of our society is not something that teaches to think. It is based on cycling of the correct knowledge, it presupposes bearers of this knowledge, and the process of its transferring.

Child in today's meaning of the word could appear only within the pedagogical model. Child is someone to whom the correct knowledge is transferring to, this process has nothing to do with the teaching to think. To put it in another words, the child is someone who makes mistakes therefore to educate her means to correct the mistakes she makes.

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So, our society embodies a pedagogical model. It's not a defect of society, nevertheless pedagogical function is too exaggerated.

Pedagogical (not only in relation to children) exists not as something temporary, not as something that having executed its function becomes unnecessary. The pedagogical element becomes unnecessary only in case the one who studied has become independent as a result of education.

Pedagogical function exists as an instance of the answers to the questions, as a place of ultimate truths that are supposed to be placed in the minds of learners. It exists not as something that liberates but as that which imposes itself, unduly asserting its necessity, which commands that the individual needs this instance.

In the very excessiveness of pedagogical function lies the initial fallacy of pedagogical model of society. To correct this fallacy means to keep pedagogical model only to the extent to which it does not enslave, thus to which it releases the ability to think independently. In other words to the extent to which it makes children become adults and not vice versa: affirms the childhood as not passing in the real adulthood. To the extent to which it nourishes the individual who does not need mentors, and not those who are looking for them.

4 Processing the concept of child

The one who is totally integrated in the complete social order cannot and does not want to transform the given order. She initially has no need for that.

She needs to follow some rule, which is external in relation to her. She appears as embeddedness into it, as its part. Her existence is limited by her being a part of external order. She does not put this order under a question. The scope of this order is her comfort.

She possesses no mechanisms of nihilization: she has no doubts, so she can't reset her knowledge, and therefore can't learn something new. She removed this mechanism out of herself, to protect the passiveness of her life.

4.1 Childhood as external structure

With rise of Protestant ethics in sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the feeling of guilt was internalized: the norms of morality started to be external necessary requirements, the obligation to follow which was places in the domain of personal responsibility. The structure childhood\adultness became outside: it started to be a part of the moral order, that is, the dominance external force, moral category.

Child is the one who is taught, formed into an adult. In other words, there is a ready-made path in which she has to fit in, and by passing which she will become a grown up.

Childhood became the category under control of external social order, so it cannot be not monitored by the existing social norms and standards (in the definition of childhood is already placed the necessity to control the satisfiability of implementation of this definition, for the childhood should remain in the way it is represented in the definition) If it breaks out of the

pressure of control, that is, if the external path formation from child into adult is not imposed in full – such setting would consider as unacceptable in society, as something that should be condemned and punished by it.

The only model of behaviour, which is acceptable to reproduce in the relationship with the child is the one where the roles of an adult and a child are embodied, that is, where the former purposefully forms the later. Even in case another type of communication takes place – even if the child is treated as an adult – it is done only for the educational purpose, that is, this communication is only an imitation of the way adults communicate with each other. It is not possible to embody any other type of communication, what is permissible is only reproduction of described pattern, any deviations will signal that those who communicate need help, advice or other intervention of society.

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Thus, the structure childhood/adulthood moved to the external dimension, became external structure. It exists as an external social category, as a ready-made social pattern, in which everyone supposed to be embedded (within the moral and biological discourses).

The whole society that surrounds the creature called child, especially her parents, watch over that integration (embodiment into the ready-made social pattern) to be fulfilled. In this way society creates a child and parents are those who are primarily responsible for child to be a child. They assert the child as a child.

It can be argued that the structure of the child/adult as part of a common sense represent the movement of disciplinary power (in Foucauldian sense), which acts as a force that blocks the submersion of this structure to the inside by keeping it outside.

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When the category of the child was moved to the outside, it was given into the power of settled common sense (common sense should be understood here as shifting responsibility onto some external force). By making the child the part of this external order, by connecting it to this externality, there was blocked the possibility for internal resistance and self-reformation.

The structure adult\child was moved from the inside to outside and become total, its access to the inside was barred. Now it is possible to become involved into it only as into external.

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As a part of the thinking-as-representation, of the common sense and the related with it pedagogical model of society the child can only exist as something that supposed to be formed from the outside.

Replacement of common sense by the perverted common sense and replacement of the widely accepted model of a mistake by the model of stupidity will allow for the structure adult/child to become internal. Being internal it will function as an endless process of learning through repetition and renewal of the dialectical movement adult/child.

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Practices connected with children constitute the very phenomenon of the child. The way we act with children changes the object of an act. There is no knowledge about the child outside of this constitutive acting. The understanding of the principle of knowledge as practice disables perceiving of the structure child/adult as the external and the unchangeable one.

To understand that the knowledge about the child is the practical one and does not exist outside of the practices which are connected with the children means to become capable to recognise it as internal one, thus changeable.

Therefore the concept of child is the question of the practice. To discover its practicality means to discover it changeableness.

This also means that the concept of child is not linked with practice as that which regulates it, thus it is not linked through the regulation. Practices connected with the child and the very shaping of the concept of child are linked on a more profound level (more plastic) than the level of regulations.

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Modern common sense is constituted on the same principles as the Classical episteme: each word takes its prescribed place, each word is perceived as such that can be exhausted by a prescience definition, each word is a representative of a certain part of reality.

The word 'child' started to be perceived as clear, as not demanding an effort of thought. Present common sense suggests ready-made interpretation of this word. Thereby common sense turns it out – removes it from its internality, from the only space where it could attain its self-generating power. This process is part of the extroversion of the very common sense when it becomes deprived of its generational force.

It seems so obvious to us what does the word 'child' mean, that the child is no longer an adult, and the adult is no longer a child. The problem with that is not that this knowledge or perception is not correct, it's that in regard to this knowledge there appears a feeling of clarity and completeness of knowledge.

4.2 There is no truth about child

Word 'childhood' is now part of the discourse, which imposes ultimate truths, discourse which presupposes the possibility of completeness.

Our language works in that way that there does not appear any reason to doubt the words that we use. The word that one utters in the conversation already has a strict definition and there is no mechanism in our everyday language to form new meanings of the word. The new meaning is something what language of common sense excludes of itself.

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There is no truth about the child, which can be revealed. We can employ here Deleuze's understanding of truth, for truth for him is not something that can be discovered, but something which is always generated. He states: "In every respect, truth is a matter of production, not of adequation". (*Difference 154*). In this sense, the truth about the child does exist, but it does not exist anywhere outside of the concept of child. There is no such reality, due to correspondence to which, the concept of child may be counted as true, and because of non-correspondence to which – false. The truth about the child is the practice of thinking centred around the concept of child. It is the involvement in the generation of this concept, the absorbing of its materiality. It can be said that the condition of truth, is the lack of truth. In order that the truth could exist (that is could be generated), there should be no pre-assigned truth.

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Thus, the child is not something concerning what there is the ultimate truth. Any theorising is not the discovery of the truth, it is the process, out of which the truth results.

Since there is nothing substantial in the child, there is no outside of common sense of the concept of child and there is no inside to it either. In other words, if the concept of child exists at the expense of non-coincidence with itself (that means it every time does not fully coincide with itself), then there is no scope of this concept, and hence there is no such thing that can be overcome, and there is no such thing as identical or internal of the concept that one can refer to.

Generation of the concept assumes the capturing of area of materiality and the drawing of limit scope of the concept, which makes it possible to separate the internal of the concept from its external.

The limit scope of the concept together with the corresponding division into external and internal of the concept, to identical and alien (non-identical) appears only as a result of activation of the self-discrepancy of the concept. That is to say when the concept moves from a passive state to an active state (state of generation). Only at that point the line that separates the outer from inner is set.

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The way words 'child' and 'adult' function today (i.e. as a part of settled common sense) is conceived of as the only and ultimate reality of those words.

To move the generation of new sense in opposition to inertia of existing common sense doesn't mean that we have to go beyond or transgress the boundaries of common sense, on the contrary, it means that the generative power will function within the very common sense.

The inertia of common sense and the perception of it as of inert is caused by the weakening of the force of creativity, that is, the by the estrangement from the generative force of language - the force that could produce the distance towards 'obvious' meaning of the words and thus towards the discourse within which those words functions. An absence of such distance indicates a closure of the very space of creativity.

As Alenka Zupančič stated:

> The Real is not some authentic Beyond, constituting the true of reality. The Real is not the Beyond the reality, but its own blind spot or dysfunction – that is to say, the Real is the stumbling block on account of which reality does not fully coincide with itself. (*Shortest* 80)

If we apply this logic to reality/Real of the specific concepts (in our case of the concepts of the child and the adult) it will become apparent that the Real of these concepts is their noncoincidence with themself.

In other words, there is no ultimate truth about what child is or what does the word 'child' or 'adult' mean. What exists is the Real of those words which is not somewhere beyond of them, but on the contrary – is their most internal power which generates the meaning of those words by not letting them to attain some ultimate definition.

To undertake archaeology of those notions is to detect this gap that separates reality of those notions from itself.

The closure of the very space of creativity related to the words 'child' and 'adult' manifests it in perceiving those words as completely unproblematic. Archaeology allows us to reveal an empty place inside of those words, thus the place out of which the new sense could be generated.

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To pervert the concept of child, which is part of the modern sense, means to reveal the void in its basis, the void that is the absence of the child.

Concept of child functions as a signifier that represents some part of reality, namely, the body of the child. However, the body of the child does not exist independently of the concept of child. The fact that outside of this representation there exists no such reality that it could represent is the foundation of the

possibility of functioning of the word 'child'. That is to say, in order for the word to be capable of functioning there must exist an illusion that this reality is independent of the word.

The same principle is at works in science: it creates a the reality that it studies, but it creates it in such a way that the subject of its research not perceived as created, but as an actual, autonomous and as existing before the intervention of science and science -based thinking. This illusion is part of the methodology of science, science is impossible without it.

Another necessary condition for any cognition of the world, even scientific research, is that it starts with the discovering of something new as of the detection of emptiness – something for which there are no yet names and that at the initial stage can be perceived only as a empty space, a gap in knowledge. On the next stage of cognition this emptiness fills with the name. Hence, any type of cognition of the world, including scientific research, is the detection of emptiness and processing it into a name. To put it differently, cognition is the filling of revealed absences with names.

4.3   Detecting the mode of instability of meaning

The language of the Middle Ages is inhabited by the unlimited potential of words in the same sense in which, for example, the lack of understanding is the limitless potential of understanding, or the first sounds articulated by the infant is a potential of meaning, but not yet the meaning.

Medieval episteme represents the lack of knowledge in the sense in which it started to be understood within the classical episteme. In the Middle Ages there yet was no coherent common sense, because there was no thinking of representation.

In view of this perspective, to pervert the present common sense could mean to employ our research of medieval episteme (that is, of the period of absence of

coherence of common sense) and transition to the classical episteme (that is, to the phase of consolidation of common sense) as a starting point and the material for rethinking of modern common sense and of the concept of child as its component.

***

History consists of gaps between different epistemes, that is to say, between diverse modes of functioning of the words. Considering the research made in the first chapter we can conclude that what was called a child from the point of view of the pre-classical episteme principally differs from what is called a child today. Within the modern common sense the concept of child is constituted in such a way that, even if it is capable of revealing the concepts that are its predecessors, it reveals them by giving those concepts a 'correct' meaning, that is, the meaning which is based on its own definition, and thus it neglects the specificity of the original mode of their functioning.

To be more precise, today's concept of child – the one that appeals to someone who requires care and formation – discovers its predecessor in the medieval concept of child by claiming that it is more progressive with respect to that the reality which is now called 'child' was not adequately threated at that time. In this way, the modern word 'child' is constituted as opposed to its predecessors. The modern word 'child' delineates a biological body of the child, to which the word 'child' in the Middle Ages was not relevant.

The ability to grasp the modern concept of child and its predecessors as linearly unconnected among themselves, that is, the ability to connect them in other to disconnect displays the perversion of common sense through the unfolding of the movement of matter of language, that is, through the detection of the mode of instability of meanings, as the source of their subsequent stabilization.

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As it was already mentioned, modern perception of the child presents itself as a necessity. We are entirely subjected to the ready-made concepts of the child and adult, obliged to serve this external structure and to obey its demands.

Metaphorical language of the medieval period could be represented as noncoincidence of words and things, hence it could be said that till the seventeenth century duality childhood/adulthood was pure noncoincidence with what they name.

Out of this noncoincidence in seventeenth century thinking of representation started to generate child and adult as representations, as the part of the classificatory table. In other words, a precise place was found to allocate this difference.

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The archaeology of the notion 'child' creates or liberates the space out of which it is possible to set new meanings and generate new senses to the recognized and established notion of child.

By applying the archaeological method, by discovering the past of that concept, and by reflecting on in what way this word was functioning before it started to be a representation, we can move along the process of generating of new senses of this word.

By returning to it as to the void space, we can allocate it in a new type of discourse, which will enable the generation of new senses.

New sense could be constituted only on the basis of the lack of coincidence of the word with what it names.

Let us imagine that everyday consciousness was moved into the other that is different from today's temporality, in which there is no beginning and end of life and no life itself (in today's meaning of the word, that is, in a classical-biological sense). Within such a temporality, the concept of childhood would not disappear, as it seems at first glance. It appears to us, that this concept is inseparable from the sense, which was attached to it by biological discourse (i.e. childhood is the beginning of biological life, its stage). It seems that if the concept of the biological life will be removed, then the childhood would disappear as well. However, this is not true: it will remain and another meaning of it will be released – childhood will get the possibility to be to perceived as an renewing movement of returning to the instance where something is invented.

4.4   Changing temporality of childhood

To begin the sentence with the words "all children are …" (which is so usual for us today) means to actively participate in the constitution and maintenance of the concept of child, which is widely accepted nowadays. To generalize in this case – means to affirm the child as that which is defined being based on the principle of division between adult and child in accordance with the biological age, thus relying on the perception of time as linear progress.

As it was explained previously, the concept of child is placed today within the classical biological discourse. The notion 'child' is included in the dictionary, which provides a definition affirming this notion as a part of this discourse. The classical biological discourse is that environment where the concept of child is kept safe and unavailable for any changes.

We might claim that described mechanism is an example that demonstrates one of the ways we use to protect our life from thinking and responsibility. For the concept to be kept safe means to be explained to the end – here everything is clear and obvious: first there is a child, then the age of puberty, after which the child becomes an adult.

Danger to the thinklessness and to the irresponsibility, which expresses it, lies in such perception of the edge between the child and the adult which allows perceiving it as spanned through the whole life and as such that vibrates all the way from birth to death.

It is dangerous to the thinklessness and to the irresponsibility because being perceived in such a way this edge begins to be something that should be considered, it forces to reckon with it. By asserting the final definition of the word 'child' common sense is trying to get rid of such a perception of the edge between the child and the adult – to define it in order not to think it through, in order to stop it to be an object of thought.

By placing childhood into that temporality, where it becomes finite, that is by defining childhood as that which at a certain moment ends and by defining a child as someone who in a certain age ceases to be a child, common sense abolishes and supersede that empty space within which alone can appear adulthood.

Here is at works the same logic as with the opposition between mistakes and stupidity: by giving preference to the concept of mistake we presuppose the existence of a certain true, errorless knowledge: to reach it we need to make a shift from a mistake to a correct statement, that process represents the dialectics of correct/incorrect. If we reject the model of 'mistake' in favour of the model of 'stupidity', the latter will allow us to delineate the empty space, which is a condition for the process of thinking to begin, the condition that outline the topology within which thinking can appear.

If the potential of the concept of 'child' will be released (access to this potential is limited today by the way of perceiving, which automatically switches on when dealing with these concepts) the child will get the possibility to appear as a lack which requires overcoming, i.e. fulfilment. After all, if there is no lack, then there is nothing that has to be filled. Child as a lack of adultness, and as that which should always remain not fulfilled to the end for the adultness to be adultness.

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Consequently, one of the ways to reveal the potential of the word 'child' is to withdraw it out of the habitual temporality in which it is placed today. That is of the linear temporality in accordance with which child is understood as early period of biological life of human beings, which precedes adulthood.

Distinctive feature of our everyday thinking is to think that the child is someone who needs to be taught, because she doesn't know something and has the ability to learn. But this definition can be inverted and written in the following way: the one who has ability to learn – is a child (regardless of biological age). To have this ability means to realize it. And this realization is called 'childhood'. But, it should be noted that this definition is not a signification, it is incomplete and flexible in use, and it indicates the certain kind of condition.

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Today we perceive life as a part of linear layout – within such perception it seems to consists of two parts: the beginning (that is, childhood), when learning to speak takes place as well as the absorption of commonly accepted rules of conduct, and the actual life (that is, adulthood). Within this layout, the learning to speak seems to be something that has to stop at some point of time. It is also the case with morality: its norms are also not something that should be invented, but something that has to be accepted, thus an adult is someone who is consciously guided by accepted norms.

However, another perception of childhood is possible: the one within which there would be no such point at which ability to speak is finally mastered and there would be no utterly accepted moral guidelines, and thus there would be no childhood in the traditional sense.

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Life is not necessarily the flow of biological time, years lived by the body, not the gradual aging. It might be thought as dialectic of childhood\adulthood, the tension between them. Such point of view involves a very different temporality, the one which is dissimilar to the temporality of classical biological discourse.

Within this kind of temporality adulthood can be thought as a direction, not a phase of a life (always leading direction). Direction, which exists until the end of life. And the child can be thought as something that is always-preserved, as a condition for becoming an adult.

Thus a childness is not something that should be suppressed, but it is at the same time not something that should be released – such lines of behaviour are imposed by external ethical formations. The state of childhood is that which should always remain, so that the childness should always remain as a point from which to push off in adulthood, because adulthood exists only as this pushing off.

***

Within the coherent common sense childhood is perceived as a certain stage of developmental process. The ultimate goal of this process is to reach a coherent consciousness of the adult. Child is habitually perceived as someone who adult ceases to be, the incoherence of a child mind is that which vanishes while attaining coherence that is characteristic of the adult.

However, I claim that childhood is not something out of which the adult grows up, not that which does not fit anymore and has to be left; it is a constitutive part of adulthood. Childhood is the incoherence, that is, the mechanism that supports the functioning of a coherent mind.

To perceive childhood as ending at some point, and adulthood as definitively forthcoming means to disconnect the mind from the life-giving source which is capable of transforming it.

Childhood and adulthood are not opposites, but the same thing under show of a difference, they are experienced in each other, determined from each other, they are not merely representations of objective reality, they are the form of living organization of humans, the manifestation of the special form of life perception and of dealing with life.

***

In her work "Narrative of a Child Analysis" Melanie Klein states

> If the hope to grow up enters, the feeling of impotence in comparison to adults diminishes, which alleviates anxiety and feelings of being inferior and useless. In the adult neurotic, too, we find that his unconscious feeling that he is still a child in comparison to other people plays an important role in his impotence, in both the narrower and the wider sense. Alternatively, he might feel himself to be quite old; there seems nothing between these two extremes. (*Klein* 180)

Thus Melanie Klein replaces the 'growing up' with 'the hope to grow up'. For her there is no such thing as growing up, there is just a hope. And once it enters (which is not necessarily happened in childhood, and not necessarily once), the feeling of impotence diminishes. Furthermore, the state of being too old is the same as a state of being too young. And the opposite state of those two is a state of not being useless, therefore the state where the hope to grow up functions.

Hence, childhood (the same as adulthood) is not understood here as an age. Melanie Klein perceives transition from childhood to adulthood as a certain pattern which one can apply in order to alleviate feelings of being inferior and unpresentable.

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Childhood and adulthood does not exist as successive change of state. The construction childhood/adulthood can be embodied as a successive change precisely because it is not successive.

Elements of this constriction exist in the mode of simultaneity but not only, because as concepts they determine each other. Childhood event become such only in adult life and adult life – is the embodiment of identification with an adult in the childhood. Adulthood is a negation of that which does not exist, to be more precise, of that which exists only as this negation, thus simultaneously with adulthood and as its constitutive part.

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Deleuze's analysis of Freud's thought demonstrates another way of deploying the perception of the phenomena of childhood and adulthood as of those that do not occur one after another in time. Namely, while analysing Freud's concept of the fantasm, Deleuze points out that its two constitutive elements – infantile (pre-genital) and post-pubescent (genital) series - although succeed one another in time from the point of view of the solipsistic unconscious of the subject, nevertheless, if to consider phenomenon of 'delay', one should not speak about succession of one series by another, but rather of coexistence of two series and of resonance between them. The phenomenon of 'delay' indicates a period of time which is needed for the supposedly original pre-genital infantile scene to produce its effect at a distant genital adult scene that resembles it.

Examining this process Deleuze makes a clarification:

> In fact the two series – one infantile, the other adult – are not distributed within the same subject. The childhood event is not one of the two real

> series but, rather, the dark precursor, which establishes communication between the basic series, that of the adults we knew as a child and that of the adult we are among other adults and other children. (*Difference* 124)

Deleuze indicates that, in Freud's understanding, the fantasm is the ultimate reality which implicates something which points beyond the series. However, that does not mean that in this context childhood scene reveals itself as something unreal or imaginary. It rather means that that the empirical condition of succession in time in the fantasy is replaced by the simultaneous coexistence of the infantile and adult series.

> The phantasy is the manifestation of the child as dark precursor. Moreover, what is originary in the phantasy is not one series in relation to the other, but the difference between series in so far as this relates one series of differences to another series of differences, in abstraction from their empirical succession in time. (*Difference* 125)

***

Childhood event is accomplished with a delay, moreover, it could be claimed that it is by itself this delay.

We can apply here Derrida's understanding of a delay within his concept of difference:

> It is thus the delay, which is in the beginning. Without which, difference would be the lapse which a consciousness, a self-presence of the present, accords itself. To defer (différer) thus cannot mean to retard a present possibility, to postpone an act, to put off a perception already now possible. That possibility is possible only through a différance which must be conceived of in other terms than those of a calculus or mechanics of decision. To say that differance is originary is simultaneously to erase the myth of a present origin. Which is why 'originary' must be understood as having been crossed out, without which diferance would be derived from an original plenitude. It is a non-origin, which is originary. (*Derrida* 203)

In view of this perspective, it could be claimed that childhood as non-origin is originary. It is not a beginning but it is an instance from which something can start.

Childhood as a delay, which is a beginning, is always accomplished subsequently - already in adult life. Childhood events are always delayed and this delay represents the possibility of the beginning of adult life, its basis.

4.5   The image of childhood as a fantasy of beginning

Childhood perceived as an internal structure provides access to the ultimate space of interpretation which opens up the possibility of such re-thinking of this concept that blurs distinct boundaries of individuation – that is the space of the disappearance of the individual, thus of the return to the non-individuated passive materiality. That is the level where childhood is not someone's childhood, but actual pre-individual experience of the beginning.

Concept of a child does not denote a person in a certain period of life, above all it is a conceptualized metaphor of beginning, questioning and getting-acquainted. This particular state is ascribed to certain physical actuality, but it may be detached from it and actualized in another context. Childhood as ontological possibility can be detached from the child as biologico-moral actuality.

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The child was invented as a fantasy of origins, as symbol of ultimate beginning, as the instance of complete perfection. Childhood means innocence – something which is not yet touched with decay.

This fantasy was attached to a specific referent: individual before puberty, and within this linking was further developed. It produced actual consequences in

reality, became generator of certain progress: there started to develop practices that function on the basis of the concept of a child (paediatrics, methods of early development, children's literature and cartoons, etc.)

Though when there emerged an understanding that the joining together of the notion 'child' with what it denotes is to a certain degree flexible, appeared an chance for more efficient work with that concept, and wider range of opportunities for the generation of new practices that spring from this concept.

In other words, within the understanding of its flexibility fantasy of ultimate beginning could be more effectively modified and attached to more types of practices and in more different ways, not only to the practices that deal with humans before the age of puberty.

In such a way the concept of child was used, for example, in the case of Picasso. When his work met resistance, which was cast in the form of a complaint that "any child could do it", Picasso answered, "if an adult can still draw like a child at forty he is a genius" (qtd. in *Melly* 64).

In his response, Picasso has transformed the concept of child – the question implied understanding of a child as incompetent creature, a human in the age when she does not have professional skills. In Picasso's reply to, a child – is an image of that which is inherent to the genius – of an ability not to follow old tracks, and to generating new ones.

4.6   The lack as the ontological base of the structure child/adult

The concept of child is constituted around the lack of the child. It forms (or reforms) each time through the renewal of this lack. To put it in other words, the child is the lack which is the foundation and beginning of the formation of the concept, the lack, without which the process of formation (or reformation) would be impossible. There is no substantial link between the concept of child and that what it denotes, as well as between the child and the adult, there is only

a continuously renewable line that connects/disconnects these elements while delineating the void.

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The child exists as the absence of adulthood, as non-adult. And the adult exists as a dissolution of childhood. In this sense, the pair child/adult consists of two non-existences.

The line that separates/connects those nonexistences is vibrating and is constantly drawn and redrawn. Furthermore, this line is continuously captured by different discourses. To trace this vibration and this capturing means to trace the genealogy of those concepts and of the relation child/adult.

Child as nonexisting is a non-adult, just as an adult is a non-child. Their reality (that what is real about this relation) is the lack of them, the empty space. Their mutual lack generates constituents of this pair. They are not totally identical to themselves because their absence is the part of them.

The difference between the adult and the child is the constant internal movement, there is no such place that this difference occupies. Even if it exists, it is empty and by occupying it, the difference between the adult and the child does not fulfil it. The problem is where this movement occurs: it takes place on the stable level of common sense, in order to be revived it needs to be returned to the generative point of common sense (which is the point of its self-annihilation). This return would designate the perversion of common sense.

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Childhood becomes childhood only in adult life. The child does not realize that she is a child, she gradually takes over the adult's understanding of her. The

concept of childhood actualizes when the adult reflects on herself in the past and on the other children.

Thus, the childhood appears only in the adulthood. It appears as that, the absence of which constitutes the emergence of the adulthood. The childhood appears as already absent. But this lack creates the adulthood. It creates it as something different from itself. Thus, the childhood is nothing, but nothing which generates. It is not the foundation of the adulthood, it is the point of generation and self-abolition simultaneously.

The adult does not destroy the child she was (becoming the adult is not the cancellation of the childhood), it creates the childhood. It appears retroactively as absent. It generates as nothingness that generates. And due to this generated lack, through its abolition (and at the same time generation) appears the adult.

The adult is the one who in that which is different from herself recognises an absent in herself and whose function in relation to this absence lies in an effort to make up for that lack. Therefore the upbringing is making the adult out of the child.

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The childhood as the beginning has meaning only as something that has to be overcome, as something that is a necessary structural support for the process of growing up.

The childhood exists as that which should come to an end, the child is the one who has to stop being the child. She does not simply turn into an adult, she was originally there as an adult who has not yet got rid of her childhood. In fact, a permanent getting rid of the childhood constitutes the adulthood.

One's own child is also an occasion to join the childhood (once again to discover childhood experience), when teaching a child to be an adult (and that is the only thing they are taught) those who teach them undergo the same path

themselves. For example, in order to communicate with those, who are just beginning to learn to speak and to support their language learning, it is necessary to abstract from the familiar adult language and to undergo from the beginning the path from the affective childhood 'language' to an adult speech, which consists of the articulated phrases.

This occasion (having your own child), does not reveal its potential if the childhood is referred to as an external structure, as that which is no longer unidentified, which is already made known, where there is no space for the research, if the 'child' is something which is already known, something the investigation of what was assigned to the doctors and psychologists, who in their turn, have developed methods of rearing and education, thereby making the childhood an external structure. If, however, to return it to the domain of internal, in the area of uncertainty, the childhood will become an opportunity for those who have joined it (the child, the parents, the educators, etc.) to invent new types of communication and new forms of cooperation.

4.7 Alternative conceptualization of adulthood

As it was discussed earlier, within the folk psychology, which is a fundamental part of the unperverted common sense, the transformation of the child into the adult is perceived as the transition from the condition which is characterised by a high ability to learn, creativity and the courage which results out of lack of knowledge and imprudence (those are the characteristics of the childhood) to the condition characterised by prudence and ability for logical thinking. This type of thinking is subjected to the repressive apparatus as it is performed in accordance to strict established laws. This second condition is a condition of the adulthood, which replaces the childhood.

We can mark the adulthood understood in this way (within the unperverted common sense) as the fake adulthood. Thus the variant of definition of the real adulthood, which results out of the perverted common sense might be the following one: the adulthood is still the second type of condition, but it does not

supersede the first type of condition, in other words the real adulthood is a continuous presence of the dialectics of two types of conditions. The first condition maintains all the time abolishing the second one. And the second one constantly emerges in the place of its abolition.

It can be also claimed that the real adulthood is characterised by real courage. An adult is someone who is brave not because of the lack of knowledge and imprudence. Her courage is more real because it has a base out of which it can emerge. An adult is someone whose worldview is already complete but in spite of this completeness she is brave enough to transgress it, to doubt it. Thus the completeness of the worldview is the necessary base of the real courage.

The real adult is someone whose ability to learn is not lower than the child's one, on the contrary it is higher and more "genuine". The real adult is not someone who learns because there are things that she doesn't yet know or there are things that need to be learned, the real adult learns how to think (and the real thinking is a learning to think).

Fake adulthood is the switch from the condition which is characterised by a high ability to learn, to the condition when the ability to learn is lost, that is to say, such adulthood is the replacement of the childhood by the fulfilment of an ability to learn which leads to the cancellation of this ability. The adult is someone who is complete, she doesn't have to learn anymore.

Such idea of the real adulthood to certain extent corresponds to Kant's idea of the adulthood as the ability to perceive things that seems to be the most obvious as if they are perceived for the first time, to learn about something in such a way as if it is explored for the first time. Thus, in general, to be a real adult means to maintain the ability to doubt, to wonder.

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To clarify Kant's understanding of adulthood we should refer to the question he poses in "What is Enlightenment?". Precisely, he asks why, people who were liberated from the outside guidance want to remain the children, which means that he doesn't want to use the features of this liberation.

Kant states:

> Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-imposed nonage. Nonage is the inability to use one's own understanding without another's guidance. This nonage is self-imposed if its cause lies not in lack of understanding but in indecision and lack of courage to use one's own mind without another's guidance. Dare to know! (Sapere aude.) "Have the courage to use your own understanding," is therefore the motto of the enlightenment. (*Kant* 58)

"To remain the children" has an opposite meaning to "have the courage". People prefer to remain miners because it is comfortable. They choose the protection offered by the external instance of authority – "be it divine authority or tickled-down bureaucratic parental supervision authority". (*Shock*)

Kant states that the enlightenment (thus the process of growing up) requires nothing "freedom to make public use of one's reason in all matters".

He explains:

> The citizen cannot refuse to pay the taxes levied upon him; indeed, impertinent censure of such taxes could be punished as a scandal that might cause general disobedience. Nevertheless, this man does not violate the duties of a citizen if, as a scholar, he publicly expresses his objections to the impropriety or possible injustice of such levies. A pastor, too, is bound to preach to his congregation in accord with the doctrines of the church which he serves, for he was ordained on that condition. But as a scholar he has full freedom, indeed the obligation, to communicate to his public all his carefully examined and constructive thoughts concerning errors in that doctrine and his

proposals concerning improvement of religious dogma and church institutions. This is nothing that could burden his conscience. (*Kant* 60)

By way of explanation, inside the mechanism that works (for example taxes, priesthood) one still needs to see its imperfection, not to accept it completely, and have the strength to question what seems unquestionable. Always remains in force to change what seems to be the greatest good. That is the adulthood according to Kant.

4.8   Towards a new concept of education

As discussed earlier, the child, by definition, is someone who learns, and adult is the one who is not learning anymore, and thus can teach a child. But in the modern's world, such an understanding of child and adult becomes meaningless, since it is based on an obsolete way of life.

Modern individual is forced to lead an active lifestyle. To stay afloat, she must learn through the whole lifetime, which means that she never actually leaves the state of childhood.

Contemporary technology allows access to a wide range of information and learning is not tied to a particular institution anymore. Even a small child has no limits in her cognition of the world, other than the lack of the skills needed to search for information, and the prohibition of parents to use the Internet.

Thus, the traditional understanding of the child is on the way to disappearance. Together with the traditional concept of child, the traditional concept of the adult is also going to be vanished, for the reason that soon there will be no one who teaches as there is already a possibility for everyone to learn by themselves.

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Education was not always a phenomenon, associated with childhood. Medieval schools were not designed exclusively for children. Aries claims that in the Middle Ages there was no interest in age orientation of learning programs.

Thus, there was no tradition regarding the time order in which subjects has to be taught. Each teacher was offering his own program. Only in the fourteenth century began the process of division of school programs into levels, depending on the complexity of the subject and the age of the students. Because of the scarcity of manuscript books, and the need to rely on memory, students were listening repeatedly many of the subjects.

For those reasons, in medieval classrooms were studying both adults and children "In the medieval school all the ages were mixed together in the same classroom". (*Aries* 153)

On the subsequent phase of development of education (in which we still are today) schools have become associated almost exclusively with children – there appeared a gradation of learning programs in accordance with their correlation with age.

The next stage of evolution of education lies in its unbinding from the traditional concept of childhood. Namely, education should cease to be a phenomenon that takes place only in childhood, it should be continued throughout life.

This, in consequence, would transform the very concept of childhood since it is based on the concept of education, therefore if education will no longer be bound to a certain age, the traditional concept of childhood itself as a phenomenon associated with a certain age, will cease to exist.

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The concept of education and the concept of child mutually influence each other. Therefore in its turn modification of the concept of child cause changes in the concept of education.

For this reason, together with the blurring of the contours of the concept of child inevitably arises a new understanding of the meaning of education: the one who used to be called a child ceases to be someone who is taught, and the adult ceases to be the one who teaches. They both, to the extent to which their abilities allow, become involved in the process of cognition. In other words, the child ceases to be the object of learning, and becomes its subject.

Initially (that is, with the appearance of the modern concept of the individual) the net of social roles was structured in such a way that within it adult was someone who knows what kind of information should be kept from children in their best interest and someone who possesses the ultimate truth, which has to be conveyed to the child through the process of education.

With a modification of the concept of child situation changes dramatically. There does not remains an adult in the traditional sense of the word, that is, the one who is the bearer of ultimate knowledge and the one who knows how to rear and educate the child.

Such changes in the contemporary world as the extension of freedom of information, understanding of the impossibility of accomplishment of the process of cognition, neuroscience discovery of brain plasticity, that is, of the brain's lifelong capacity of learning and adaptive reorganization, breaks classical understanding of the adult and the child, thereby making the concepts of the adult and the child more flexible and enabling us to actively participate in shaping of a new understanding of them.

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However, within the modern common sense education is still considered to be the formation in a sense of filling with content. Only within such understanding of education one can distinguish good influence (the desirable content) from the bad (unacceptable or dangerous content, namely such that has to be removed from the one who supposed to be formed).

From within this concept of education the process of education consists of the following elements: the one who is learning (the receptacle of content); material that is taught (the desirable content), and the one who teaches (the one who distinguishes desirable content from unacceptable one, that is, decides what influence is bad, thus such that the one who is learning should be protected from, and what influence is suitable).

Today it is possible to counter a traditional concept of education by another – by the one that also is based on the phenomenon of formation, but which in case of this new concept is understood as plasticity. Within the reformed concept of education formation is no longer understood as filling with content, but as the ability to change, openness to changes, capability to be influenced.

The emergence of this new concept of education is preceded by the understanding that any solidified content, that is content which is not meant to be changed by recipient (examples of such content are final determination of one's gender identity, of sexual orientation, of any other life principles, and of meaning of all these terms) contradicts the sense of what is learning.

Within a concept of education, based on this understanding, education starts to be a affirmative phenomenon because it always gives a chance for a new ways of life to emerge.

On the contrary, within the old concept education was a negative phenomenon in the sense that it was focused on the rejection of some potential sources of influence (under the guise of protection from harmful information).

Such new concept of education does not divide the influence into good and bad. The influence is measured only by the ability to affect and to be perceived by the recipient. The only restriction here is that perceiving of this influence should not result in losing ability to be filled with the new content and to regress in ability to be affected by new influences.

The following passage from Deleuze-Guattari might be read as an instruction on how to apply in practice such new concept of education: when all experiences are acceptable, every content is suitable and there are no restricted contents, the only constraint is restriction itself.

> Staying stratified-organized, signified, subjected - is not the worst that can happen; the worst that can happen is if you throw the strata into demented or suicidal collapse, which brings them back down on us heavier than ever.

> This is how it should be done: lodge yourself on a stratum, experiment with the opportunities it offers, find an advantageous place on it, find potential movements of deterritorialization, possible lines of flight, experience them, produce flow conjunctions here and there, try out continuums of intensities segment by segment, have a small plot of new land at all times. It is through a meticulous relation with the strata that one succeeds in freeing lines of flight, causing conjugated flows to pass and escape and bringing forth continuous intensities for a BwO. Connect, conjugate, continue. (*Thousand*, 178)

5 The concept of child as a product of our worldview

Concept of a child is a mark of our civilization and a product of the way we think and perceive the world and ourselves. Our common way of thinking results out of traditional ideology of domination – the one to which feminist and postcolonial discourses are opposed.

The problem is that to criticize the concept child as a repressive apparatus, means to employ traditional way of thinking, for the reason that only within such way of thinking it is possible to comprehend what is good and what is bad thus to know exactly what should be done.

To make attempts to overcome traditional system of thought – means to continue to follow the logic of this system. A different way of thinking is needed to break through that logic: the one which would not prolong the traditional worldview, and which will be capable to process the concept of childhood into something useful, instead of just criticizing it and forcing it to be dropped (as many contemporary researchers of childhood do).

In this work I'm trying to find that way. What I want to do is not to remain within the pure theorization about concept of child but to seek how the real social transformations could be obtained and how it is possible to work out new everyday practises connected with children.

5.1 Dominant ideology

Zornado, one of the contemporary theorists of childhood, shows correspondence of the predatory hierarchy between races and genders, with hierarchy between the adult and the child. He explains that such correspondence exists because all of these hierarchies have a common origin – dominant ideology, which is "the shared, unconscious experience of the obviousness and givenness of the

individual's relationship to herself and to others". (*Zornado* xvi) Dominant ideology makes common relations highly predictable. Among others, relationships between child and adult embodies patterns of dominant ideology. Shared mind of our culture continuously echoes the necessity and inevitability of domination of the child by the adult.

The child comes into the world which is already organized in accordance with authority of adults, she is born already as an element of child-adult relationships of domination. Relationships of control are the basics for all pedagogical practises and all other interactions with a child.

According to Zornado, it is not the video games that are triggers for violent behaviour of a child. The reason of child's violence is that she starts her life as already involved in the world of violence. The pattern of relationships of power – is that what a child reproduce automatically. Moreover, in the word of violence child feels powerless and violence is the only way for her to be heard.

Within the dominant ideology to care for the child means to control her. "Contrary to popular opinion, love is an ideologically determined psychodynamic event in which the adult projects her unconscious mind as an enacted relational pedagogy". (*Zornado* xviii) That is to say, parent's love is a part of the discourse of domination - it is impossible to express love to the child from outside of that discourse. Moreover if one steps out of this discourse, she automatically will cease to be a parent or at least will be treated as a bad parent. Such logic works as well in a reverse direction: "adult's love ideologically invents the child". (*Zornado* xviii)

To put it differently, child is something that inevitably emerges within the dominant ideology, on the other hand, dominant ideology is that which each time reemerges together with a concept of a child: "when the dominant culture invents the child, the dominant culture invents itself." (*Zornado* 208)

5.2   The metaphor of wax

Roots of modern concept of a child lies in applying to the child the metaphor of the shapeless material to be formed. Erasmus is one among many others who compare child with a wax. (*Cunningham*, 43)

At the time of birth human mind is raw mass of material that should be mauled and shaped. What is born is unrecognizable lump, that has to be carved into shape.

> The child that nature has given you is nothing but a shapeless lump, but the material is still pliable, capable of assuming any form, and you must so mould it that it takes on the best possible character. If you are negligent, you will rear an animal; but if you apply yourself, you will fashion, if I may use such a bold term, a godlike creature. (*Erasmus* 305)

Locke also supposed that the child is a tabula rasa or wax to be moulded. Educator responsibility was to form a child, that is to say, to fill a tabula rasa or to mould the wax. However Locke didn't treat children as passive material, but rather as material which is at the same time passive and active. He urged to treat children as rational creatures (*Locke* 54), to encourage their curiosity and to answer all their questions carefully. This leads as to the conclusion that thinkers who contributed to the development of the concept of a child perceived children not just as those who have to be formed, but also as those who are themselves teachable: who are flexible by their nature and therefore require influence. The image of a child is an image of active perception.

5.3   The nectar of education

It should be stated here once again that from the very beginning, modern concept of child was inseparable from the concept of education.

In 1520s Erasmus was developing his theory of education and upbringing children. Among others it was Erasmus who bind together the concept of child and concept of education – those were two inseparable realities for him. He wrote that the child has "to imbibe, as it were, with the milk that he suckles, the nectar of education". (*Erasmus* 299)

For Erasmus it was much greater crime to neglect an education of the child than to commit infanticide. (*Erasmus* 307) From this it is evident that the very existence of the child was perceived as the process of education.

Erasmus associated the child with high ability to learn. The child seemed for him to be predisposed by nature towards the aims of education.

According to Erasmus learning is that which "marks our true humanity". It is another evidence that the whole project of the individual, of which the concept of child is a part, is based on the concept of formation through education. "Man curtainly is not born, but made man"(*Erasmus* 304), and to be formed into a man one needs to be educated, to "experience the influence of learning and philosophy" (*Erasmus* 305), to be exposed to "education founded on moral principles"(*Erasmus* 306).

Erasmus's perception of the child had an impact on the formation of the concept of child as part of a Protestant ethic. Cunningham points out: "The conclusions they (Protestants) reached child-rearing were very similar, and drew on Erasmus's authority". (*Cunningham*, 43)

The model child of the Protestant Reformation was expressed in the thought of a mid-sixteenth-century reformer: "Is there anything on earth more precious, friendly, and lovable than a pious, disciplined, obedient, and teachable child". (qtd. in *Cunningham*, 47)

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In the sixteenth century motherhood and fatherhood ceased to be based exclusively on kinship, from now on the parenthood became associated with educational, formative function: mother and father started to be perceived as those who form the child, and not just those who bound with her by ties of kinship.

> Women who only give birth to their children but are not concerned to raise them are hardly even half-mothers; so also fathers who supply all their children's physical wants to the point of spoiling them but totally neglect their upbringing are not even fathers in half the sense of the word. (*Erasmus* 72)

Philippe Aries concludes: "The family ceased to be simply an institution for the transmission of a name and an estate – it assumed a moral and spiritual function, it moulded bodies and souls". (*Aries* 412)

***

The newly formed relationship parents-child and educator-pupil had a religious premises – within the Christian ethics child is the one who is initially sinful as she was born out of sin, thus she must learn and obey or she will go to hell. Therefore, parents are those who can guide the child on the way of salvation, "they were responsible before God for the souls, and indeed the bodies too, of their children." (*Aries* 412)

Protestants had internalized the idea of loving and judging god – the Christian's idea of dominating god was projected into society's structures (family, school, etc.). Adult is the one who loves and judges the child.

Love to a child usually is demonstrated in dominant, even violent form, nonetheless the child should obey adults, as adults are those who want only good for the child and those who know what is good for her.

Foundation of Protestant ethics condensed in the phrase:

> God Almighty in His most holy and wise providence, hath so disposed of the condition of mankind, as in all times some must be rich, some poor, some highand eminent in power and dignity; others mean and in subjection. (qtd. in *Zornado* 14)

From within this logic emerges the concept of the individual and the concept of a child as its integral element. That is our logic of understanding of the world and of ourselves that is projected on all relationships.

One of the most widespread colonial texts of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in America was the The New England Primer. It was used as a school text. Along with the alphabet, the New England Primer included "The Dutiful Child's Promises":

> I will fear God and honour the King.
> I will honour my father and mother.
> I will obey my Superiours.
> I will submit to my Elders.
> I will love my Friends.
> I will hate no man.
> I will forgive my Enemies, and pray to God for them. (qtd. in *Zornado* 16)

5.4   Child as not-yet a man

The whole concept of modern ethics (that is Christian ethics) is based on the relation child/adult, or to be more precise, it is based on the principle which made this relation possible.

In other words, the principle on which the concept of child is based marks the foundation of all our culture. That is the principle of division on the 'not-yet-a man' and 'already a man'. For instance, the problem of domination of the male over the female has its roots in the division into the child and the adult. The

woman is 'not-yet a man'. She is on the right place when she is a girl. That is why our culture requires women to look young, thus to stay a girl.

The phenomenon of European colonialism has the same roots. Those who were colonised were perceived as children or as a child-like adults. To put it in other words, as those who need to be guided by adult colonisers.

For this reason, "children are the metaphor-of-choice for other colonizing rhetorics, which have over the years cast women, indigenous or minority-ethnic, working class, or gay/lesbian people as childish or infantile". (*Hartley* 64)

The concept of child was an ideological justification and a pattern for the enslavement of the 'childlike' colonised. "As the adult invents the child's character, the dominant culture reproduces itself via the child's ideologically determined character structure." (*Zornado* 23)

Attitude towards slaves is a reflection of the relationship adult-child: a strict discipline should be established: when slaves obey their master, they are reward, when they disobey, they are punished. And all this is done in good faith, while only master knew what is good for the slave. Colonizer is an educator as he christianizes and civilizes the slave.

It is a consequence of such specificity of the concept of child in our cuture that other cultures and otherness in general was perceived as an infantile, as a stage that we have outgrown.

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Construction child/adult, which implies that shift from the childhood to the adulthood takes place just once and in a certain age, presupposes the scheme of transition from the condition of 'not-yet-man' to 'already a man' (to become a man, to turn into a man).

The morality of common sense (which has one of its founding moments in the construction child\adult, therefore reflects it) presumes an existence of a role model 'already-a-man'. If we divide the concept of this role model into components, we come to the conclusion that there are three elements of it: the preconception about the existence of the condition of completeness of the man; the preconception about the existence of the condition of being not-yet-man (that is being someone who does not yet corresponds to the existence of a role model) and the preconception about the existence of a process of her development on the path to corresponding to the role model.

Nonetheless, the fact that the base of specificity of our culture lies in the relation child/adult not simply implies that this relation represents a repressive apparatus which once has emerged in history and which we now need to overcome because we have discovered its 'real' meaning. First of all, the relation child/adult embodies our way of thinking. Therefore, the matter is not merely to overcome it, the task is much more complicated as this relation is something what we find when trying to overcome it.

Attempts to fight the concept of child as a repressive apparatus of discipline indicate our remaining within unchanged common sense. On the contrary, to keep the concept of child and to start to perceive it as a changeable and perishable – as a plasticity –means to pervert the common sense. Within the perverted common sense the childhood might be understood not as something, which once will be replaced by the adulthood, but as something which is being replaced by the adulthood all the time. In other words, the shift from the childhood to the adulthood does not take place just once but continues all the time. Transformation of the construction adult/child has the potential to transform or abolish the structure of morality of common sense.

The perverted relation child/adult, thus the perverted common sense does not maintain all necessary components of morality of unperverted common sense. Firstly, it does not maintain a preconception about the path of development from the child (not-yet-a man) to the pattern (already a complete man). Although

some features of this path still exist, they exist in a way that overturns the whole structure that is based on the presence of the prescribed role model 'already-a-man'. Within the perverted relation child/adult the path from the childhood to the adulthood does not represent a pattern which is supposed to be embodied in someone's life in a certain age, this path rather represents a principle of moving on. Though this 'moving on' is a physical criteria, it is not simply biological, it has something to do with the process of thinking.

In the perverted scheme child/adult'there is no that kind of shift which happens just once in a lifetime. There is no longer an adult as a role model in comparison with which child is a subhuman. Within the perverted common sense, the child is a necessary component of movement to the adulthood, it is something without which the adulthood cannot appear. Here, the transition from the childhood to the adulthood is replaced by the constant tension of movement of replacement of the child by the adult. In the perverted scheme the former should not be completely replaced by the later, to obtain a real adulthood there should continuously remain the tension of dialectics between the adult and the child.

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As mentioned, the concept of a child appears simultaneously with the rise of discipline, the emergence of the disciplinary society. But together with the concept of child appears the concept of the adult, because the adult is the one child has to turn into, to be precise it is the final stage of the process of disciplining and the formation of the child. The emergence of the concept of a child is a unearthing of the specific region of materiality, of the raw material and the emergence of the possibility to start the processing of it.

Understood in such a way the concept of a child that can be explained through the conception of 'archaic affectivity'.

Education, discipline, restrictions allow affectivity to be affected, that is, to pave the way from childhood to adulthood. It is a discipline, following prescribed

rules, that gradually makes solidified shape out of material. The final step of this path: conscious adherence to the proposed rules, that is, the accomplishment of formation under the set rules, complete subjection to them. This solidified condition is called the adulthood.

But this adulthood is not real, it is what I have called a fake adulthood. It is only a prolongation of childhood, which is closed on itself and does not resonate with the state that is contrary to it – with the adulthood. True adulthood does not occur if there is no ability to keep the state childhood as that which causes the move of overcoming itself.

Ordering, that which could cause influence, causes it on something that can be influenced, affected. It is not possible to decompose structure "childhood-adulthood" into two separate elements: childhood and adulthood. Childhood is a material and adulthood is ordering of the material.

Thus, there is no childhood without adulthood and no adulthood without childhood. Separated from each other, not analysed as uncompleted correlation, they lose their meaning and adulthood become fake adulthood. Childhood never moves completely into adulthood, if it does – it is fake adulthood.

Material as such appears only when it is processed at work, it does not exist as the material before the work has started. Only resonating with that which is solid, it revealing its plasticity.

Discipline is an affirmative construction to the extent it is able to transform the material without turning it into a completely solid formation, leaving it a material suitable for work.

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When Foucault writes about disciplinary practices that have emerged together with the introduction of compulsory education, he perceives them as embodiments of repressive apparatus that exposes bodies to training,

observation, and control. According to his theory, discipline creates "docile bodies" which are trained in such a way that their unity might function as school classrooms. For this discipline must be internalized, not just imposed by some external to the body controlling force. In other words, bodies should be moulded in such a way that they would function in accordance to organizational rules, which are new to the not yet disciplined body.

What Foucault misses is that there is the other side of the process of disciplinalisation of the body – it is not only about imposing of rules and organizing the body in accordance to those rules, it is also the disclosure of the susceptibility of the body, of its ability to be disciplined. This ability is the ability to perceive effect, to be adaptive. The other side of disciplinalisation is the ability to be disciplined. The disciplinary society is the society which discovers the ability to learn. For this reason in this society appeared the concept of child, that is the concept, which invents someone who needs to be shaped.

Now it can be said that the child does not appear as the one who has to be disciplined, but rather as a detection of a state of shapelessness and suitability for the formation.

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If we claim that the modern concept of child emerges as part of the project of morality, that is, along with morality, as its by-product, we should proceed by saying, that it appears as that which is opposed to the formed individual, as that which allows to set off the ideal, the pattern of the individual established by morality. Individual is the one who is formed, thus obedient, with the internalized feeling of guilt. Child is the antagonist of all these features, she is the embodiment of totally opposite qualities, and due to this it makes it possible for this pattern to exist, setting it off and making it visible. Consequently, the concept of child is an essential element of the project of morality, the one which allows it to move, to unfold itself into the process.

Thus, morality and disciplinary practices associated with it are not exclusively negative phenomenona. Appearing as a mistake, as a repressive apparatus, at the same time it opened up a new mode of reality, the new type of process, a new way of life. This new type of process implies an active position towards oneself and towards the word – the position of someone who processes and forms. In what way this discovery will be used today and if its fallacy will be obviated (that is to say, if the initial repressive element will be neutralized) depends on us.

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The problem with the concept of child concerns the fact that it has inconsistent constituents: the productive element and the repressive element. The first is about the involvement of the concept of child to the idea of education and formation. The second, the repressive element, is about the idea that the formation must be carried out with the purpose of achievement of a correspondence to a certain ready-made pattern, the one which child has not yet achieved, but which she should achieve at the end of the process of formation (in case with children, the end goal is correspondence to a pattern of the adult; in case with the colonized, correspondence to a pattern of the colonizer), besides, after the achievement of this correspondence, education ends. Repressiveness of the concept of childhood is in a very existence of the pattern that must be met.

Although the concept of a child is not monolithic, it can proceed to function without a repressive element. Without it, the concept of a child is a representation of the possibility of continuous and unceasing development and of the endless possibility of modifying and redirecting the progress.

If we simply struggle with the concept of child (as well as with the concept of women), we could only remain in the condition of resistance to it, but the concept and it functioning will not disappear. It will continue to exist as an

uncorrected error that in no way could be fix and can not be hidden. Even if we assume that the concept of a child is an empty place (since it is a social construct), then we will find nothing than we can fill that empty place with.

To correct the error, those concepts has to be taken into the work: it is necessary to change the meanings of concepts, mix the concepts, transforming their boundaries, use them as variables, have no fear that those names have some inner solid meaning that can not be overcome.

Everyone can be a child and an adult, a man and a woman, and anyone can give those words any palette of meanings.

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Today's urgent task of emancipation of children cannot be accomplished while it is associated with attempts to suppress repressing side and by this to protect the repressed side.

On the contrary emancipation becomes possible when there comes the understanding that the 'child' is a flexible concept, and not a direct representation of human before the age of puberty and that a link between the word 'child' and the presented reality, is too, to some extent arbitrary and flexible.

Emancipation of children does not occur when parents are deprived of their parental rights for the wrong treatment of a child, it occurs when child is deprived of a name 'child', and parents are deprived of the names 'mother' and 'father' – that is, when names 'child', 'mother', 'father' itself change in plastic variables, only then they ceases to be oppressive.

The same logic applies to the emancipation of women. Here the case is not about teaching and admonition of men to respect the women's human rights, it is about the detection of flexibility and conventionality of concepts of men and women and about perceiving them as stereotypes.

Or if we take another example: the concept of marriage. When it is disclosed that the marriage is not universal and obligatory form of human coexistence, but an arbitrary variant of it which only claims to be universal – the one who is aware about this nonetheless makes the decision to have traditional marriage, that very fact of choice designates the presence of a great difference between the two modules of functioning of the concept of marriage: between the module within which the concept works as a repressive and possess itself as a universal and obligatory, and within the module which functions as a result of emancipation, hence when the concept of marriage began to be realized as optional, as one among many others similar concepts, thus as a part of plastic flow of conceptualization.

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The concept of a child is not the universalization of particularism as adherents of postmodern theories believe. The concept of a child can uncover far more greater potential if it would be seen not as an imposed interpretation of certain part of reality, but as the floating concept, as variable, that is to say a such kind of universality, which is never a particularism. It can be claimed that the child as a variable is not a universalization but an abstraction. Which means that the concept of a child is not an equation, an imposing of the same name upon everyone, but a kind of empty signifier, abstraction, which is waiting to be fulfilled; a certain formula that allows for each new situation where it is used to generate new rules. It does not force a certain choice, a label, on the contrary, as a reference point and at the same time as an empty space it allows generating new models of reality and new models of behaviour.

Classical doctrines of emancipation implies following stereotypical labels, offers ready-made choices: to fight against the violation of the rights of women (hence it is clear what is a woman), children (hence it is clear what is a child), etc. My claim is that another emancipation is possible – not the emancipation as

a negation, but the emancipation-affirmation, the one which is capable of producing new.

Such emancipation would imply that it has already taken place – all are equal (children, men, women). And all the differences are mobile, variable and inessential. That is to say, the flexibility of concepts of the child, women, men, etc. is the basis for equality.

Each of us is a child, a man, a woman, a Jew, a slave: because there are no exact boundaries of these concepts, which mean that there are no clear boundaries that separate them from us.

5.5 The biological and the moral

Aries pointed out that the child is primarily a social construct, not a natural phenomenon. Although modern concept of child was constituted by society as part of the moral and biological discourses, it was retroactively assigned to be revealed in nature, and to be a universal constant, objective, always-existing phenomenon. Moral claims that constituted the concept of child always were presented as objectively relevant to the nature of the child, as always existed, self-evident laws.

The apparatuses of slavery and women's discrimination worked in accordance to the same principle which presupposes the existence of 'objective' factors, such as skin colour or type of genitalia, etc., from which are drawn conclusions about the non-physiological characteristics of individuals who are attributed with those "objective" factors and conclusions about how one must behave in relation to them.

That is to say, the field of discourse had not yet differentiated into the biological and the moral. Only within yet undifferentiated field of discourse, out of physiological characteristics (skin colour, type of genitalia, biological age, etc.) ethical conclusions could be drawn. The 'objective' physical characteristics

were supplemented with moral characteristics, not just supplemented, but become isomorphic with them and due to this also were perceived as objective.

Since the sixteenth century the moral discourse started to separate from the biological (only as a result of this separation, those two elements of discursive field becomes visible). The separation of moral from biological also marks the beginning of process of secularisation started in science. Consequently, any mixing of the biological and the moral indicates the degradation of the discourse.

Concept of child is still a part of that mixing. While in the modern world the issue of slavery and the problem of women's discrimination are in the process of their solving, the problem of mixing the biological discourse and moral discourse when it comes to the child is just beginning to be overcome.

When the moral part separates from the biological discourse, it does not disappear, on the contrary, it becomes more useful, I would even claim, it ceases to occupy a wrong place. Emerging as part of the apparatus of repression, passing this stage, it starts to serve purely as a means for thinking.

Initially, the concept of slavery, the concept of sexual difference and the concept of child played role of not only a representation of biological characteristics, to which the moral is glued, it was also the representation and the embodiment of a way of thinking the world.

Questions of colonialism and feminism are nowadays especially actual because the issue of slavery and the issue of gender become today the material for reflection. Those issues are not dissolving in practice anymore. This enabled them to become suitable objects of thinking.

It is worth to make an attempt to think the concept of child within the disconnection of moral and biological discourses. This disconnection produces perception of the child as a purely biological entity (in opposition to the folk psychology, which mixes ethical with physical meanings), and as a purely ethical entity (in opposition to the conservative ethical discourse, which is

mixed with biological). And since the concept of child as a purely ethical entity is detached from the biological givens, that is, the physical representatives, it becomes the representative of a certain way of thinking, having groped which one can start to work with it.

Morality which is not able to embody is nonsense. Because morality, by definition, prescribes the rules that govern the practice. Detached from practice morality loses its meaning. Consequently the concept of child as a purely ethical entity, which is detached from the child as the physical representative, is nonsense.

But it is precisely this state of the concept, when it vibrates between the nonsense and the starting point of sense, and does not slip from this state into the state of definiteness and certainty, thus remains in this ongoing vibration – indicates that the process of initiation to the materiality of words (that is, the process of generation) takes place.

The materiality of words is a source of thinking. To reside within it means to uphold the concept in a state of uncertainty, keeping it in a condition of a raw material suitable to work with.

After all, the concept understood in such a way is not fully separated from practice. It is linked with it, but not in a way that binds together conservative moral discourse with practice. The concept of child as a purely moral (that is as nonsense) is linked with the practice not as that which sets the rules and establishes directions, but as something that inhibits its inertia, slows it down and keeps it in a condition when it perpetually is not yet ready to fully unfold, that is to unfold in definiteness.

6   Reflections on Affectivity

6.1 Childhood phrase-affect

In his essay "Emma: between Philosophy and Psychoanalysis" [4], Lyotard makes a distinction between the childhood phrase-affect and the adulthood articulated phrases.

The childhood phrase-affect not just lacks the instance of the "I", it is also lacks the instance of addressee. Thus the phrase-affect is a "presence" which is addressed to no one, neither as a question, nor as a reply.

Therefore, the phrase-affect lacks the instances needed for the participation in circulation of common sense, which embodies in the adults the capacity to articulate. This capacity is required to link phrases with each other.

The phrase-affect is non-significant, neither destined, nor referenced. Besides the "pure" childhood phrase-affect does not involve a demand, because a demand is an expectation of linking. But, in spite of the fact that it is deprived of all fundamental characteristics of phrase, Lyotard insists that it is sufficient to call this "presence" a phrase, hence to claim that it is a constitutive part of the speech.

Signification and addressing belong to the articulated speech, which consists of phrases that hold messages sent from someone to someone. "Since specific instances that articulate the universe are lacking, one can say only that the affect

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[4] In "Emma: between Philosophy and Psychoanalysis" Lyotard deals with Freud's case of "Emma". She traces her fear of shops to an incident at age of twelve when she entered a shop, saw two shop assistants laughing, and ran out of the shop in a panic attack. Freud traces this scene to an earlier traumatic event which was repressed by Emma – when Emma was eight years old, a shopkeeper had fondled her genitals through her clothes.

presents a universe. The something that it "presents" is its "presence" to itself, its being-here-now." (*Emma* 33) Because the phrase-affect is not involved in the instances which are constitutive for the articulated speech and which are necessary to connect the phrases, Lyotard concludes "the affect-phrase remains unconnected, thus absolute". (*Emma* 33)

The childhood phrase-affect is a non-significant "presence" which happens suddenly in the course of the phrases. That is the "silences" that occur in the speech, the "silence of forces". (*Emma* 29) This "silence" is nothing, but it can be read as the presence of the absence of representation, the presence of something as nothing.

To articulate means to link the phrases with each other. The affect-phrase can't be localized in either a phenomenological or clock temporality, it is a stranger to physical and phenomenological diachrony. The physical time ("adult time") is formed by the consistency of past, present, and future. Within this time the phrase-affect occurs as a lost time.

Lyotard states that this time can be named a "dead time", as it is

> a vague repetition (situated in the adult time, the affect represents [itself] because it represents nothing […] loss of control, of finality; the deflection of desire and of understanding; relinquishment, abandonment, childish behaviour. These designations express the resistance of identity to the affect. The affect necessarily inscribes itself in an order of its own as the event of an expropriation. (*Emma* 40)

The childhood phrase-affect belies the supposed personal identity, that is to say the supposed identity turns out to be a lie in the face of the "presence" that is the phrase-affect.

For Lyotard "adulthood is defined by at least a predominance of articulated phrases". (*Emma* 40)

And the phrase-affect, which is a "pure" affectivity "anthropologically speaking, it is bound up with childhood". (*Emma* 44)

Nonetheless, phrase-affect belongs to the childhood and is tied to the unpreparedness of the childhood (which is the initial absence of articulated language), it persists into the adulthood and it remains there as a defenselessness to "presence", to the possibilities which are both tempting and threatening.

Thus the childhood remains as a part of the adulthood, precisely as the part in which the adult turns out to be "without defence" before the tempting threats of the "presence". Avital Ronell states:

> childhood for Lyotard wasn't at the beginning of some history but it can come
> up at any moment whenever you feel you losing your voice, you're throttled,
> you're persecuted, you can't represent yourself, you're unrepresentable, and
> unpresentable. […] for Lyotard it is not a historical developmental instance, it
> could come at you, and it lies in ambush all the time to break your stride, and
> disrupt any grasp of things that you might think you have.". (*Shock*)

Hence Lyotard's thoughts open up a possibility to perceive the childhood not as a part of the linear layout of human life (the birth - period of childhood - period of adulthood - death), but as something which is associated with the constant presence of inexhaustible beginning, and with the lack of the adulthood, thus of the articulated adult language and the presence of the unarticulated speech.

The adulthood (articulated speech) can only come from the lack of the articulated speech. It is something for the occurrence of which there should constantly remain a presence of its absence. Linked in this way, the duality childhood\adulthood remains throughout the whole life, that is, throughout the adulthood the adult remains the child because it is necessary to remain the child in order to be the adult. The childhood is a source of the adulthood, which is accompanying it all the time.

According to Lyotard, the childhood unarticulated phrases are untranslatable into the adult's articulated language. The adult's articulated language which is

associated with genital organization, retroactively tried to assimilate "pure" childhood affect-phrase. And vice versa, the adult's language is untranslatable into the child's "language" because there is no such language. Lyotard states:

> […] the pedagogical import of the comparison… would suggest that the adult "language" of pleasure (and of pain) is translatable into that of the child and that Emma's failure to understand is, as with a foreign language, only a matter of maturation (as is assumed, for example, in so-called "sexual education". But such is not the case.) One cannot speak of a childhood affective "language", since the pure phrase-affect I invoked under the name of childhood is lacking the articulation indispensable to all translations. (*Emma* 43)

The most elementary of these articulations are those of referentiality and the addressing.

The adult articulated language is unable to express "pure" affectivity:

> In truth, the silent 'presence' of the affect, a sigh, demands of articulated language an endless series of stagings, novels, tragedies, epics, an accumulation and linking of articulated phrases which are contradictory, undecidable, very numerous, or, at least, impossible task of getting even with the "nothing" of childhood "affect". Then again, the literary work […] will not cease "rendering" this un-working which is "pure" affectivity. (*Emma* 43)

For Lyotard, childhood "pure" affectivity is a more "archaic" susceptibility than any articulation and it is irreducible to it. " ' Presence', the pure autonomy of the affect, does not translate itself in either presentation or representation. Between this affectivity and its articulation, the different is ineluctable". (*Emma* 44) What awakes this susceptibility is the articulated adult phrase. "The awakening creates a stasis in the course of articulation, one that reveals, in turn, an unpresentable 'precence' ". (*Emma* 43)

Therefore, something which is childhood (the unarticulated phrases) later does not transforms (or translates) into the representation. But the childhood phrase-

affect is the condition for the functioning of the adult language, and thus for the articulated language of representation. Childhood phrase-affect remains in the adulthood as a constitutive empty space[5]. So what is at stake is not that the childhood phrase-affect later somehow transforms, converts to become the basis or the material, for the adults' language. The issue is about a different scheme, a scheme in which the childhood is a lack of the representation that makes the representation possible. The adult language of the representation is possible because it retains an instance where it abolishes itself – that is the childhood phrase-affect.

We can also say that the child is a two-level discrepancy. On the first level it is a discrepancy between the representation of the child and what it represents (which takes place in the adults' articulated language). On the second, the child is a discrepancy of the adult with herself, or the adult's non-coincidence with herself.

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Lyotard states that it is relevant to measure affect quantitatively, not qualitatively. Affect is a psychical category, expressed in the level of the load it carries. Affect is an overloading, the excess of load.

> Freud emphasized that what is important in the affect is quantity and not
> quality or "address." The yes and the no, the pleasure and the pain, and their

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[5] The following is the where Lyotard clarifies in what way the nothingness is a constitutive part of the speech:

Conjoined by *and*, phrases and events follow each other, but their succession does not obey a categorical order (*because*; *if-then*; *in order to*; *although…*). Joined to the preceding one by *and*, a phrase arises out of nothingness to link up with it. Paratax thus connotes the abyss of Not-Being which opens between phrases, it stresses the surprise that something begins when what is said is said. And is the conjunction that most allows the constitutive discontinuity (or oblivion) of time to threaten, while defying it through its equally constitutive continuity (or retention). (*Differend, 66*)

"address" are not decisive. The one is of signification, the other of addressing, aiul as such they belong to articulated language, constructed of phrases that hold messages sent from someone to someone. What is important in the affect is the load it carries, how much it overloads the thought-body, the psychical appearance. (Kant said that this is its qualitative variety; much in the affect feels not so much sublime as "energetic. Again, a physics.) By "overload" (a mechanical metaphor), one indicates the "presence" of a nonsignificant phrase (pleasure or pain?), neither destined (from whom to whom?), nor referenced (of what is it a question?), which happens suddenly in the course of phrases. (*Emma* 30)

Only a formalism, example of which Lyotard shows in this passage, allows to accurately determine an affect. Because of this, it is possible to explain what affect is by using mechanical metaphors and the language of physics.

By analogy with Lyotard's reasoning it also may be stated that childhood and adulthood are not two analogous opposing periods of life, which can be compared with each other. Childhood and adulthood are two characteristics of the same phenomenon, but childhood is a category which should be measured quantitatively, and adulthood - qualitatively.

6.2   Growing up

For Lyotard the transition from the childhood to the adulthood is associated with entering the space of the articulated language, namely of the language which is constituted by the linked phrases. And the requirement for them to be linked is the responsibility of the adult. Linkage is a demand, implementation of which constitutes the adult.

"First of all, it is necessary to link onto a phrase that happens (be it by a silence, which is a phrase), there is no possibility of not linking onto it. Second, to link is necessary; how to link is contingent" (*Differend* 29)

The adult is someone who links phrases. The demand of the adulthood is the demand of linkage even if it is impossible to understand, to say, to think the unthinkable. Linkage requires courage and bravery.

The transition into the adulthood occurs on an empty place (the lack of sense). This empty place is a phrase-affect. To grow up, means to fill this empty space, to take a call. The presence of the empty space is a necessary structural condition for the process of transition into the adulthood to occur. It is an affirmative absence, the absence as a condition of emergence, for this reason it is necessary.

Transition to the adulthood might be regarded as a challenge to form links out of unlikable, to produce the language, to generate new senses. But the possibility of this generation exists only if there is a material for such generation. This material (which is at the same time the condition of generation) is the initial lack of linkage.

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Lyotard brings together the loss of personal identity and the childhood phrase-affect. Phrase-affect reveals the supposed identity as a lie. Hence the affect in a way resists identity.

In adult language affect plays a role of empty place, it is a childish behaviour – loss of control and understanding. Thus the childish behaviour (performance of affect) might be referred to as a regress in comparison with language of adults. Although the regress which is a constructive part of adult language. In that sense regress is a disintegration of identity.

If adulthood is considered as "at least a predominance of articulated phrases", it can be stated that the movement towards adulthood is the movement from an absence of predominance of articulated phrases to the presence of this predominance. This movement might be referred to as a progress.

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Every new step of progress becomes possible only if it starts with affectivity, which here must be understood as plasticity. That is with the opening of the initial affectivity as the loss of identity. In this sense regress is needed for the progress to occur in the same way as the destruction of the old is needed to allow the possibility of the new.

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Adulthood is a sphere that contains the capacity to influence a childhood susceptibility. Adult with her role of educator is a source of a shock for the child. That is what adulthood in relation to childhood is about and that is what education imposed upon the child is about. In this sense sexuality as a part of adult sphere is a chance for the childhood phrase-affect to occur. For this reason Lyotard states that every educator is a seducer.

> The "polymorphic perversity" of childhood affectivity narrated by the adult is by no means held to make even an exceptional case of the genital zone. If one can distinguish the "stages" which would mark the evolution of this affectivity by the successive selection of this or that erogenous zone, it is certainly because the education that the adult imposes upon the child confronts the child's vague excitability, one by one, with each of them. Orality and anality, without taking the rest into account, bear evidence that the disciplining of the body prescribed by the adult supplies the errant affectivity of the child with an abundance of occasions to be affected. In a vague sense, every educator is, in principle, a seducer. (*Emma* 43)

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Lyotard shows how the transition from the childhood to the adulthood is manifested: it is not manifested by the emergence of biological puberty, with its clear age limits, it is manifested every time, when the child is shocked with addressed to her articulated speech while the child is not able to be addressed.

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Lyotard explains this process, using the following comparison:

> One can imagine that the child Emma speaks a given language (of pleasure and pain), and that the shopkeeper addressed her in a strange language, one unknown to her but of the same (affective) register. When we find ourselves in an analogous situation, as when a speaker addresses us in an unknown language, we do not feel that what is said to us is absurd. Rather, we postulate that his phrases in general are meaningful […], but are devoid of sense for us because we do not know how to translate them into our language in an articulated way and respond with an appropriate linking. The speaker addresses us, but we are only affected by this "address" and not properly addressed. In this way, Emma would be affected by the phrase given in the gesture of the shopkeeper despite being unable to be "addressed" by him. (*Emma* 42)

The failure to be addressed or the failure to comprehend articulated speech is an empty place within the articulated language and it precedes the articulated language as its absence. Lyotard suggests that that which separates the childhood phrase-affect from the adult language is sexuality, that he understands as "an a priori partition between sexed 'genres' ". (*Emma* 43) However, it is not about the child's knowing of genitality, thus not about the difference between two sexes. What is at stake is the capability of genitality to be an occasion for the event of the phrase-affect to take place.

Lyotard states:

> To introduce the difference of the sexes is to compel […] childhood affectivity to identify itself with one of the sexes, to refer to the other as an entity, namely as an object, that it cannot embody, and to finally address itself to that object as its intended partner. […] The installation of genitality (much more than its biological maturation) keeps pace with the articulation of the phrase-affect in a double polarity of referentiality (there is/there is not: a penis; the binary determination of the object can undoubtedly carry with it another property; only the "yes" or the "no" are important) and of the addressing ("I" who does not have the penis, "you" who has it, and the one in

order for the other). Genitality would not give rise to a very specific "shock" if it did not force affective childhood to assimilate, for the better or worse, a set of axioms that are initially incomprehensible to it. (*Emma* 44)

Genitality gives rise to a specific shock by forcing affective childhood to assimilate axioms that are not incomprehensible to it. Thus, it is not so much about genitality as about the principle by which it functions in relation to the child: about that incomprehensible which the articulated speech of adults introduces to a child. As Avital Ronell explains:

Lyotard will have tried to demonstrate that the difference between sexes offers a blow, but it remains "only shocking", says he, not more. It only strikes a blow in a sense secondary to the differánt between childhood and adult affect. (*Shock*)

The "shock" occurs because the child as a pure affectivity could neither listen nor respond to it. Child-affectivity is aware of neither the addressing nor the reference. Articulated speech being addressed to the child presupposes her as the individuality but the child doesn't know herself as the individuality.

As it was stated, for Lyotard affectivity is an "archaic" susceptibility, it is more initial than all articulations. Presence of an affect is not translatable into representation. Therefore the conflict between articulation and affectivity is inevitable. Namely an articulated adult phrase always awakens susceptibility.

We can extend this Lyotard's thought by saying that growing up is not about the biological maturation, it continues throughout the life. Shock is a necessary condition for the start of any learning process, perception of any new.

Any active thinking begin with shock and with violence because thinking involve the violation of existing ways of thinking and of already formed ways of perception.

In order to occur the shock needs as its precondition a high level of affectivity and perceptivity – for something that has ability to encourage thinking,

something that can crack the thought, had chance to influence it (to commit violence).

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Precisely in order to make the state of constitutive absence expressible there must be introduced such condition as "being affected without being addressed", in accordance with which a distinction between affectedness and addressedness should be drawn.

The later points out the modification under some sort of influence, receiving this influence in conformity with certain preset structures and solidifying in the resulting formation. The former points out the receiving of influence, but the type of this influence is not completely predetermined, and receiving of influence in this case does not result in solidifying, quite the reverse, it remains in the state of plasticity, preserving life-giving tension between yes and no: a state of shock, which is needed for the emergence of the new.

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Avital Ronell analyzing Lyotard's essay refers to his remark, where the parallels are shown between the shopkeeper addressing Emma and the God ("our Alts Vater, our primal Father") addressing Abraham. Emma and Abraham are both unaddressable.

The shopkeeper faces Emma as a "you" and as "you a woman". By this he demands: to listen to the difference of the sexes. "He places the child all at once in the position of a "you", in an exchange that she doesn't understand, as well as in a position of a woman, in a sexual division which she also doesn't comprehend". (*Shock*)

Abraham becomes Abraham, just after the God addressed him. He doesn't know himself as Abraham before that addressing. Emma and Abraham both represent the turnover from the childhood to the adulthood, they are "figures targeted by puberty". (*Shock*) They were shocked by the call of unknown force, which they were not able to receive "Yet the call faithfully diverts them and something happens, jostling them, relating them to the unrelatable". (*Shock*)

Lyotard states "I do not confuse God with the shopkeeper. But I say that the Law bursts into pagan affectivity with the same violence as sex (genitality) attacks childhood affectivity". (*Emma* 42)

Thus, the moral, which is a demand of the law, is the same shock of puberty as the sexuality. The child makes one more step towards the adulthood each time when her susceptibility is affected – when she is facing moral demands that she is not able to fulfil. Namely, the intrusion of morality signifies the beginning of the unfolding of dialectic of childhood-maturation.

We can extend this thought to the level of society by saying that religion and morality indicate the childhood of society, as they point out towards the period of shock, when there are yet no forces to accept the call of incomprehensible, to constructively process it. In this sense, the phenomenon of religion appears as an error, correction of which accompanies the maturation of society.

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As it was stated earlier, historically, the type of transition from the childhood to the adulthood which is based on the interiorization of guilt is connected with the shift marked by the emergence of Protestant ethics, therefore the shift which caused the appearance of the childhood. The concept of childhood emerged as a part of the moral discourse, together with morality in the modern meaning of the word. Morality, that is the interiorization of the guilt, generated the project of the individual, of which the "child" is a part. However, regarding the transition from the childhood to the adulthood, it is not as simple as it seems. It is not

enough to emphasize that "the morality" and "the childhood" form the parts of repressive apparatus, or that the childhood is the embodiment of the method of morality. The emergence of morality, of the individual and of the child – is primarily the emergence of possibilities, of a new space, where something new could emerge.

Even if the morality, the science, the childhood etc. appear initially as an error – that does not mean that they need to be corrected by somehow transcending these phenomena or overcoming them.

We can still claim, that this error should be corrected but that would not mean that is has to be eliminated. To "correct" would mean to recognize it as a mistake, but as a mistake which is a necessity. And as a mistake that does not involve the existence of the correct answer. Thus to "correct" it would not mean to find the right answer. On the contrary, all the right answers are the shadow (reflection with the opposite meaning) of errors. The "error" here functions as the affirmation. Consequently, to "correct" will mean to grasp the principle of the generation of this opened space – thus "to correct the error" not in the sense to illuminate it, but to comprehend the principle of how this space is generated, and to actively participate in its generation. In this way we will say "yes" to morality, to science, to the concept of child, but by saying this "yes" we will pervert the morality, the science and the concept of child. As a result we will get the morality which is each time generated, hence generatable; we will get the science which reflects and questions its own fundamental principles, which do not describe a given reality, but "prescribes" laws to it; we will get the concept of child which is each time renewable, open to the possibility of obtaining new senses.

Thus, it turns out that there are two possibilities: either to take a chance and actively participate in this newly opened space, which means to join materiality of generation of senses, or to exist in a decline, degeneration of this space, this implies the filling of this space with an unperverted common sense – in which the answers to all the questions are already given, and there exists someone who

understands how things really are, for whom everything is clear; where the external authority and externally imposed rules are taken too seriously, and the childhood and adulthood are the parts of these external structures.

The motion which occurs in the degeneration of the newly opened space is the movement of joining the structure of the imposed from the outside rules. The motion which occurs in the generation of the newly opened space is the movement of recognizing fake externality of those structures, and at the same time making them internal – in this way there appears an ability to reflect on it as once constructed (thus not eternal and fixed), consequently to see the childhood as the social construct - therefore to see it as the plastic material; applying the same logic, to see the morality and the science as the plastic material, science as a plastic material etc. Namely to see them as plasticity, and not as something given from outside.

6.3   Relations of forces and the will to power

To turn to the concept of affect in Nietzsche, we should first clarify some of general aspects of his philosophy.

Nietzsche presupposes that nothing else is "given" as real but our world of desires and passions, that is to say, the world of affects. There is no other reality, except the reality of our impulses, even thinking is only a relation of these impulses to one another.

For Nietzsche, the material world possess the same degree of reality as our affects themselves, it is a more primitive form of the world of affects,

> in which everything still lies locked in a mighty unity, which afterwards
> branches off and develops itself in organic processes (naturally also, refines
> and debilitates)—as a kind of instinctive life in which all organic functions,
> including self-regulation, assimilation, nutrition, secretion, and change of
> matter, are still synthetically united with one another--as a PRIMARY FORM
> of matter, are still synthetically united with one another—as a f life. (*Beyond*
> 36)

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Nietzsche proposes a hypothesis whether all action of material world, inasmuch as a power operates therein, is the power of will, the effect of will. The goal of this hypothesis is to explain entire instinctive life as the development of one fundamental form of will, that is to say, the will to power, as well as to prove the right to define all active forces unequivocally as will to power.

As can be seen, for Nietzsche, will to power is the ultimate generative beginning of the organic and inorganic worlds, furthermore, it is a beginning and the only possibility of thinking. "The world seen from within, the world defined and designated according to its 'intelligible character' — it would simply be 'Will to Power,' and nothing else". (*Beyond* 37)

Another important point is that for Nietzsche, everything is woven from the relationship between forces, and the will to power is a distinguishing element in this relationship. To consider all that exists as a relationship of forces means to consider it not just as an accumulation of given hierarchies of solid formations, but also to have ability to perceive new types of metamorphoses and to reflect them in new interpretations and to generate novel interpretations that will cause new metamorphoses. The generation of new interpretations occurs by the following scheme: the capture of the real (of accumulation of solid formations), which means the perception of it as material, the dissolution and modification of drawn borders within the occupied territory.

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According to Nietzsche, everything that exists is the correlation of commanding forces and obeying forces. Hence that which obeys is also a force. "Inferior forces do not, by obeying, cease to be forces distinct from those which command. Obeying is a quality of force as such and relates to power just as much as commanding does". (Deleuze *Nietzsche* 40)

Active force is subjugating, dominating, appropriating, possessing and imposing forms. It is the reaching out for power. As well as activity, passivity is also a certain type of force. Although the activity is something that, by definition, exceeds passivity, it does not mean that passivity is the opposite of force.

The element which receives the influence of the other force is a constitutive component of the correlation of forces. The separation distance between the commanding force and the force that obeys expresses the will to power. Precisely because the will to power is that which connects forces and at the same time does not let them merge together, it can be revealed through both active and passive force.

Plasticity of the force is a characteristic which is detected in the interaction of activity and passivity of the force. It is the launching of the mechanism for its self-transformation.

To clarify how the force is related to the will to power, we should refer to Deleuze's analysis of Nietzsche. He concludes that will to power is simultaneously the compliment of force and is something internal to it. Will to power is the principle of synthesis of forces and at the same time the genetic and differential element of force. The synthesis is one of forces, of their difference and reproduction.

Here how Deleuze explains the specificity of this principle:

> The will to power […] is an essentially plastic principle that is no wider than what it conditions, that changes itself with the conditioned and determines itself in each case along with what it determines. The will to power is, indeed, never separable from particular determined forces, from their quantities, qualities and directions. It is never superior to the ways that it determines a relation between forces, it is always plastic and changing. (Deleuze *Nietzsche* 50)

We can see that in relation to the forces the will to power is the principle of their functioning, it is not something external to force, not a separate entity that

complements it from the outside, but rather that which does not take away anything from the forces and adds nothing to them, that which only determines them and through this doesn't allow them to merge together, that is to say, neither to become a homogeneous mass nor to become indeterminate mass. Will to power is not something which exceeds forces and not that which serve forces. It enables force to be force.

The difference between two forces that are correlated with each other is both quantitative and qualitative. The will to power is what distinguishes these forces among themselves, that is, the quantitative and qualitative gap between them.

Force is that which dominates the other force. So, in the relation between forces, one of them dominates, and the other is dominated. To dominate, the power needs a certain complement, that quantitatively and qualitatively distinguished it from dominated force. This complement, and at the same time the generating internal element of the force, is will to power.

Only through the will to power one force dominates over the other, but also the will to power makes another force to be dominated, it is through will to power that it obeys.

6.4 The will to power as the primitive affective form

Nietzsche states that the will to power is "the primitive affective form" from which all other feelings derive. (*Will* 360) For Nietzsche, the capacity to be affected does not signify passivity, what it denotes is more appropriate to call sensibility. In this sense even before elaborating will to power Nietzsche was already speaking of a feeling of power. (Deleuze *Nietzsche* 62) Before the concept of power was transformed into the concept of will to power, Nietzsche treated power as an affair of feeling and sensibility. After the concept of the will to power was developed, understanding of a power as sensibility integrated into it and hence became its structural element.

The will to power is sensibility in a sense that it manifests itself in the sensibility of force. Therefore, will to power could be interpreted as affectivity, but it has to be considered that affectivity as an ability for being affected is not a passivity, at least not in the usual sense of the word.

This may be clarified in a following way: if we presume that affectivity is a primordial plasticity, the ability to be a material – the flexibility and adaptability of the material, it can be considered not just as something passive and manipulable, but rather as active. Plasticity, considered as the activity can be understood as an inexhaustible willingness to change, to accept modifications, to perceive effect. In this sense, plasticity is something affirming, not just reactive and negative. Furthermore, following this logic, plasticity should be considered to be the maximum degree of affirmation, since within plasticity affirmation is never exhausted – it never solidifies and is never harden into stable solid form.

Passive is not inactive, but non-activated, in other words, a material. Passive is not-yet-active. It is something in a state of passivity and waiting to be formed. Like a bricks that are waiting to be formed in a house, and by this to produce the act of building.

Any activity is possible only being based on passivity, on the ground of which the activity unfolds. Between passive (that which is waiting to be affected) and active (that which is already affected) there is no impassable boundary. The material is both active and passive, that is to say, active and passive areas are intertwined, and hence they define each other.

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In the context of this discussion, it is helpful to turn to Heidegger for the reason that it was he who influenced the rehabilitation of passivity in philosophy, namely the passivity of the subject.

Heidegger's Dasein is thrown into the world. That is to say, from someone who previously was a basis of knowledge, and who perceive and cognize the world, the subject (I, human) turned into someone with whom something happens: the knowledge, experience, relationships with others, life.

Since Heidegger the subject ceased to be absolute master of the situation, she finds herself dependent on the already existing linguistic and symbolic determinations within the functioning common sense.

Thereby, since Heidegger subjectivity started to be perceived as a passive and affectuated, henceforth it stopped to be identified with the self-sufficient transcendental ego, which constitutes the world. Accordingly, post-Heideggerian subjectivity is, then, not so much an independent object of study, as an instrument, with which it is possible to access a deep dimension of reality, that is, dimension that are initially changeable.

For Heidegger, the affectivity is a guide to the authentic self of Dasein. Only through affectivity one can open the initial internal inconsistency and changeability. He states:

> Passion: the lucidly gathering grip on beings. […] passion restores our essential being, because it loosens and liberates in its very grounds, and because passion at the same time reaches out into the expanse of beings. (*Heidegger Nietzsche* 48-49)

Thus, the subjectivity of the post-Heideggerian subject is fundamentally passive, or, more precisely, affective, main determining features of it is the ability to be affected.

But it also could be claimed that initial passivity is not individualized. That which has the quality of the material can not be a subject. Material is not something divided (or at least not to the end divided) into subject and object. At the level of passivity subject and object are merged together. The defining features of a material is that it is not known what it will become after its conversion.

Although Heidegger perception of passivity is quite advanced, he still sees passivity as the characteristic of the subject, and not as a sphere in which there is yet no subject.

Interestingly, when analysing the difference between anger and hate, Heidegger speaks about affectivity, which does not comply with the limits of individuation, thus it can not be controlled by the individual (for the reason that it blurs the limits of individuation). But in the process that expresses in disclosure of affectivity and "lifting beyond ourselves", Heidegger sees the second part as the most important element of it. Here's his analysis:

> Anger, for instance, is an affect. In contrast, by "hate" we mean something quite different. Hate is not simply another affect, it is not an affect at all. It is a passion. But we call both of them "feelings." We speak of the feeling of hatred and of an angry feeling. We cannot plan or decide to be angry. Anger comes over us, seizes us, "affects" us. Such a seizure is sudden and turbulent. Our being is moved by a kind of excitement, something stirs us up, lifts us beyond ourselves, but in such a way that, seized by our excitement, we are no longer masters of ourselves. We say, "He acted on impulse," that is to say, under the influence of an affect. Popular speech proves to be keensighted when it says of someone who is stirred up and acts in an excited manner, "He isn't altogether himself." When we are seized by excitement, our being "altogether there" vanishes; it is transformed into a kind of "falling apart." We say, "He's beside himself with joy. (*Heidegger Nietzsche* 45)

6.5   The non-origin of the will to power

In "Emma" Lyotard points out that what he calls 'pure' affectivity corresponds to the Kantian "pure" faculty of pleasure and pain, as it is not derived from some other faculty then itself. (*Emma* 44)

The same principle of non-origin is at stake in Nietzsche's concept of will to power. As an initial form of affect, will to power is the basis primordial indeterminacy, is a free plastic force that is not conditioned by influences outside of it. (this characteristic of it is the reason why it has the ability to be further affected and influenced); pleasure and pain – exterior and secondary manifestations of this state of force.

> [My theory would be: -] that the will to power is the primitive form of affect,: that all other affects are only developments of it; that it is notably enlightening to posit power in place of individual "happiness" (after which every living thing is supposed to be striving) : "there is a striving for power, for an increase of power"; - pleasure is only a symptom of the feeling of power attained, a consciousness of a difference (- there is no striving for pleasure: but pleasure supervenes when that which is being striven for is attained: pleasure is an accompaniment, pleasure is not the motive -); that all driving force is will to power, that there is no other physical, dynamic or psychic force except this. (*Will* 367)

Analysing Nietzsche's statement that the will to power is the original form of affects, Heidegger warns us that we should not understand such descriptions from the point of view of our common psychology.

> Nor is it enough to revamp the current "psychological" explanations of affects, passions, and feelings. We must above all see that here it is not a matter for psychology, nor even for a psychology undergirded by physiology and biology. It is a matter of the basic modes that constitute Dasein, a matter of the ways man confronts the Da, the openness and concealment of beings, in which he stands. (*Heidegger Nietzsche* 45)

Even if Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche's statement "the will to power is the primitive form of affect" is somehow controversial, what is important for us is how by employing it he shows, that Nietzsche's notion of affect can't be considered within the frames of folk psychology, as psychology captures only secondary manifestations of an affect it is not able to see the primal layer of it –

that within which an affect is a basic mode, thus the mode of unfolding of plasticity.

Demonstrating that within Nietzsche's philosophy will to power as the original form of affect is primordial, Heidegger gives the following arguments: to will is to will out beyond oneself, "in view of such being beyond oneself in the affect (Über-sich-hinaus-sein-im-Affekt), will to power is the original form of affect" (*Heidegger Nietzsche* 46); will itself cannot be willed. "We can never resolve to have a will, in the sense that we would arrogate to ourselves a will; for such resoluteness is itself a willing". (*Heidegger Nietzsche* 46)

Nonetheless, these arguments prove only the primordiality of a certain activity that is in some respects a secondary formation. The will out beyond oneself presupposes the existence of limits of the self, those limits are that which the activity of willing attempts to overcome. However, the presence of these limits is a secondary state in comparison with the state where there are no such limits, that is, the state of uncertainty, in which something is present in the condition of material.

In other words, what Heidegger calls the initial willing, is conditioned by the presence of the individual as of the one who realizes this willing. If we consider the will to power (which is the original form of affect) as an active passivity and a plastic principle, the mediation with the contours of individuality would be removed.

Passivity and plasticity represent a condition in which the limits of individualization are not yet drawn, it is a relief and process of making the material suitable for drawing any limits that would determine it. By the way of explanation, this lack of contours of individualization makes it possible for them to be drawn by the act of will.

6.6   Affectivity as decomposition

Nietzsche understands affectivity as the basic characteristic of the material world. Although that "life itself is will to power" (*Beyond* 18), it declare itself as separation, disintegration and decomposition. To clarify this point, we need to turn to the Deleuze's analysis ones again:

> The fact is that the will to power rules even in the inorganic world, or rather that there is no inorganic world. Action at a distance cannot be eliminated, for one thing attracts another and a thing feels itself attracted. This is the fundamental fact. […] Nietzsche likes to compare the phenomena of atomic disintegration, the division of protoplasm and the reproduction of organic life. And not only do disintegration, division and separation always express will to power but so do being disintegrated, being separated and being divided: "Division appears as the consequence of the will to power" (*Deleuze Nietzsche* 58-59).

The will to power understood as affectivity is the ability to decompose, to reset the state of being a material that has the ability to perceive effect, and is nothing else except this ability. Decomposition understood in such way is at the same time the beginning, as what is decomposed is ready to be composed again, to perceive an influence and to be formed as the result of this perception. Therefore affectivity might be understood simultaneously as decay and beginning.

Both Nietzsche and Lyotard understand affectivity as a beginning. Affectivity is at the same time the beginning of speech and the plasticity of the organic and inorganic worlds – that is because on the level of pure affectivity there is no difference between the domain of words and the domain of things – on that level all of these components are only lack, plasticity and adaptability.

Decomposition is a consequence of the will to power. But there should be something that is solidified, so that is could be later decomposed. In the social sphere that what is solidified is a common sense.

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To comprehend another aspect of relationship between affectivity and the ability for modification we should take a look at the Nietzsche's analysis of pity. He criticizes the propensity of feeling pity for suffering of the others. As the argument for this criticism he states that the discipline of great suffering is the only source which produces an enhancement of humanity.

To educate human means to cultivate in her the ability for the great suffering, that is to say the ability to endure and to completely submit herself to this enduring, to become what perceives an effect, what becomes affected.

For Nietzsche, well-being of the man makes him ridiculous and his destruction desirable. Well-being is not the beginning of the way and not a goal, it is an end. Suffering is the material for transformation with which one can work and as a result of this work to acquire her greatness.

> The tension of soul in misfortune which communicates to it its energy, its shuddering in view of rack and ruin, its inventiveness and bravery in undergoing, enduring, interpreting, and exploiting misfortune, and whatever depth, mystery, disguise, spirit, artifice, or greatness has been bestowed upon the soul—has it not been bestowed through suffering, through the discipline of great suffering? In man CREATURE and CREATOR are united: in man there is not only matter, shred, excess, clay, mire, folly, chaos; but there is also the creator, the sculptor, the hardness of the hammer, the divinity of the spectator, and the seventh day—do you understand this contrast? (*Beyond* 140)

In other words, it can be stated that humans consist of two parts: one is "matter, shred, excess, clay, mire, folly, chaos" and the other is creator. Suffering as cultivation of human is a manifestation of the interaction of these two parts. Human suffering is a manifestation of the process of her formation.

Suffering indicates that certain impressions were received and processed, that there takes place a conflict and modification. Suffering is the most acute

reaction to the environment, it is an entering into contact with it, letting it to affect you.

Such openness to the influence, susceptibility to it enables capturing of a portion of stimulus of environment, and through this, receiving the material for interpretation.

The absence of suffering, that is, well-being, indicates that the process of perception and processing of perception does not occur, thus there is no creator who processes the material, as there is no inflow of material.

The fact of suffering designates that one has exceeded the limits of her adaptability to the environment. This means that the suffering necessarily results in the shift to another level of interaction with this environment, a rapprochement with it, that is to say in elevation of level of mutual modification of both, of that what affects and what is affected.

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To comprehend the possibility of coincidence of passivity and activity it is useful to refer to Nietzsche's thinking about forgetfulness. The ability to forget is an active rather than a negative. Although forgetfulness means the loss of memories, at the same time, it means creating an empty space in which alone can appear something new. In other words, forgetfulness is the ability to erase any content and by this to generate the lack, thus to make room for the new.

> To shut the doors and windows of consciousness for a while; not to be bothered by the noise and battle which our underworld of serviceable organs work with and against each other; a little peace, a little tabula rasa of consciousness to make room for something new, above all for the nobler functions and functionaries, for ruling, predicting, predetermining (our organism runs along oligarchic lines, you see) - that, as I said, is the benefit of active forgetfulness, like a doorkeeper or guardian of mental order, rest and

etiquette: from which can immediately see how there could be no happiness, cheerfulness, hope, pride, immediacy, without forgetfulness. The person in whom this apparatus of suppression is damaged, so that it stops working, can be compared (and not just compared) to a dyspeptic; he cannot 'cope' with anything. (*Genealogy* 35)

Nietzsche calls forgetfulness "plastic, regenerative and curative force" (qtd. in *Deleuze Nietzsche* 106). Interpreting Nietzsche's concept of forgetfulness, Deleuze says that "wax of consciousness hardens" (*Deleuze Nietzsche* 106) if one has no ability to forget. Such hardening is opposed to the active ability of forgetfulness.

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If we are to combine Nietzsche's and Lyotard's ideas on affectivity, we might start with the following remark.

Even in everyday language phrase 'state of affect' indicates that someone who is in this state does not control herself while some other force possesses her. In other words, state of affect makes one suitable for something external to take possession over her, that is, makes one suitable for interaction.

As it was pointed out earlier, in Lyotard's interpretation phrase-affect, which belongs to the childhood, is, associated with the absence of linkage, and therefore with defencelessness to reality. We might interpret this defencelessness as revealing of the ability to be affected, that is, as the ability to disavow one's identity and thereby to get to the layer of unconditional openness to the influence and of the lack of completeness.

It is in this sense that the will to power is affectivity. Only by way of a return to the original affectivity, one receives a possibility to open an access to it.

Affectivity is the layer on which the access to the generative force (to the will to power) is opened, thus is reachable for as. It is a place of absence of any sense,

but this absence is constitutive for any possibility of making sense. It is an absence of sense out of which generation of sense starts.

The passage from the constitutive absence of sense to making sense is reflected in the image of transition from childhood to adulthood. That transition presupposes shock – the ability to be affected in a sufficient degree.

7   Reinterpretation of phenomenon

Arguing from Nietzschean perspective it can be claimed that till today all existing values are Christian values, that is, products of the reactive force that embody the will to nothingness. What Nietzsche calls the transmutation or transvaluation of all values: it is an annihilation of existing values and generation of the new, thus it is the penetration to a genetic level of force (to the will to power), through which all values are produced.

In nihilism, which is the ultimate expression of reactive forces, already exists the possibility of its transcendence and self-denial, and it can only be overcome from within itself, that is by evaluation of the devaluation of all the values as self-sufficient value itself (in other words, when the devaluation of all values becomes an affirmative value).

Using Nietzsche's terminology, we can explain this by saying that morality and religion occur as an error, as begotten with reactive forces, but later it can overcome its nature, by becoming the servants of the active forces.

Here how Deleuze explains this switch:

> Religion has as many senses as there are forces capable of taking possession of it. But religion itself is a force with a greater or lesser affinity for the forces that take possession of it and that it takes possession of itself. Insofar as religion is possessed by forces of a different nature it does not reach its higher degree, the only one that matters, where it would cease to be a means. On the contrary, when it is conquered by forces of the same nature, or when, growing up, it takes possession of these forces and shakes off the yoke of those which dominated it in its infancy, it then discovers its own essence in its higher degree. But, each time that Nietzsche speaks to us of an active religion, a religion of the strong, a religion without ressentiment or bad conscience, he is talking of a state in which religion finds itself subjugated by forces of an entirely different nature from its own and cannot unmask itself: religion as "procedure of selection and education in the hands of philosophers". Even in

the case of Christ, religion as belief or faith remains entirely subjugated by the force of a practice which merely gives "the feeling of being divine". (*Deleuze Nietzsche* 134)

In other words, although religion and its elements (such as morality, common values, concept of an individual) – although all this appear as an error, and only as an error it may occur – that error in itself has the potential of its correction.

Besides the only way for the will to power to unfold is to appears first as an error, and then correct it through the self-denial and self- annihilation, that is, through the return to the roots and transmutation.

When this erroneousness (of the religion, morality, etc.) becomes obvious, it does not lead to the liquidation of this phenomenon, on the contrary, it becomes valuable, and not despite of the fact that elements of it make no sense, but because of it, they become valuable as an open space for new meanings. The play of annihilation becomes a itself valuable and affirming.

The fact that it is a lie and that it is revealed should not prevent us from further development of these structures. But they should be developed not as a genuine phenomena but as a plastic material for formation.

On the contrary, the accusation of these phenomena, blaming them for being a lie and manipulation, attempts to fight them and to get rid of them indicate that these phenomena are still taken too much seriously and perceived as a real threat.

To perceive something as a plastic material, means not to take it seriously and not to fear it, thus attain the possibility to master it by making it a part of the game of interpretation.

In this respect, if we return to the concept of childhood, it has as many meanings as many there are forces that can take possession of it. It can be subjugated by the forces completely different from its own nature: although childhood is a

moral and disciplinary apparatus, it does not mean that it is vain and embodies degradation, as well as the very morality and discipline.

The concept of a child is purposeless, is has no end goal that should be achieved as a result of its development or stability, as there is no original meaning of this concept. All there is is senselessness and only through engaging in which it is possible to generate new meanings.

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The history of any phenomenon is a history of influences on it, a history of modification of it within its state of plasticity, a history of its obtaining new meanings and alteration of these meanings.

Its history begins when a certain amount of reality being formed into a concept and starts to exist as that which has relatively defined its boundaries. The history of a phenomenon is a history of its subordination, of taking possession of it, its humiliation, of brutal destruction of its borders and the abolition of its independence.

"A thing is sometimes this, sometimes that, sometimes something more complicated — depending on the forces (the gods) which take possession of it." (*Deleuze Nietzsche* 4)

There is no one-and-only true meaning of the phenomenon, there is only the relationship of the material and the influence that if falls under: only a subjugation, dependence, capturing of the phenomenon and blurring of its borders. "All subjugation, all domination amounts to a new interpretation". (*Deleuze Nietzsche* 3)

Nietzsche claims that there is no distinct sense of things and "What matters in all things is the higher levels" (*Philosophy* 30). However the highest level of the

phenomenon or thing is the state of its absence, of distortion of its borders, the state in which it does not coincide with itself.

In order to better understand what does reinterpretation of the past means we can refer to Nietzsche's definition of real philosophers.

> The real philosophers, however, are commanders and law-givers; they say: "Thus shall it be!" They determine first the Whither and the Why of mankind, and thereby set aside the previous labour of all philosophical workers, and all subjugators of the past they grasp at the future with a creative hand, and whatever is and was, becomes for them thereby a means, an instrument, and a hammer. Their "knowing" is creating, their creating is a law-giving, their will to truth is –will to power. Are there at present such philosophers? (*Beyond* 92).

The real philosopher is a conqueror of the past, she transforms what is given by using it as a means, that is, she is the one who is able to grasp existing phenomena as material. Her cognitive= creative = law-giving activity is an activity of the victorious interpretation of existing phenomena.

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"A force is domination, but also the object on which domination is exercised". (*Deleuze Nietzsche* 6) Put differently, that which affects, reveals itself as a force when it detects as a force what it affects.

At the same time we argue that the material, namely the affectivity is a 'pure' will to power. Hence something can capture the part of reality, influence it, if it identifies it as a resisting force and at the same time as a material for capturing= interpretation.

When a phenomenon (which is a delineated part of the reality) is captured by a new force – that is to say influenced and affected by it – because by this it

reveals to be a pure affectivity, it starts to imitate that by what it is captured. It starts to reflect this force, it accepts its imprint, for the reason that it is by itself nothing else than the material: the ability to be influenced. Through this what was reflected and caused the influence, in its reflection ceases to be a reflection of itself. The imprint of it, its influence and the imitation of the material, create a gap: the space in which alone something can be generated, and a new meaning can occur. The discrepancy between the reflection and that what is reflected causes a generation of new contours and meanings of the phenomenon.

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If we are to further correlate these arguments with Lyotard's concept of childhood- affectivity, we can say that by analogy with the maturation of a person the maturation of society, which is constituted by a certain phenomenon occurs through a return to the childhood of society, to the detection of the beginning of this phenomenon - if not to say the lack – and through further active anew processing of it.

As we saw, Lyotard explains childhood affective shock by drawing the line of analogy with the shock experienced by pagan affectivity caused by the Law.

The statement that religion appears as an error, means that once it appeared, it couldn't remain in the state of emergence, it immediately started to identify itself as complete and always present. The same is with an adult – once she begins perceiving herself as an adult, she starts to identify herself as complete and self-sufficient. To be an adult means to know something that child does not know. But there is difference between "to know" and "to cognize" (to learn, getting to know). The former indicates the state of completeness (already "having come to know") while the later indicates the condition of lack of knowledge, which presupposes the ability to perceive new, to be influenced and traumatized by the new. This condition is associated with childhood.

Anew discovery of one's childhood implies "going back" to the state where there is affectivity but there is no ability to be addressed. To open this state in

oneself means to fall into the possession of forces that let one keep herself in the mode of being a material to work with: to open oneself as incomplete, fix oneself as an error and discover oneself as stupidity, which alone can be a start of real adulthood.

The same state can be discovered within interpersonal phenomena, such as the religion. To open within religion the state which is analogous to the state of childhood means to "go back" to the state which was opened by the very appearance of religion and which made phenomenon of religion possible – to reveal it's state of affectivity and plasticity.

7.1   Nietzsche's image of the child

Nietzsche stresses the need to leave necessity and causality behind: "Most important point of view: to gain the of becoming by expelling purposes. Necessity, causality - no more!" (ltd. in *Braak Nietzsche* 131) Through assertion of chance as a mechanism of affirmation, he gave nobility to all things, as he released them from their servitude under purpose. "This blessed security have I found in all things, that they prefer to dance on the feet of chance" (*Thus* 132). Chance is that which confronts guilt, to release something from servitude under purpose means to make it innocent.

What is more, releasing things from the purpose imply understanding them as a play of forces which produce new interpretations. The notion of innocence here is associated with the absence of guilt – of that which can appear only when certain ready-made sense is declared to be the purpose of the thing. The guilt can be imputed to the thing only if it is assumed that there exists a pattern to which this thing should match, and this matching presumes to be the purpose of the thing, while the dismatching results in the imputation of guilt. Nietzsche frees things from that purpose and by this gives them nobility.

Possibility of generating new meanings involves innocence, removal of guilt, and therefore the release from the purpose. In this sense, the lack of guilt is the lack of a clear framework for the meaning of things.

State of innocence, Nietzsche compares with the innocence of a child. "Suffer the chance to come unto me: innocent is it as a little child!" (*Thus* 139). Man does now know how to play, he is unable to affirm chance by casting the dice. The one who knows how to play is a child.

Nietzsche's describes third metamorphosis of the spirit as turning from lion into a child. Here is how Nietzsche unfolds the image of the child:

> Innocence is the child, and forgetfulness, a new beginning, a game, a self-rolling wheel, a first movement, a holy Yea. Aye, for the game of creating, my brethren, there is needed a holy Yea unto life: ITS OWN will, willeth now the spirit; HIS OWN world winneth the world's outcast. (*Thus* 31)

While analysing Nietzsche's image of the child, Robert Gooding-Williams points out that

> The essence of the third metamorphosis is not a transition from willing to being (that is, from "I will" to "I am"), but a shift in self-understanding that involves a disappearance of the idea of a substantial subject (a so-called "doer behind the deed") to whom various acts of willing can be ascribed. The child, far from saying "I am" or "I will", does not say "I" at all. Rather, he "wills his own will", thereby appearing to acknowledge no substantial subject but only the act of willing itself. (*Gooding-Williams* 41)

Following this line of thought we might claim that the state of childhood is a state of deflation of substantial subject. However, although the state of childhood is an absence of a subject as an objectively existing entity, it nonetheless maintains the processes of subjectivity. That is a process in which there is yet no "I" to be spoken, there is a will, but it is not yet the will of someone who refers to herself as "I", it is a will of the will.

This volition is a capturing of the real (of fragments and pieces that make up the material) and the processing of the captured elements. It is a certain point of accumulation of the will, the drawing of borders.

The childhood, that is the third metamorphosis of the spirit is not a desubjectivation, rather it presupposes a different understanding of subjectivity – not as the condition of being an entity called "subject", but as a state, which never results in being subject.

At the same time, we can argue that becoming a child, than is a third metamorphosis of Zarathustra, is the acquisition of real maturity. Although the transformation from lion into a child is described at the beginning of the Nietzsche's book, Zarathustra will undergo this metamorphosis, thus become a child only at the end of the book.

The innocence, playfulness – ability to expel purposes, is simultaneously the manifestation of childhood and of the real maturity.

"The maturity of man—that means, to have reacquired the seriousness that one had as a child at play" (*Beyond* 57)

Getting rid of purposes is the acquisition of courage and freedom.

"The absolute necessity to completely get rid of purposes: otherwise we won't dare to try to offer ourselves up and let go! Only the innocence of becoming gives us the greatest courage and the greatest freedom!" (qtd. in *Braak Nietzsche* 131)

The child is an image of "new beginning", redemption from guilt and revenge, a radical break with what came before, which only a real adult is capable to accomplish.

Nietzsche states that the progress of human thinking and the characteristic of the one who thinks already beyond good and evil, the one who is a cheerful and world-affirming – is that all what before was taken seriously by mankind, the

most ingenious concept invented by man (such as the concept of God and the concept of sin) for her seems to be a toy in children's hands.

But that is not because there will appear some other serious concepts, but because to be a real adulthood – means to perceive all of them as a game and fun. And at the same time, the real adult, will be "always childish enough, an eternal child". (*Beyond* 50)

7.2   Auf den Versuch hin leben

The word "maturity" Nietzsche uses to describe "free spirits":

> […] to that matured freedom of the spirit which is, in an equal degree, self mastery and discipline of the heart, and gives access to the path of much and various reflection—to that inner comprehensiveness and self satisfaction of over-richness which precludes all danger that the spirit has gone astray even in its own path and is sitting intoxicated in some corner or other; to that overplus of plastic, healing, imitative and restorative power which is the very sign of vigorous health, that overplus which confers upon the free spirit the perilous prerogative of spending a life in experiment and of running adventurous risks: the past-master-privilege of the free spirit." (*Human* 7)

Apart from the fact that for Nietzsche, the freedom of spirit is its maturity, he also associates this state with the possession of the "plastic, healing, imitative and restorative power" furthermore, he opposes that possession to the condition, when there is still a danger to stop on the way: to convert to one of the worldviews, being unable anymore to cast doubt on each of them and all of them. But at the same time the possession of plastic power is not just doesn't abolish but even presuppose self-discipline. These are two of the elements (the possession of plastic power and self-discipline) that compose the lifestyle of free spirits, which Nietzsche calls the "life in experiment" ("Auf den Versuch hin leben").

To better understand what it mean to spend a life in experiment, we might first reflect on what the word "experiment" mean.

The standard definition of experiment is an experiment is "an orderly procedure carried out with the goal of verifying, refuting, or establishing the validity of a hypothesis." Except that life as an experiment does not presuppose a ready-made hypothesis that has to be verified. However, the absence of hypothesis does not abolish the need of experiment, on the contrary it allows experiment to go on endlessly and to produce hypothesis.

Experiment is in a certain sense an attempt that in advance is doomed to failure. It is not yet effectivity, but it is being done for the sake of efficiency. And life which is lived as an ongoing experiment, is a never-ending experiment which has no purpose that can be achieved (purpose can make subsequent experiments unnecessary).

We can draw a parallel between this type of experiment and the state of childhood. Everything that child do, that is to say, everything that constitutes the practice of the child can be considered as an experiment, because what she does is an exploration on the basis of not-yet knowing. Scientific experiment may be considered as taking over and transformation of the practice of childhood.

Courage is what corresponds to the experimental way of life, to be more precise, it is what corresponds to an awareness and acceptance of the fact that the state of the experiment will last forever. That is, that childhood (unprepared, uncertainty) will never pass into adulthood (the state of certainty). Real adulthood is that which never embodies completely, it persists as not embodied to the end. Real adult is someone who is never convinced to the end, never converted to ready-made worldview.

Thus, life in experiment may be understood as the absence of ready-made norms and patterns to realize. The implementation of ready-made norms corresponds to fake adulthood. In the case of the fake adulthood, the child is one who is not familiar with how to be, for example, a woman or a man. A grown-up,

respectively, is the one who is already familiar with these patterns and implement them.

Experiment is the state of invention patterns. To carry on in this state, uncertainty and daring are needed, and that is plasticity. In other words, life in experiment it never ending replacement of childhood with adulthood.

8   A genealogy of play

8.1   Spheres of seriousness and unseriousness

With the emergence of the modern concept of child in the seventeenth century there appeared a division into sphere of seriousness and sphere of unseriousness. The newly discovered domain of childhood has become a place of concentration of unseriousness and, respectively, the newly discovered domain of adulthood has become a place where seriousness belongs.

Games, toys, and fairy tales from that time became associated almost exclusively with childhood, as an adult's destiny started to be linked with seriousness, not with play.

To a large extent childhood was constituted as a delineation (and at the same time establishment) of area of unserious. While the sphere adulthood was delineated as a sphere of a truly serious things.

The newly appeared division into seriousness and unseriousness was a reflection of the emergence of the scientific worldview, that is, of the worldview based on representation, which presupposes awareness of the presence of some external to the individual objective reality. In other words, the man has become the subject of knowledge by opposing herself to the object of knowledge – the objective reality. From that time there appears the criteria for asserting that something is serious. This criteria is objectivity.

From there on, individual was no longer a part of the natural world, but a being distinct from the natural world, who cognizes it opposing herself to it. She has put distance between the nature and herself in an attempt to understand and master it. Such cognition and mastering constituted a sphere of seriousness and nobility.

The former worldview within which the individual has not been subtracted from

the realm of nature, that is, has not yet become the knowing subject started to be perceived as a demonstration of immaturity.

What is now associated with children once was a constitutive element of special worldview not familiar with the differentiation into individual and collective, as well as differentiation into the subject of cognition and the object of cognition.

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Until the seventeenth century there was no clear distinction between the forms of pastime for children and for adult. Field of activity was homogeneous, it was not yet clearly structured in accordance with the understanding of what children should do, and what should adults. Accordingly, the child has not yet been associated with the game. Aries claims that there was no strict division between children's games and those played by adults.

Before the life activities were divided into serious and unserious there did not yet exist a criterion by which the child could be separated out of the mass of human beings. Thus, the sphere of human activity was undifferentiated: people of all ages were involved in the same types of activities. The child has not yet become something separate from the adult and the adult has not ceased to be a child.

From the evidence of the Middle Ages iconography which depicts people at play we know that before the seventeenth century children from the age of four were playing the same games as adults, either in the collective of adults or in the collective of other children. Thus Middle Ages children were playing games, which nowadays considered as games for adults. For instance, there were no rules that prohibited children to play games of chance, and to play for money.

Conversely, adults were playing games which today are played only by children, such as, for example, hide-and-seek, blind-man's buff and snowball fight. While analysing Middle Ages iconography of games historian Van Marie commented:

"As for the games played by grown-ups, one cannot honestly say that they were any less childish than those played by children". (qtd. in *Aries* 72)

Games formed an essential part of traditional ceremonies. Later when games lost their communal character and sacred symbolism they became individual and profane and as such were confined to children.

Toys which, since the seventeenth century have come to be associated with children, had previously belonged to the world of adults. To be more precise:

> What eventually became an individual toy unconnected with the community or the calendar and devoid of any social content, would appear to have been linked at first with traditional ceremonies which brought together children and adolescents - between whom, in any case, there was no clear distinction - and adults. (*Aries* 68)

There was no clear distinction between doll as a child's toy and as the part of the word of the adults. As such dolls were the objects of a household, of funerary cult, etc. For this reason Aries states "what in modern times was to become their (children's) monopoly, they had to share in ancient times, at least with the dead". (*Aries* 69)

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Today adult's immersion in the game is considered to be an escape from the world of serious things and therefore perceived as childish behaviour. And it can not be perceived in a different way in the time when the world is strictly divided into the sphere of activities that are suitable for children and activities that are suitable for adults. Within this division game has completely fallen within the domain of childhood, the world of unserious.

Aries claims that in the Middle Ages the work – that which today is considered to be a sphere of serious activities – did not have so much importance and did not play such a significant role in society as in our times (see *Aries* 72).

Whereas activities, which we would consider today as unserious, were paid much more attention than they are in our days. The game played an important role in the lives of people, both adults and children. Prior to the differentiation of passtimes into serious and unserious, the game was an essential part of social life.

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Public evaluation of games from a position of morality began to appear in the seventeenth century, simultaneously with the formation of the modern concept of childhood. Before this concept came into being, there was no need to distinguish between games that are morally comprehensible or incomprehensible, for the reason that there was not yet a child in the modern understanding of the word – a creatures whose innocence should be protected and who should be formed in accordance with moral norms.

From the seventeenth century a new attitude to games began to form, the one which is quite similar to our attitude, but essentially different from perception of games in Middle Ages. This new attitude to games "bears witness to a new attitude to childhood: a desire to safeguard its morality and also to educate it, by forbidding it to play games henceforth classified as evil and by encouraging it to play games henceforth recognized as good". (*Aries* 82)

Medieval church criticized games, while the general public has long remained indifferent to their moral evaluation. Since the seventeenth century, games become part of the project of formation of children. Those that were recognized as the most useful were included in educational programs. On this basis education had adopted games which it previously condemned as morally harmful. Thus the acceptability of the game at the times of formation of moral consciousness was determined by its capacity to fit into the sphere of serious activities.

One of the examples of inclusion of the game into formational program can be found in the history of emergence of physical culture. It was developed by the doctors of eighteenth century on the basis of inspiration from the old exercise games.

With the development of the disciplinary society, physical health of the individual becomes of great importance. Together with this physical games become highly valued as they was a part of programs of health maintenance. While the rise of nationalism physical games found another justification, they become part of the training of a soldiers.

> Thus, under the successive influence of the humanist pedagogues, the doctors of the Enlightenment and the first nationalists, we have come from the violent and suspect games of the Middle Ages to gymnastics and military training, from popular tussles to gymnastic societies. (*Aries* 90)

These changes were dictated by the new social need that has appeared during this time – the need to care for individual physical and moral health. As a result of such changes, games that used to be a significant part of social life and in which all ages were equally involved, have now gained specialization in accordance with which they were divided into categories: according to the age and social status. Unserious pastimes for children stared to be considered unworthy of a respectable serious man.

> Thus in the seventeenth century a distinction was made between the games of adults and noblemen and the games of children and yokels. The distinction was an old one, dating back to the Middle Ages. But in the Middle Ages, from the twelfth century to be precise, it applied only to certain games, few in number and distinctive in character: the courtly games. Before that, before the final constitution of the idea of nobility, games were common to all people, whatever their rank. (*Aries* 92)

A sphere of seriousness came into being along with the emergence of moral consciousness. Games have retained their importance to the extent to which they could be absorbed by this sphere. Everything that in the game could not serve

the purposes of serious adult world was given to the child, thus become a part of the world of unserious activities.

8.2   The generative potential of play

It is worth to reflect on what was lost and, conversely, what opportunities were opened together with the loss of the old perception of play and with the advent of modern attitude towards it.

Today play is associated with relaxation, thus with something that is opposite to responsible and serious activities. Within the habitual patterns of everyday consciousness the play as unserious activity is opposed to the work, which is serious activity. Life priorities of modern individual are established in such a way that the worthy sense of human life is seen in striving for honour and knowledge. Under such priorities play is perceived as occasional interruption on the way towards the realization of worthy life goals, or as an attempt to escape from reality into a fictional world.

One of the basic characteristics of the type of individual, which began to be formed in the seventeenth century, is that she sees her life as a task to be accomplished. She lives in constant anticipation of the future, in preparation for the future. This perception of life constitutes an adult worldview.

Play is essentially inconsistent with this vision of life. It serves no goal that is external in relation to it. Play, as activity, is not suitable as a means for accomplishing tasks. It is self-sufficient and self-maintaining action. The meaning of play is closed on itself.

Within the modern worldview, play can only be perceived in a negative sense as an obstacle on the way to the accomplishment of life tasks and thus as something that is opposed to work as purposeful activity.

In order for play to be perceived as a positive phenomenon – as a transition to a different mode of existence, other than our usual modus – the different worldview is needed.

Despite the fact that nowadays play has diminished its value and has been negated as a valuable entity, in the phenomenon of play, which is still articulated in today's society, nevertheless lies the potential that could be actualized with a view of transforming this society.

Play that has become a part of immovable mode of common sense can be re-interpreted in such a way that a new understanding of it will modify the very common sense.

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In order to unveil hidden meanings of the play, we should return here to Nietzsche's thoughts.

Category of play is fundamental to Nietzsche's philosophy. He considered play to be a highest form of human activity. Furthermore, play is the only type of activity that is capable to overcome nihilism.

To extend these theses we have to turn again to Nietzsche's allegory of three metamorphoses, which symbolizes the progressive transformation of human spirit. In the first stage of development of human spirit it is symbolized by a camel – the one who is loaded down with the weight of obsolete commandments, dead authorities, and traditions that have lost their meaning.

Spirit's transformation from camel to lion symbolizes the release from this weight. He proclaims sacred "No" to all moral demands upon him. By this human spirit conquers his freedom for creating new values. At this stage, the human spirit not only frees itself, but also makes reality suitable for transformation. By this it paves the way for the possibility of the play, that is, for the possibility of creative processing of reality. Lion's sacred "No" is a

preparation of the ground for the play, the destruction of the old, its transformation into nothing.

During the third transformation liberated human spirit in a creative play turns into a child. The image of the child is the image of the one who is capable of play of creating. Within this transformation the whole world passes through the transformation; it ceases to exist as an authentic. It becomes a platform for transformation through the play, it converts into material for creative play. Only such a situation makes it possible for new values to be generated.

Creation is only possible as a play, since only by playing it is possible to use the world, which was reduced to nothingness, as the source for the new. "In this world only play, play as artists and children engage in it, exhibits coming-to-be and passing away, structuring and destroying, without any moral additive, in forever equal innocence". (*Philosophy* 62)

The movement of the play is the a movement from the world the meaning of which has already been formed to a world in which its meaning gets an opportunity to be generated again.

In The Joyful Wisdom, Nietzsche describes the final stage of spirit's development as 'the great health', which reveals itself as a play:

> Another ideal runs ahead of us, a strange, tempting, dangerous ideal to which we should not wish to persuade anybody because we do not readily concede the right to it to anyone: the ideal of a spirit who plays naively — that is, not deliberately but from overflowing power and abundance — with all that was hitherto called holy, good, untouchable, divine; for whom those supreme things that the people naturally accept as their value standards, signify danger, decay, debasement, or at least recreation, blindness, and temporary self-oblivion; the ideal of a human, superhuman well-being and benevolence that will often appear inhuman — for example, when it confronts all earthly seriousness so far, all solemnity in gesture, word, tone, eye, morality, and task so far, as if it were their most incarnate and involuntary parody — and in spite of all of this, it is perhaps only with him that great seriousness really begins,

that the real question mark is posed for the first time, that the destiny of the soul changes, the hand moves forward, the tragedy begins. (*Joyful* 352)

Spirit plays naively with "everything that was hitherto called holy, good, untouchable and divine". Thus with all the morality, all the old values are no longer to be taken seriously, they become objects of play. And only with this unseriousness great seriousness begins.

In this context, play can also be perceived as an experiment; and the child, as mentioned above, as the experimenter. Experiment transforms all the values into something weightless and unsubstantial.

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Play is a space of creativity. Its mode of existence is nothingness, out of which it produces a new world. Play occurs in the so-called real world, but the imaginary world, which it creates, is not less real. Abolishing the real, reducing it to nothingness, the play uses it to create a new reality. By this the play erases the usual division into real and unreal: that division, which was introduced with the emergence of classical scientific worldview.

From the point of view of settled common sense, the play is that what hides the real world or that where we hide from reality. However, the other point of view is possible, from the perspective of which the play is the production of a new self-sufficient reality. Although to functions as a transformational opportunity, the game needs the real world, it needs it as something to abolish by transforming into the material for generative work. The real world is only a point of departure for a journey of generativity of play.

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Understanding play as the highest form of human activity, we can expand our reflections by arguing that play constitutes an essential part of the culture. Any development of culture – be it development of art or progress in science - is only possible in the form of articulation of this constitutive element, for the reason that it is a play that allows an inexhaustible opportunity for the new to emerge, it prepares the ground for this: by transforming the old into unserious matter it makes it possible not to remain within the old forms, but to generate new.

Nietzsche associates the process of thinking with playful activity. He states that thinking is "playful pondering of material. This spontaneous play of fantasizing force is our fundamental intellectual life" (qtd. in *Hinman* 117)

It can be said that thinking as a play is the highest type of thinking, as it is creative thinking that is capable of generating a new and, therefore of the transformation of culture.

Play remains an area, which is not subjected to moral laws, that is over which moral laws have no control. Play implies becoming and renewal because it is not under the authority of the old norms. The rules of play are generated within play and serve only the purpose of play.

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Play allows such a relationship to reality, which is unattainable by any other means. Only in play world reveals itself as a play of forces, hence only in play it reveals itself as plastic, thus as suitable for transformation.

However, it should be noted that there is no subject of the transformation or formation of the world, on the contrary, the formation is only possible as a consequence of a blurring of the subject's boundaries. In other words, overcoming of norms and values and the generation of the new is only possible when the subject stops to represent any ultimate meaning or point toward any

final goal, when it becomes the one with the interplay of forces, joining through this the creative play of the world.

In this sense, the experience of the play is the experience of nothingness, of the lack of formedness of the world, which is the starting point for involvement into its formation.

In a game the player is identified with the content of the game she plays, thus she ceases to exist outside of the game. In this way she destroys herself, while creating herself anew, this time not as a part of the real world, but as a part of an generated world that has been generated by the game.

It could be argued that in a certain sense the subject of the game is not possible it can only exist as lacking, as that which dissolved in the game. This absence of the subject of the game allows access into the universal play, through which formation and diversity affirm themselves.

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Example of medieval attitude towards games allows us to transcend today's traditional division into play and work, that is, into spheres of seriousness and unseriousness. As a result of such transcendence, we also get a chance to transform the traditional concept of child, as it is a part of the conception of the world divided into serious and unserious.

In this part of my work I made an attempt to reveal such an understanding of the play, which is not consistent with the settled common sense understanding of the meaning of play. The perception of play which is presented here blurs relatively recently formed borders of serious and unserious. As has been shown, the play, understood as the highest human activity, is both unserious pastime and the expression of the highest type of seriousness. In this context the child, that is, the playful creature, appears as the one who is simultaneously involved into that which is unserious and that which is the most serious of all.

The modern concept of child emerged in result of division of reality into spheres of seriousness and unseriousness. Within it child's destiny is to be a part of the sphere of unserious. Games are that which constitutes this sphere. Accordingly, the child is a displacement of the play into the sphere of unseriousness.

Today's concept of child still conceals that what was then expelled into it, that due to what it was formed. It conceals the generative potential of the game, although through this concealment it simultaneously denies it, it still remains the storage location of this potential.

Concept the child is a part of our thinking, it represents a way of its functioning. Hence, on the reverse side of our thinking there are hidden traces of that which was expelled under the guise of unseriousness: the great unseriousness, which is at the same time a real seriousness.

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On a practical everyday level the erasure of distinction between spheres of seriousness and unseriousness means the elimination of boundaries between play and work. Those boundaries would be removed for the reason that there would remain no criterion in accordance with which some kind of activity might be called "work". The limits of the field of creativity would be expanded, and the activity that previously constituted the sphere seriousness, would become a part of this field.

Such changes is not appropriate to describe as mixing of spheres of seriousness and unseriousness, it is rather an absorption of the sphere of seriousness by the sphere of unseriousness – such absorption liberates "serious" activity for its free interpretation, that is, makes it suitable to become part of the field of generativity.

When the distinction between spheres of seriousness and unseriousness is erased, the whole life becomes a game, thus allowing a person, who now turned into a player to take a position of active interpreter.

To play life as if it were a game is more effective than to live life. Life that is played, does not depend on previously established norms, values and practices. It functions in accordance with its internal laws, that is, it is dependent only on the reality it has created. Established norms, values and practices it uses as toys, weaving them into the fabric of its stories. For to become a toy – is the best destiny for the products of the past.

9   The flow of language generation and the state of childhood

The most important task of this chapter is to sketch the general context of such understanding of language of which my comprehension of the concept of child is a part. At some points I will proceed from the Deleuzian social-philosophy of DeLanda.

9.1   Entities out of the flow

Every entity is an occurrence of stable state in the flow of material. Such entities are people, words, things, etc. Flow is a source of every stable structure. Each separate entity is a history of solidification and of de-solidification of material in different forms, to put it in another way, it is a history of positing and blurring of borders of entities, of stabilization and destabilization of those borders.

Interpreting Deleuze and Guattari concept of body without organs, DeLanda explains that the real word is the unformed and unstructured flows. It is a coexistence of actualizations of a stable state of material. The idea of body without organs presupposes that the organism is not a body but the stratum in the body without organs, that is to say a phenomenon of coagulation and imposition of the form.

Culture is not something opposed to the materiality, on the contrary, it is a constitutive part of the transformation of the material flow. "Culture is not a completely separate sphere of reality, but instead mixes and blends with flows of organic (and even mineral) materials". (*DeLanda* 111) [6]

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[6] In this respect we can claim that a child is a historical concept, does not implement that the child does not actually exist. Everything that exists is a historical product, everything was generated through the process of history: mountains, people, language. There is no

The whole history (history of human culture and history of the word without human) is a history of homogenization and de-homogenization, therefore of the processes of stabilization and de-stabilization of the flow of material. Those processes are what history distinguishes and describes, furthermore, there is nothing else to be described.

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The world seen as unformed flow cannot be divided into subjects and objects. World as flow is a compilation of entities which are subjectivations without subjects. There is no essential difference between different types of entities, it is just that each category of entity (words, humans, things, etc.) employ a special way of subjectivation. Namely, each category produces and maintains its own type of boundaries.

In can be said that entity (the process of subjectivation) is a force, the principal activity of which is to delineate its boundaries. These boundaries are not solid, they become defined and redefined through the process of subjectivation and through the interactions of subjectivations. But this does not mean that objectively there are no boundaries of entities.

Any entity, be it a word or a thing, is a portion of an unformed flow. An amount of a flow, which gains a sufficient level of stability, can be considered a separate entity. Its separateness is not something that is set by our subjective perception. However, our subjective perception, that is to say, our interrelation with an entity, has a power to move, to blur or to strengthen the limits of entities, although it never totally exhausts it.

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fundamental difference between biological and cultural, it exists only in the specifics of unfolding of complexity.

The defining feature of entities is their sensibility. Entities feel each other while capturing the territory and drawing their boundaries. They fall under influences of other entities and produce the influence on other entities, that is to say, they affect and are affected by one another and that is why it can be considered that subjectivation is sensibility. Entities feel one another and experience one another: they dwell within sensuality.

Mutual perception determines entities, but never completely – there always remain something which is yet undetermined, some feature of a force which is yet unrelieved by another force.

Thus, through coupling and uncoupling entities, including words, determine each other, but at the same time preserving their own borders. Words are defined by their interaction (on all vectors of the process of which they are a part: by interaction with those who utter them, with other words, etc.) Nonetheless these interactions (and definitions that are accomplished through interactions) does not fully exhaust the meaning of the word, therefore does not abolish genuine independence of the word. Words can couple with each other, can be used in different ways, but nonetheless still remain to a certain degree independent.

The genuine independence of entities appears (or declare itself, which in this case has the same meaning) only in their interaction with other entities, but at the same time, their interaction is possible only on the grounds of their genuine independence. Their independence exists in actual fact, but it appears and abolishes at the same time (it could be claimed that it appears to be abolished). Due to such a way of existence, meaning of each word never fully exhausts itself and things are never exhausted by words.

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The sphere of language is not opposed to the sphere of material things, it is a part of it. "All names work like physical labels: they do not refer to an object via

a mental entity, but directly, the way the word 'this' does". (*DeLanda* 190)

Thus, word is a material label, the same physical unity as any other sample of materiality that we get used to consider to be a material entity, in the same way as there is no essential difference between the gesture and material things.

Naming is willing, which means applying physical force. Introducing a label, putting pressure on other speakers in order to provide future circulation of the product of the fact of naming - all this are the elements of flow of language-material.

As a part of the material world, language is not a stable structure, it undergoes modifications. To express this differently, like everything else language is a historical product. It changes and its current state is just a stage of its modification.

More or less stable consolidations in the flow of variable linguistic elements form new language entities. Thus language generation occurs as thickenings in this flow.

> Our languages may also be seen over time as momentary slowing downs or thickenings in a flow of norms that gives rise to a multitude of different structures. And a similar point applies to our institutions, which may also be considered transitory hardenings in the flows of money, routines, and prestige, and, if they have acquired a permanent building to house them, in the mineral flows from which the construction materials derive." to house them. (*DeLanda* 259)

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Within the generative flow of language words affect each other, limiting one another as partly separated forces. At the same time, they form more or less stable unities, within which there takes place a distribution of the spheres of capturing of reality.

To the question: what is a source of productivity of language? - Manuel DeLanda answer is: "combinatory constraints of words". (*DeLanda* 219) It is a formative characteristic of the word and a constitutive part of its meaning, that determines the kind of words with which it may be combined. Thus each words carry with it information about the "frequency of co-occurrence with other words", that is to say, the information that contains a regulations concerning the kind of the words that may occur next. George K. Zipf called the frequency of co-occurrence of the words their degree of crystallization. (*Zipf* 154)

This implies that the meaning of the word is not something that is imposed upon it from the outside and in accordance to some external rules, on the contrary, it constitutes within the very materiality of language, as it defines by the set of other word that typically co-occurs with it, thus through it crystallization. The meaning of the word is not defined on the basis of reference to the entity it names, but through relation with other words. Hence, "the meaning of words would be determined by their combinability, not their identity". (*De Landa* 220)

In order to comprehend this more fully, we shall refer to the example of sexuality which Nikita Elizarov gives to explain the relation of physical reality to symbolic one.

> There is no human sexuality free of meaning. As soon as we start to speak (of sexuality, for example), we enter the symbolic domain, in which a word signifies not an object of reality how de Saussure thought of it (in this case, a practical usage of genital organs), but other words.

> The multiplicity of signifying each other signifiers constitutes a network, the distributions of highly interconnected symbols in which are what we know as concepts. They do have a reference to reality but not in a descriptive nor a defining sense: a model is not merely describing what it refers to — it actively models it by filtering and shaping an unordered flow of raw information into the meaningful form. It implies that the same raw material can be shaped in infinitely many forms, and, therefore, can have that many senses. The usage

of genital organs, for instance, does not posses any meaning per se, but the concepts of sexuality that refer to it can assign infinitely many. (*Elizarov)*

Individual does not interact with the words in such a way that she indicates, according to some external to the language rules, what part of reality it will designate. Individual is a constitutive element of a process of generation of language, which functions in accordance to its internal rules. "Combinatorial productivity would not result from a centralized body of rules, but from a decentralized process in which each word locally restricts the speaker's choices at each point in the construction". (*De Landa* 219)

Language is not generated through the establishment of new rules and regulations and by imposing an obligation to obey them. Any rules imposed from outside of the sphere of linguistic practices presuppose division into correct and incorrect, while development can only take place in spite of such a division, that is, when both that which in the established linguistic order is taken as incorrect, and that which is taken as correct could serve as a material for further processing within the flow of language generation.

9.2   Standardization of language: degradation or development

Standardization may be seen as a transition to the state of high level of stabilization of the flow of language generation. In other words, the standardization of language is its homogenization, which in a certain sense slows down its development. It occurs through the imposition of fixed norms by institutions and by pressure of the members of society on each other.

According to the history of language, since the sixteenth century European languages were shaped by different forces of homogenization. At that time standardised national languages were beginning to emerge in Europe, that is to say, there took place the process of homogenization of language through endeavours to linguistic change and prescribing fixed linguistic norms.

What resulted in the standardization was that since sixteenth century language started to be seen as an embodiment of some 'eternal values', language began to be perceived as stronghold of rationality, unambiguity and universality. Those elements of language that match these features were enforced as standard.

The standardization of language intensified in eighteenth century: the force of homogenization was implemented through rise of nationalism and the growth of disciplinary institutions, among which the greatest role was played by introduction of compulsory primary schooling.

The rice of nationalism caused the need of homogeneous identity for citizens, with this purpose the unified national language was set with its strict norms and prohibition against making changes. Standard national language is an engine for assimilation the masses into society, thus, into the apparatus which can function as a single unit, each part of which can be heard by another.

Compulsory primary schooling has become an effective mechanism for the suppression of all that constitutes a danger to the standardized language, all that "contaminate" it: local dialects, slangs, jargons.

Schools were one of the key instances through which the standardization of language happened. It can be stated that implementation of compulsory education system and standardization of language are mutually conditioning processes. Here is how Dick Leith explains interrelation between those phenomena:

> Some degree of standardisation is usually involved if a language is to be formally taught, if a highly centralised nation-state tends to select one linguistic variety for this purpose. A taught language inevitably becomes subject to attention and scrutiny, aimed at describing its forms and structures. One of the two goals of standardisation is the attainment of minimal variation of form. In practice, this means two things. First, eliminating variation within the standardised variety. Second, it means trying to stop linguistic change. (*Leith* 41)

Both of these tasks are performed through the codification, which is a description of correct linguistic forms. Such descriptions results in a prescription: through codification occurs evaluation of linguistic forms as 'correct' and stigmatisation of linguistic forms which are undesirable. School functions as an institutional base for codification.

Thus, codification is enforcement of linguistic norms, which is accomplished through differentiation of language variations into permitted and those that supposed to be avoided.

That is to say, standardization of language means creating a stable entities (stable names) out of changeable language material. That is, choosing among a variety of names and ways of naming only one name and only one way of naming to be identified as correct, by this sacrificing all the rest.

As a result of standardization the correct usage of names started to be understood as applying them to the right entities. After the procedure of standardization of language the rightness of the names and of the chosen way of naming started to be perceived as obvious.

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From the point of view described here, distinctions between correct and incorrect variants of language are stereotypes spread through social obligation. The standardization of language works as imposition of those stereotypes.

Any act of naming doesn't grasp the essence of what it names. By naming we highlight a certain characteristics of an entity to which the given name will be subsequently bound. But none of the characteristics of an entity can be considered as its essence. The isolation of certain characteristics of entity and binding them to a name is always an oversimplification of this entity. The highlighting of certain characteristics and binding them to the name never

exhausts the essence of entity, for this reason any name to some extent is necessarily a stereotype, however that does not prevents it from being objective.

Different way to explain this is by saying that the name draws the borders of an entity, but the drawn borders are never borders of an entity itself. Although the name functions as a physical label, by pointing to the entity, it never completely exhausts it. The use of this particular name and drawing of this particular borders are conditioned by a history of its usage. Overcoming of stereotypes occurs when established borders of the entity are processed and perceived as material for further processing. Or, to put it in other words, through a detection of an instance in which name does not yet fully coincide with that what is named by it, that is to say of the process that took place in childhood, when there was yet an empty space between the name and what it refers to. Childhood is that which deals with filling up of this space. The fullness of it is considered as the adulthood (which I certainly think is a fake adulthood).

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As a result of standardization the process of generating language undergoes a decline. From now on its further development is possible only as overcoming the stabilized entities.

However, the standardization of language results in the deceleration of its development, there are some other crucial aspects of interaction between the phenomenon of standardization and language generation.

Standardization can also be seen as a necessary step in the progress of language, namely, as that which makes impossible the development of language in accordance with the previous schemes, thereby modifying the very way of its progress, making it different from the previous one.

Hence, standardization can serve as an intensifier of language development, as a trigger for its essential transformation. At the same time, this does not mean that

within the previous stages of its vital activity it ceases to be a constraint in the language development process.

Such a contradictory role of standardization in the development of language is possible due to the fact that throughout the standardization of the language there continuously remains something over the unfolding of which standardization is not capable to take control. Therefore, standardization is always only a hindrance (necessary for future development) in language development; it cannot entirely stop its progress.

This principle of necessary secondariness of standardization is visible in the process of individual language acquisition.

The imposition of language standards is a secondary process compared to the processes of language acquisition by the child. Language learning is always a re-invention of language rather than adoption of the rules of adults. The child does not absorb a set of rules, she learns language by being exposed to adult conversation, thus, without being explicitly explained what the rules are. The imposing of rules takes place only afterwards, when the child who speaks incorrectly is corrected by the remarks of adults. In other words, apart from language standardization and learning the correct variant of language, simultaneously there is always present another ability: the ability to participate in the generation of language.

Even if the practice of language standardization is highly active, it is implemented only as a secondary process, as that which is imposed on the primary ability to learn language, always over the generation of language, as the regulation within the framework of generation, but never as its abolition.

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The situation of childhood clarifies the matter of mechanism of language generation and in interaction of this generation with the phenomena that impede it.

Childhood is the stage when clear boundaries between verbal and nonverbal realities are not yet drawn, when the strong frames of concepts are not yet shaped, and the habit of standard coupling of the words is not yet formed. The child is in the process of mastering of the language, which means that she has not yet mastered it. This is the period when a person is actively involved in the development of language, that is, in its invention. In acquiring the language, the child plays a role of an agent of interaction with the internal laws by which language develops. One might even say that it is not a child who is learning the language, but the language, which is gradually making a child a part of itself, absorbing her in the functioning of its laws, making her a part of its circulation.

Another way of putting this is: as rules regarding the use of language are imposed on a child, she retains the power to use these rules in the interests of the development of language, in contrast to the period of adulthood, within which the imposition of rules is a representation of the process of limitation of creative potential. Within the period of childhood rules contribute to language acquisition, thus to plunging into the generational flow of language, they does not terminate it, as in the situation with adulthood.

In other words, the state of childhood is a condition of actualization of generative potential of rules and adulthood is a state of actualization of their degenerative potential.

The state of involvement in the generative flow of language does not belong exclusively to childhood, but in childhood it is most highly expressed. Child has no other way than to create a language, as the child does not yet possess the language. The state of language acquisition is also possible in adulthood. Correspondingly, in adulthood it is possible to actualize generative potential of rules. The adult can return to a state that is familiar to her from the childhood,

that is, to the state that gives the opportunity to return the plasticity of language and the force needed for involvement into its generation.

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Standardization appears as the stabilization and consolidation of formedness, but at the same time, although the formedness logically has to be seen as solidification, thus as termination of the process of formation, it can be also regarded as that what grounds the process of formation: formedness is the path through which (zeroing which) it is possible to get to the instance of formlessness, i.e. to the instance out of which the process of formation runs.

The formedness on the reverse side of it preserves formlessness, it transfers formlessness to another round of development.

This process - the movement from formedness to the generative instance that is, formlessness - is the actualization of the generative potential of rules.

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Standardization of the language, which began in the sixteenth century, can be represented as a situation of actualization of generative potential of rules.

That is to say, the intensification of standardization of language and particularly its manifestation in implementing of compulsory education, even if, on the one hand has simplified language and slowed its development, in fact, has become a milestone in the process of its complexification. Having simplified and formalized the language, it has divided it into two components: a simplified, formalized and another one, that is not covered by formalization, but which serves as the material, entering into interaction with which formal language gains the potential for development (already in accordance with its own specific rules).

Thus, the standardization of the language has not led to the delay of its development and suppression of its complexity, but on the contrary, has become a stage of its complexification. Here's an example that DeLanda gives:

> the effect of compulsory education was not to erase linguistic class differences: rather than learning the "classless" standard as their exclusive new language, students of working-class background simply learned to switch codes; that is, they learned to deploy the standard in certain situations, while switching back to their native variety in their own homes and neighbourhoods. (*De Landa* 246)

To put it differently, with the intensification of standardization the diversity in language has not been erased, on the contrary, because the formalized language has emerged, a bearers of languages who did not previously interact, now started to be able to communicate: by using common, that is, standard language, they revived it through enriching with other codes which were implanted from the outside of the standard language. That is to say, in the new language (the standard language) were able to meet the specifics of other languages, other codes, that previously had no possibility to interact with each other and through this interactions the standard language has become more complex, since it served as a place of interaction of diverse language material.

To sum up these points, at the superficial level of perception the normalization of the language (the emergence of meta-language: written grammar and dictionaries) appears as that, which simplifies the language, inhibits its development, however, to go beneath this level of perception means to comprehend formalization of language as the ground of its development. Put differently, in addition to the fact that there appeared written rules of the language and the request to subordinate language to those rules (i.e. simplification takes place), there has also appeared the possibility for changes to take place at the very level of formalized language, which means that the formalization started to be the place where language development occurred on the more complex stage of its evolution.

It is possible to assert that the present stage of development of language - its extreme formalization, universalization, the development of programming languages - are consequences of the disclosure of generational potential of rules.

It should be added in this context that formalization could be considered from two points of view. According to the first point of view, formalization is a simplification, the effort to limit the diversity of reality to a much too narrow field. But from a different point of view, the formalization can be seen as the emergence of a mode of defining, which allows to reveal such type of complexity of reality which can not be revealed in any other way. Formalization, understood in this way, is not a reduction of a certain part of reality to a certain sign, not just an assignment of a strict meaning to the signifiers, it is the invention of a way of defining, which provides access to a such type of reality that is not translatable into the language of phenomenal reality.

The first point of view on formalization perceives it as a degradation of language development. The second point of view recognizes it as a transition to another level of language development. The first one is capable of seeing only the degenerative potential of rules, while the second one is capable of detecting their generative potential.

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It is possible to link our previous discussion to the history of the concept of child through indicating that it was during the beginning of standardization of language that the concept of child as we know it today has started to develop. It is possible to assert that the concept of child was a part of a general movement of standardization.

The child emerges in conjunction with compulsory schooling, as the object of demand of mandatory formation. The standardized language is an instrument of such formation.

Following the logic that we used earlier, it could be stated that, simultaneously with the discovery of the child as of the dimension of reality which should be formed, there was revealed the dimension of reality that can be formed, that is plastic, thus capable of receiving form. In other words, there was discovered such a way to interact with reality in which formlessness gets an opportunity to manifest itself, and by this opens up a possibility of formation.

In order for something to be transformed or generated, first it has to be revealed as formless, even if this condition of formless is never actually actualized, that is, always exists only retrospectively, as the ontological principle of the process of formation. Therefore, through the discovering of the phenomenon of the child the word was discovered as an unformed flow.

To look at this from another perspective, through the emergence of the phenomenon of the child (and through the emergence of standardization) the unformed flow of materiality attained the opportunity to unfold itself.

The same logic is at work when we claim that standardization is not only the inhibition of the development, but also a certain mode of implementation of development. Throughout the standardization of language there constantly remains something, which standardization is not able to affect – in the same way as in the processes of formation there always remains that which is still unformed, that which as a matter of principle allows the very process of formation.

10   Conclusion

Common sense is a habit, the habit of thinking in a certain way, of articulating habitual thoughts. It is an inert environment where thinking is moving along the pre-laid track. At the same time, the ability to develop a habit, to re-adapt, is a way to modify common sense.

All settled patterns that compose the way of life and create a general mosaic of worldview (such as gender identity, national identity, a way of behavior with the child, the choice of religion and so forth) should be regarded as a habit. By perceiving them in such a way and by realizing and implementing the ability to actively produce habits it is possible to transform the settled common sense into the movable. New ways of life and new patterns of behavior arise as a result of application of this practice.

Thus, habit can be considered from two perspectives: as a stable phenomenon and as the mutable. It can be seen at the same time as the constant repetition of the same and as a mechanism for implementation of changes.

The word 'habit' is derived from the Latin word 'habere', which means 'to have', 'to hold, possess', and from Latin 'habitare' meaning 'to live, dwell'. Hence, habit can be interpreted as the unique mechanism of self-formation which individual possesses. It appears as a technique of allowing an individual to take possession of her own life.

To comprehend the habit as a mechanism of transformation means to expose a state of plasticity in yourself. To uncover the ability to develop the habit implies revealing the ability to change.

Plasticity here means adaptability and changeability. If we reflect on the settled common sense with the perspective that it is a habit, we can see that its present condition – the current habitual patterns of life – is the result of a certain process of habituation.

They have become habitual because there once occurred the process of getting used to them which entailed in the emergence of their perception as self-evident and immutable. However, the disclosure of the process of habituation that precedes the habitual way of life also reveals the possibility of the practice of generating new habits and of different life patterns. Thus, behind every habit is a process of obtaining it: the metamorphosis and work at the level of state of plasticity.

Hence, in every passivity it is possible to disclose a potential of active force, i.e. every passive thing has the capacity of becoming active. In its turn, the active component could unfold itself only through setting in motion the passive one.

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Any use of the settled traditional patterns could be considered as a form of escapism - as a way to escape from the uncertainty and variety of life and from the challenge to employ those uncertainty and variety. Contentment with the traditional is the avoidance of the use of raw material in a reasonable way: as a matter that could be further processed into new forms.

Patterns of behaviour that are repeated and thus become habitual constitute a certain way of life. The work of active generation of habits results in the active way of life. Habits that are not actively formed and are acquired by inertia respectively form passive inert way of life.

An active way of life involves setting passive matter in motion by triggering its potential of being active. The passive way of life leaves this potential unrecognized and unactualized.

To actively form one's habits means to mould oneself. Such active position involves dynamic processing of the environment in which the individual is immersed – her participation in the transformation of things, thoughts, and words that constitute her environment. By transforming them individual employs elements of her environment as a nutrition resource for her activism.

To exist as a movable matter in the process of re-formation is the worthiest and the most useful way of existence of traditional concepts. An active way of life forms due to such mode of their functioning. I call this way of being of traditional concepts a perversion of common sense.

The word 'perversion' is appropriate here as it indicates the process when the familiar is used in an unusual way. It implies the disabling of the power of normalization.

In the etymology of the verb 'pervert' we discover the Latin word 'pervertere' that means 'to overthrow, overturn', 'to corrupt, subvert, abuse', 'turn the wrong way, turn about', 'to turn upside down'. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, 'to pervert' means 'to turn aside from a right religious belief or system', 'while the noun 'pervert' refers to 'the one who has forsaken a doctrine or system regarded as true, apostate'.

Perversion is understood as a type of human behavior that deviates from what is considered normal. 'Pervert' as a sexual term means someone whose sexual behavior is counter to that designed and intended by nature. This scheme presupposes an appeal to some external authority (in this case to nature). It is assumed that sexuality is not a changeable social construct, but a natural phenomenon that functions in accordance with a certain prescribed norms, a certain rule, deviation from which is unacceptable. Within the settled commonsensical worldview someone who distorts or corrupts this norms is deemed to be abnormal and her way of life to be intolerable.

Hence, perversion implies a deviation from the habitual normality: such an approach towards words and things that allows to snatch them out of the clutches of their imputed truth and to liberate them from the correct purposes and functions. To perform this is to learn how to turn them into toys, i.e to treat them as a matter in a process of formation.

Such an attitude toward concepts constitutes the way of life, within the scope of which there are no boundaries between the dimension of game and the dimension of reality.

The great potential of the image of child is that it represents the one who is essentially playful. Child does not see the difference between the game and reality. Her serious attitude to game – the phenomena that was stigmatized by common sense as worthless and unserious – allows to break the blockade of seriousness and inviolability of the common sense itself. It allows to approach the generational potential of reality by luring the settled and sacred things in a play. As Nietzsche states: "I know of no other way of coping with great tasks, than play" (qtd. in *Yovanovich* 18).

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Child is a habit. Our way of understanding of the phenomenon of child is a passively acquired pattern. This understanding exposes the way of perception that is taken for granted.

However such a habitual concept of child could become a valuable material through processing of which the active way of life could be generated.

The task of perversion of the concept of child and of the chain of concepts that define it is particularly relevant today.

The process of perversion is painful, since changing habitual and settled patterns means triggering pain points. Painfulness of an issue is the touchstone indicating the extent to which a certain concept is ossified and inert, and therefore inhibits cultural evolution.

What is thought to be unalterable and inflexible under any circumstances is a sanctuary of the inertial forces. Patterns that are revered as sacred and are forbidden to be changed in particular should be subjected to change.

Child is the most persistent habit. It is a sore point of society and its sacred cow. This is manifested in the unequivocal prohibition of sexual contact between adults and children, in condemnation of involvement of children in other kinds of sexual activities, in unconditional common confidence that child should be protected from potentially harmful information (usually this refers to sexual content, cruel or violent content, content encouraging suicide, etc.). The last thing society is going to sacrifice is it's paternalistic attitude towards children, for the reason that this attitude constitutes its very understanding of what child is.

Child is the last bastion of traditional consciousness. After the beliefs that people with a certain skin colour need to be guided by people with a different skin color and that woman needs a man's guardianship were dispelled, emancipation in the field related to children is logically the next step in the evolution of society.

The concept of child is a non-emancipated sphere that is protected the most. To break through this protection and to open access to its perversion is to ensure the progress of a large-scale emancipation.

The concept of the child should be necessarily perverted, perverted without fail. In the light of Freud's brilliant insight that "all humans are innately perverse" (*Gay* 145-6) it can be asserted that there is a hope for a bright future.

Summary and Key Words

Key words: child / childhood / adult / adulthood / common sense / perversion / education / formation / material / affectivity / language / play / game

Summary

In my dissertation, employing the examples of words 'child' and 'childhood', I investigated how differently words function being part of different historical epistemes. The fact that at different times the word in different ways interact with reality allows to reveal the point within which the word does not coincide with itself, and, thus, within which there lies the potential of generation of its meanings.

The meaning, which the word 'child' bears being part of the modern common sense, does not essentially coincide with the way in which it was used in the Middle Ages. Respectively, the meaning that the word 'child' may acquire in the future might be essentially different from its today's meaning.

The meaning of any word is not defined by the effort of human will — it is determined from within its connectivity with other words. That is to say, the fact that the word has a meaning is a consequence of its being a part of usual for some historical period linkages of words. The word is not a representation of a certain part of reality, but a representation of a linkages of words from within which and through which it gets its meaning.

These usual combinations of words represent specificity of thinking and of understanding of the world in a certain historical period. Each word points towards other words through which it occurs to be defined in that historical period, and hence on the overall mosaic of meanings of words, which is representative for a certain type of worldview and world perception.

Today the word 'child' is considered to be a representation of biological body of a child and of such a kind of reality that needs to be guarded and formed. The modern word 'child' became captured by classical biological and disciplinary discourses, what is more, it does not exist outside of these discourses. However, the word child was used before these types of discourses appeared.

Within the medieval perception the word 'childhood' functioned as a part of metaphorical language. For at that period the relation of language to the world was not of the relation of signification but rather of analogy. Category of ages of life functioned in a similar way as, for example, signs of zodiac or the cycle of the four elements.

Since the sixteenth century the concept of child that is familiar to us today begins to emerge. The word 'child' has become a part of the language of representation, which means that it started to represent a certain part of reality and to dictate the rules with respect to this part of reality. This word has become constitutive of newly emerged socio-biological and moral discourses: the word 'child' began to indicate the biological body of a child together with the child as a part of the social body, it also began to imply the way of behaviour towards the reality it started to represent. The child began to be understood as the one who should be formed. The word 'child' has become associated with discipline, morality and formation.

Simultaneously with the 'child', in the modern sense of this word, there appeared an adult, and, consequently, there emerged the concept of maturation: the formation of adult out of child.

To trace the transition of the word from one episteme to another means to comprehend the principles of system of generation of its meaning, and consequently to become able to actively use this mechanism and contribute to it.

In my dissertation I made an attempt to see the word 'child' in its past, in its present, and in its future. Namely, I investigated the history of the concept of child, analysed in what way this word functions within the modern common

sense, and outlined the prospects of the possibilities of further unfolding of its meaning potential.

The concept of child exists as a part of the modern common sense, and nowhere outside of its scope. It cannot be extracted from the common sense or purified from it. The revealing of the potential of the word 'child' should not be carried out by searching for some mystical way out of the common sense. Rather, it should be done through immersion into the common sense, but this immersion must indicate the active position of its interpretation.

To be able to discover something surprising in what is familiar means to be capable of revealing the hidden potential of it. A look of surprise reaches up to the very ground of the common sense: the ground that preserved its flexibility. A look of surprise modifies what is familiar into the material for moulding into the new forms.

Apart of the common sense there is no other material for processing into the new forms. Any generation of the new is a recycling of the old, its use as a raw material. In other words, to produce something new there is no need to dare beyond the common sense — the common sense itself needs to be made suitable for use as a raw material.

In order to reveal the concept of child as a raw material, the linkages of the concepts determining its meaning should be explored. Our usual understanding of what child is is linked with the ideas of formation and ability to be moulded by education. The modern concept of child represents the idea that a child is the one who is formed by an adult into an adult. Simultaneously with the invention of child in the modern sense of the word, that is, of the part of reality that needs to be formed, there was revealed the formability of this part of reality. This ability is characterised by affectivity: the capacity to be subjected to influence and to change as a result of it.

From the point of view that results from such a change of perspective, childhood is no longer perceived as the period of biological life followed by adulthood, it

is understood as the state of plasticity, that is, the state activation of which constitutes adulthood. In this context adulthood might be understood as daring, courage, and risk taking: as an active involvement in the generation of new forms of life out of the raw material of traditional forms.

The global task of emancipation of children can not be realized through the protection of children which are understood as human beings in the biological state of immaturity. To accomplish this purpose two factors must be present: the perception of childhood as a state not alien to each of us; the comprehension of child as a phenomenon that is produced by our way of thinking and employed in our way of explaining the world.

In accordance with a similar principle the process of emancipation of women unfolds today: within its framework women are not understood as a biological group, to which certain social roles are attached; woman is revealed as a state of oppression and subjection, in which, in varying degrees, can reside each of us, and not only the creature with a certain type of genitalia. The emancipation of women is not the protection of women as a biological group, it is the revealing of the mode of thinking, within which a woman emerges as a phenomenon and a biological group.

Emancipation of children is the revealing of the state of childhood in each of us, regardless of age in the biological sense. Emancipation requires the ability to perceive the concept of child as something non-self-evident, the ability to expose its discrepancy with itself, and the ability to generate out of the state of discrepancy new meanings of the concept of child.

Povzetek in ključne beside

Povzetek

V svoji disertaciji sem na primeru besed "otrok" in "otroštvo" raziskovala, kako so besede funkcionirale, ko so bile del različnih zgodovinskih epistem. Dejstvo, da v različnih obdobjih beseda in realnost različno vzajemno delujeta, nam dovoljuje najti točko, v kateri se beseda ne ujema sama s seboj, oziroma točko, v okviru katere se skriva potencial generacije pomenov besede.

Pomen, ki ga ima beseda "otrok" kot del današnjega pojmovanja, ni enak pomenu, ki je bil v uporabi v srednjem veku. Zato se lahko pomen besede "otrok" v prihodnosti bistveno razlikuje od svojega današnjega pomena.

Pomen vsake besede ni določen s prizadevanji človeške volje, temveč se določuje v povezavi z drugimi besedami. Torej je dejstvo, da ima beseda smisel, posledica tega, da je beseda del besedne povezave, običajne za določeno zgodovinsko obdobje. Beseda ni prikaz določenega dela realnosti, temveč predstavlja odnose besed, preko katerih dobiva svoj pomen.

Takšna običajna kombinacija besed predstavlja specifiko mišljenja in razumevanja sveta v določenem zgodovinskem obdobju. Vsaka beseda se nanaša na druge besede, preko katerih se opredeljuje v zdajšnjem zgodovinskem obdobju, in s tem tudi na splošen mozaik pomenov besed, ki predstavlja določen tip svetovnega nazora in ideologije.

Danes besedo "otrok" pojmujemo kot prikaz biološkega telesa otroka in takšnega tipa realnosti, ki zahteva nadzorovanje in oblikovanje. Danes je beseda "otrok" ujeta v klasične biološke in disciplinske diskurze, in še več – ta beseda

ne obstaja zunaj navedenih diskurzov. Vendar se je beseda otrok uporabljala še pred nastankom tovrstnih diskurzov.

V srednjeveškem pogledu na svet je beseda "otroštvo" funkcionirala kot del metaforičnega jezika. V tem obdobju namreč razmerje jezika do sveta ni pomenilo razmerja označevanja ampak analogije. Kategorija starosti življenja je delovala na enak način, kot na primer zodiakalni znaki ali ciklus štirih elementov.

Od šestnajstega stoletja se je začel uveljavljati koncept otroka, ki je običajen tudi danes. Beseda "otrok" je postala del jezika za reprezentacijo, kar pomeni, da je začela predstavljati določen del realnosti in narekovati pravila v razmerju do tega dela realnosti. Ta beseda je postala konstitutivni element novih socialno-bioloških in moralnih diskurzov: beseda "otrok" je dobila pomen njegovega biološkega telesa ter otroka kot del družbe, prav tako je začela označevati način ravnanja z realnostjo. Otrok je bil videti kot nekaj, kar mora prejeti obliko. Beseda "otrok" je začela asociirati z disciplino, moralnostjo in oblikovanjem.

Sočasno z "otrokom" v sodobnem pomenu te besede se je uveljavil pojem odrasel in posledično se je uveljavila ideja zorenja: oblikovanje otroka v odraslega.

Zaslediti prehod besede iz ene episteme v drugo pomeni doumeti načela sistema ustvarjanja njenih pomenov, torej postati aktivno sposoben uporabljati ta mehanizem in prispevati njegovemu delu.

V svoji disertaciji poskušam opazovati besedo "otrok" v njeni preteklosti, sedanjosti in prihodnosti, in sicer preučujem zgodovino koncepcije otroka, analiziram, kako beseda deluje v okviru današnjega zdravega razuma, in nakazujem možnosti za prihodnjo razširitev potenciala njenega pomena.

Pojem otroka obstaja kot del sedanjega zdravega razuma in nikakor zunaj njegovih mej, prav tako ga ni mogoče odstraniti ali ločiti od njega. Prepoznavanje potenciala besede "otrok" ne sme potekati z iskanjem nekega

mističnega izhoda iz zdravega razuma. Prej s pogrezanjem v zdravi razum, ki mora kazati na aktivno pozicijo interpretacije besede.

Sposobnost odkriti zase nekaj čudovitega v že znanem, pomeni sposobnost najti skrite potenciale. Pogled presenečenja sega v osnovo zdravega razuma: temelj, kjer je skrita njegova gibkost. Pogled presenečenja spreminja tisto, kar je že znano, v snov za oblikovanje novih oblik.

Poleg zdravega razuma ne obstaja drugo gradivo za oblikovanje v nove oblike. Vsako ustvarjanje novega je koriščenje starega, uporaba starega kot snovi. Z drugimi besedami, da dobimo nekaj novega, ni treba presegati zdravi razum - zdravi razum moramo pretvoriti v snov, primerno za uporabo.

Da bi ugotovili koncept otroka kot snovi, moramo preiskati povezavo pojmov, ki definirajo njegov pomen. Naše običajno razumevanje, kaj je otrok, je povezano z idejama o oblikovanju ter sposobnosti oblikovanja skozi izobraževanje. Danes pojem otroka predstavlja idejo, da je on tisti, iz katerega odrasla oseba oblikuje odraslo osebo. Sočasno z nastankom pojma otroka v sodobnem pomenu besede, to je tistega dela realnosti, ki mora biti oblikovana, je bila tudi ugotovljena sposobnost tega dela realnosti za oblikovanje. Ta sposobnost je označena z afektivnostjo: sposobnostjo padati pod vpliv in spreminjati se pod takšnim vplivom.

Zaradi spremembe vidika otroštvo ni več videti kot obdobje biološkega življenja, ki preide v odraslost, ampak se razume kot stanje plastičnosti, torej kot stanje, z aktiviranjem katerega konstituiramo odraslo življenje. V zvezi s tem odraslost lahko razumemo kot pogum in prevzemanje tveganja: kot aktivno sodelovanje pri generaciji novih življenjskih oblik iz snovi tradicionalnih oblik.

Globalne naloge emancipacije otrok ni mogoče doseči z varstvom otrok, ki jih razumemo kot človeška bitja v biološkem stanju nezrelosti. Za dosežek tega cilja morata obstajati dva dejavnika: percepcija otroštva kot stanja, ki ni tuje za vsakega od nas; razumevanje otroka kot pojava, ki jo naš način razmišljanja proizvaja in ki jo naš način razlaganja sveta uporablja.

Na podobnem načelu se danes odvija emancipacija žensk: v njegovem okviru ž_enske ne obravnavamo kot biološko skupino, s katero povezujemo določene družbene vloge; ženska se razkriva kot stanje zatiranja in podrejanja, v katerem se v taki ali drugačni meri lahko najde eden od nas, ne pa samo oseba z določeno vrsto genitalij. Emancipacija žensk ne pomeni varstva žensk kot biološke skupine, temveč prikaz režima mišljenja, s katerim se ženska pojavi kot fenomen in biološka skupina.

Emancipacija otrok je razkritje stanja otroštva v vseh nas, ne glede na starost v biološkem smislu. Za emancipacijo je potrebna sposobnost dojemanja koncepta otroka kot nekaj, kar ni samoumevno, sposobnost opredeljevanja njegovega neskladja s samim seboj ter sposobnost generiranja novih smislov koncepcije otroka iz neskladnosti.

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