THE VEIL WHICH SHOWS AND HIDES

TURKISH WOMEN BETWEEN MODERNITY AND TRADITION

MASTER THESIS

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ABSTRACT

The presented work deals with women as a junction of many contemporary problems and disputes in Turkey. Women are a foundation of three perspectives, each with its own logic, none the less, they are all closely connected. Construction of "Turkishness" trough the ideal image of a woman is groundwork of cultural and national Turkish identity. Since two such ideal images were produced, Kemalist and Islamist, women play an important role in distinguishing the left political ideology from the right. What is more, both political constructs are leaned on sexual difference, because "Turkish" tries to patch where the construction of sex fails.

 The work is divided into four thematic parts, structured in a way to most completely embrace the problem of the veil and Turkish women captured in the dispute. The work tries to enlighten contemporary problems in Turkey with concepts of postcolonial studies and psychoanalysis. It presents and warns about contemporary conflicts firstly with the help of postcolonial studies, which are later on critically discussed with psychoanalytical approaches. The red thread which leads us through the text is Turkey's "inbetweeness" causing bipolarity in the politics and society. Both, the Turkish woman as an image and the veil as the most visible political symbol, are products of the state in between modernity and tradition. Multiculturalists' liberal notion of tolerance seems to fail solving the problem of the veil and its ban and problems of living or coexisting with Others and Neighbors, which are acute not only in Turkey but also in Europe and in the rest of the world. Proposed solution is alienation instead of segregation.

KEYWORDS:

Turkey, Women, the veil, the Neighbor, tolerance, construct.

INTRODUCTION

The following work deals with women as a junction of many contemporary problems and disputes in Turkey. Women are a foundation of three perspectives, each with its own logic, none the less, as we will see, they are all closely connected. Construction of "Turkishness" trough the ideal image of a woman is groundwork of cultural and national Turkish identity. Since two such ideal images were produced, women play an important role in distinguishing the left political ideology from the right. What is more, the question we cannot escape is the question of women as second sex. The presented work will use the junction of problems concerning Turkish women as a methodology.

The work is divided into four thematic parts structured in a way to most completely embrace the problem of the veil and Turkish women captured in the dispute. The red thread which leads us through the text is Turkey's "inbetweeness" causing bipolarity in the politics and society. Both, the Turkish woman as an image and the veil as the most visible political symbol, are products of the state in between modernity and tradition.

In the first part we will be interested in the historical and political background which leads to the division of Turkish society. We will distinguish between two perspectives: outer and inner. Nonetheless both perspectives are being based on Said's orientalism closely connected with postcolonialism and imperialism. Notwithstanding that Turkey was never a colony, on a contrary, the summit of Ottoman Empire was marked with expansionist politics, it was regarded, in the imperialist spirit, as inferior and backwarded. As we will see that such understanding of Turkey had a huge impact on Atatürk's modernization politics, aiming to move Turkey closer to Europe. What is more, Atatürk's Turkey is an example of inner-orientalism, and as we will show further on, inner-orientalism is a reason for Turkish inner clash of civilization. Because the Kemalist regime imposed modernity from above only small but powerful elite followed the reforms and internalized them. Islamist movement used the division between the elite and traditionally oriented masses to sweep into power. They created their own identity, another Turkish woman. This is why the clash and the bipolarity are especially visible in women's attire which expresses political and also religious convictions. We will show how women played an important role in identity politics, since both of the oppositions, Kemalist and Islamist, constructed their own "ideal" image of the Turkish woman. Nonetheless, as we will show, these two women are not that much different as their creators would have wanted.

Division of Turkey, despite intentional segregation of space, creates constant conflict situation encountering the Neighbor. In the second part we will show how and why the notion of the Neighbor, and not the Other, much more precisely describes Turkish situation of cultural clashes. We will want to know who is a Neighbor, is he an enemy or a friend? Does he represent himself in public or private sphere? To understand the problems erected when coming upon a Neighbor, we will lean on Žižek's criticism of multicultural liberalism and tolerance as a false, ideologically created, problem. For Žižek tolerance is a postpolitical term, saying "do not harass me".

Further on we will confront two theoretical positions, historicism and psychoanalysis and their perspective on construction. For Judith Butler sex is only a construct of historically variable discursive practices, while for Joan Copjec sex is produced by the internal limit, the failure of signification. We will try to answer the posing question of a connection between a construct of a woman and national identity.

At the end we will try to illuminate the problem of veiling and the veil ban in Turkey. After understanding historical and political background of the ban, we will claim that veiled women in Turkey are traumatic intruders. Yet, they are not supposed to be eliminated but changed. Since the veil is the most visible symbol of their appurtenance to traditional, Islamism half of society, the veil provokes the Kemalist opposition and as such it has to be removed. As we will see in some cases, the veil even becomes an object of envy.

The following text tries to enlighten contemporary problems in Turkey with concepts of postcolonial studies and psychoanalysis. It presents and warns about contemporary conflicts firstly with the help of postcolonial studies, which are later on critically discussed with psychoanalytical approaches. The work confronts theoretical antagonisms between psychoanalysis and historicism, psychoanalysis and liberal multiculturalism, and at the end it searches for solution of the existing bipolarity in Turkey.

TURKEY BETWEEN THE ORIENT AND THE OCCIDENT, BETWEEN MODERNITY AND TRADITION

Orient is a broad and in many ways desultory geographic concept and symbol, which besides very general geographic location indicates much more. The Orient has many connotations. As a geographic term the verb Orient comes from Latin verb *oriens,* which simply means east. This is why the Orient firstly extended over the Near and Middle East, including Persia, Mesopotamia, Asia Minnor and Egipt. With discoveries of the Far East the Oreint spread as far as Pacific ocean and this is why the nowadays usage of the term became indefinite and vague. When we talk about Oriental carpets, Oriental harems or for example Oriental women we mostly think about the area of the Near and Middle East, but when we divide the world into the Orient and its opposite, the Occident, the Orient spreads over the borders of the Far East and denotes non-Western world, the parts of the world that do not coincide with Europe or USA, or with the West in general. Precisely this kind of binary partition of the world, us – them, West – non-West, civilization – barbarism, ascribed to the Orient many negative connotations. The Orient became phantasmatic opposite of the West, all the West is not or does not want to be. At the same time the Orient is represented as needed of Western help, which justifies every intervention of "better developed" countries. The West colonized and subordinated most of the non-Western world with its discourse "to civilize and modernize". But contemporary examples of Western politics show that are military interventions in the Middle East justified and legitimized with the same reasons and a similar discourse – to modernize and democratizes.

Orient is, as Said wrote, a "realm, which was discursively constructed" and is always "something more than what was [and is] empirically known about it" (1979: 148, 55). Orient was invented inside of the discourse of Orientalism and as such it was taking shape for decades, even centuries. Imaginative geographical and historical knowledge, that was strengthen in time, was still not effectively overcome. The most important characteristic of Orientalism is its imperishableness. "Only the source of these rather narcissistic Western ideas about the Orient changed in time, not their character" (Said, 1979: 62).

Since the Orient is a broad term, and as Said is saying, it includes geographical, cultural, linguistic and ethical unit, we have to specify which part of the Orient we will be talking about. We can start talking about Turkey in 1923 when Turkey became a republic. For centuries before that we talk about Ottoman Empire. The difference between Ottomans

and Turks is very important especially in the discourse of Kemalists. It defines the difference between old and new, traditional and modern. Further on we will talk about Ottoman women before the year 1923, and about Turkish women after the revolution and with the establishment of the republic, since the name itself carried an important meaning in the modernization period. The term the Orient will be only used in the cases of Orientalist and modernized discourse in Europe, Ottoman Empire and Turkey.

Its specific geographical position, extending all over Asia Minor, as a bridge between Europe and Asia is placing Turkey 'in between'. As we will show, its 'in-betweenness' causes Turkey's constant struggle in search for identity and its bipolar division as a result of the struggle. While on the other hand Europe never thought of Turkey as a bridge, almost a part of the Western world, but as a border between West and East. Orientalist tradition produced its own, none the less very powerful and long lasting, vision of the Orient, distanced from the Western world. As we will see further on, the Orientalist perspective shaped and influenced Turkey's own self-images based on two visions and ideologies: Kemalist and Islamist. For this reason we will divide this chapter into two parts. The first part focuses on Orientalist construction of the Oreient as "mirage", the second part, on the other hand, elucidates Kemalist vision of the modern Republic as a response to centuries long Western superiority depicted in Orientalist thought, and Islamism as a reaction to Kemalist submissiveness to the Western tradition.

Even though Turkish "in-betweenes" affects men as much as women, we will concentrate only on position of women in the Turkish society and their representation outside Turkey.

ORIENTALIST VISION

In Europe the Orient was always more than its real image, since, as Gaston Bachelard wrote, objective space is usually less important than poetic, which has qualities of imaginative value. What is geographically and historically remote is many times poetic – made up (Bachelard, 1964). Even an expert never fully overcomes the imaginative component of a remote space (Said, 1996: 76, 77). ''For several centuries, Western attitudes toward Turkey, and toward Islam generally, have been shaped by a combination of moral outrage and irrepressible concupiscence focused on the trope of ''Oriental sexuality'' – a theme deploying an entire arsenal of fictionalized devices such

as the harem, the public bath, the slave market, concubines, eunuchs, polygamy and homosexuality'' (Schick 2000: 83). Sexualized images of Oriental women have long been a product of European imagination, taking Ingres' Turkish bath as the most vivid example. It represents bathing of women as an erotic scene of unease tension, full of sexual inclinations, from homosexuality to voyeurism. Art historian Roger Benjamin describes the work of artists traveling to the Orient as an ''Oriental mirage'' (1997) or an unclear vision. Every painting or picture that wants to imitate the reality is just an approximation marked with a technique, personal interpretation and deliberate adaptation of a coincidental view. Orientalist art is confronted with one more barrier, artist's own ethnocentric culture (Benjamin, 1997: 7).

If Oriental women represented extremely sexual and mysterious Orient in 19th century, their representation completely changed in the second half of 20th century. Female figures lost their erotic charge. They are mostly represented veiled, powerless and frightened and as such they are fortifying negative representation of Oriental men (Cafnik, 2007). Controversial cartoons of Mohamed, published in Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten in 2005, are just one example of such media representation. As we will see later, female image in orientalist representation strengthens the relationship of power between the West and the East.

On the contrary, visual representation of Oriental men does not change much trough history. From 16th to 21st century they are represented as terrifying, cruel, aggressive, brutal, and without mercy. The Orient is in general represented as a complete opposite to the West, in the fashion of binary oppositions, as the Other. ''The Others are in some way different than the majority, they are ''them'' instead of ''us''. [...] They are represented with a help of strong oppositions – good/bad, civilized/primitive... (Hall, 1997: 226). Binary oppositions are reductionist and over-simplified and they are rarely natural. There is always relationship of power between the two halves of a binary opposition (Derrida, 1974), making one side dominant and the other subordinate.

Orient was always placed between western despise and fear (Said, 1996: 81). For centuries Islam represented a threat to Christian Europe. Arab expansion and Ottoman incursions left tracks of fear for centuries. Nowadays, especially after 9/11 attacks, in many media representations lurk a threat of jihad and a fear of Muslim taking over the world. Sayyid agrees with Said when saying

»The West sees in Islam the distorted mirror of its own past. It marks the rebirth of the God they have killed so that Man could live. The Islamic resurgence marks the revenge of

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God; it signals the return of faith, the return of all that puts into question the idea of the progressive liberation of humanity. These ideas trade on the notion that only in the West are humans truly human. The articulation of global Muslim subjectivity threatens human emancipation by trying to make the world a slave to Allah. Islamic fundamentalism arouses such anxiety because it questions a number of assumptions which allow us to continue to see the West as a model of political, economic, cultural, and intellectual development« (Sayyid, 2003: 4).

Fundamentalism emerged in USA as a part of protestant movement against modernism in the beginning of 20th century, and it soon took its forms in all religions and movements advocating return to basic values. But no matter that fundamentalism exists in all religions; it is today most commonly connected with Islam.

"Fundamentalism itself is made flesh by drawing upon examples of "Islamic fundamentalism". Veiled (Muslim) women and bearded (Muslim) men, book burners and suicide bombers have emerged as fundamentalist icons enjoying recurrent Hollywood canonization. Consequently, although representing only one aspect of a global fundamentalism, Islamic fundamentalism has become a metaphor for fundamentalism in general. This would suggest that fundamentalism and Islamic fundamentalism are closely related" (Sayyid, 2003: 7-8).

Not only that we are way too fond of using Islamic fundamentalism as a general determination of fundamentalism as a concept, what we are doing as well is equalizing fundamentalism and Islam. "One way of describing the discourse on "Islamic fundamentalism" is to call it "Orientalism"" (Sayyid, 2003: 31). Said argued, that Orientalism provides accounts of Islam (and the Orient) which are organized around four main themes: first there is an "absolute and systematic difference" between the West and the Orient. Secondly, the representations of the Orient are based on textual exegesis rather than "modern Oriental realities". Thirdly, the Orient is unchanging, uniform and incapable of describing itself. Fourthly, the Orient is to be feared or to be mastered (1985: 300 – 301).

Orientalist practice invented a collection of binary oppositions, where abundance of the West opposes overall shortage in the Orient; when the West has rationality and the Orient irrationality, Western tolerance conflicts Oriental fanaticism and the progress does not go hand in hand with traditionalism. The Orient is in this fashion always identified with exact opposite to the West. Even more, every time the West is talking about the Orient or Islam, as Orient's prevailing religion, in the sense of binary

oppositions, it is about praising the West. Hall lists four main areas in which the category of the West circulates and coordinates. It functions as an analytical category which allows us to map out the world in terms of the West and non-West. Second, it is a criterion by which we can make judgements about the rest of the world – both spatially and temporally. Third, it marks a frontier around which a number of positive and negative qualities are sorted and gathered. For example: Europe is innovative, the Orient is stagnant; Europe is decentralized, the Orient is centralized; Europe is geographically stable, the Orient is geographically unstable, etc. Fourth, it is a term that represents a particular way of life; developed, industrialized, urbanized capitalist, secular and modern (Hall, 1992: 227-228).

The Western world is built on the idea of modernity. Sayyid described Europe as "an ideological formation centered on the discourse of modernity" (2003: 102). Modernity is a cornerstone of the Western identity and it is precisely because of that, why the contrast between modernity and non-modernity, at the same time means the difference between the West and it's Other. The Orient is always the Other for the West and it is also represented as such. The Others are people in some way different than the majority, they are "them" instead of "us" and they are usually exposed to the binary way of representation (Hall, 1997: 226). Why does the dominant Western world tends to exaggerated representation of difference? Why is the difference so important? The linguists are convinced, that "difference" matters because it is essential to meaning, without it meaning could not exist. Saussure argued that we know what black means, not because there is some essence of "blackness", but because we can contrast it with its opposite – white (Culler, 1967: 19). It is the difference that carries meaning. This is why modern Orientalists, based on the inherited knowledge from their predecessors, describe Orientals as liars, credulous, intriguers, to put it shortly completely different from them and their European environment. The difference between us and them is the one which emphasizes our strengths and points out their weaknesses. This is why Said denominates Orientalism as political vision of reality whose structure promotes the difference between known and unknown (Said, 1996: 62). Anthropological answer to the question why does the difference matter is also supported with meaning. Every culture depends on giving things meaning by "assigning them to different positions within a classificatory system". Binary oppositions are crucial for all classification, because one must establish a clear difference between things in order to classify them (Hall, 1997: 236). In a similar way is stereotyping part of maintenance of social and symbolic order. Stereotyping "symbolically fixes boundaries, and exclude everything which does not belong (Hall, 1997: 258). As it goes for binary oppositions, stereotyping

as well exists in the relationships of power. The power is usually directed against the subordinated or excluded group. One aspect of this power is called ethnocentrism, "application of the norms of one's own culture to that of others (Brown, 1965: 183). Derrida argued that between binary oppositions like us/them, we are not dealing with peaceful coexistence but rather with a violent hierarchy. One of the terms governs the other or has the upper hand (1972: 41). This is how stereotyping forms a connection between representation, difference and power. "The power, it seems, has to be understood here, not only in terms of economic exploitation and physical coercion, but also in broader cultural or symbolic terms, including the power to represent someone or something in a certain way – within a certain regime of representation" (Hall, 1997: 259). Hall understands the idea of stereotyping in the same way as Foucault's power/knowledge theory and Gramsci's hegemony. After Foucault, not only that knowledge always means a form of power, what is more, the power makes the knowledge valid. And weather something is true becomes less important. Hegemony is exactly a kind of power Orientalists are using, it is giving them a sense of permanent superiority over the other culture.

Said leaned his work on Foucault and Gramsci. He wrote that Europe invented stereotypical image of the Orient, which was far from the real image of the countries from the Middle East. Orientalism was denoted as a discourse that was enabling Europe to invent Orient politically, sociologically, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively. This is why orientalism closely parellels Foucault's concept of power/knowledge. "A discourse produces, through different practices of relation (scholarship, exhibition, literature, painting, etc.), a form of racialized knowledge of the Other (Orientalism) deeply implicated in the operations of power (imperialism)" (Hall, 1997: 260). Further on Said defines power in a way which emphasizes the similarities between Foucault and Gramsci's hegemony.

"In any society not totalitarian, then, certain cultural forms predominate over other; the form of this cultural leadership is what Gramsci has identified as hegemony, an indispensable concept for any understanding of cultural life in the industrial West. It is hegemony, or rather the result of cultural hegemony at work, that gives Orientalism its durability and its strength […] Orientalism is never far from […] the idea of Europe, a collective notion identifying "us" Europeans as against all "those" non-Europeans, and indeed it can be argued that the major component in European culture is precisely what made that culture hegemonic both in and outside Europe: the idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison with all the non-European peoples and cultures. There is

in addition the hegemony of European ideas about the Orient, themselves reiterating European superiority over Oriental backwardness, usually overriding the possibility that a more independent thinker [...] may have very different views on the matter" (Said, 1997: 17-18).

If we turn back to Oriental women, how are they represented in the West? Are they represented sexual, erotic and seducing or powerless and subjugated? Are Oriental women sexual or asexual in the eyes of the West? Or is their image dialectic and so sexual and asexual at the same time?

Existence of the duality of Orientalist representation was explained by Irvin Schick, when he said that "oriental sexuality played a much more central and polyvalent role in Western thought than is usually acknowledged. [...] Gender and sexuality were deployed in various ways in colonial discourse to construct the imaginary spaces that non-Europeans occupy, thereby creating geography of contrasts that served both Europe's self-definition and its imperial ambitions (2000: 83). Shick further argues that there are fundamental gender and especially sexuality attributes of socially constructed space, while sexualized images in Europe's discourse of the Other are key markers of place, and hence as determinants of identity and alterity (2000: 84). Following linguists definition of the importance of difference, we can say that the identity itself functions only when it is opposing identity of the Other.

Studying the corpus of Orientalist literary works Schick found two contradictory but coexisting qualities describing Oriental women. She can be both, repulsive and alluring, crude and refined, filthy and obsessed with bathing, ugly and beautiful, ragged and elegant, shapeless and perfectly proportioned, manipulator and helpless prisoner. Nonetheless "Oriental woman is one single type" (Schick, 2000: 92). The same split is present in Orientalist visual representation. Oriental, Ottoman or Turkish women are inside the orientalist discourse sexual and asexual and always represented as one type of women. This is possible because "the power of Orientalism derives, not from its manifest content (specific images, individual stereotypes), but rather from its epistemeology: it is the very existence of difference that is operative, not particular differences" (Schick, 2000: 92). What is more "contradictory stereotypes can coexist without undermining one another's effectiveness; indeed they reinforce each other at the very moment that they reciprocally contradict or negate one another" (Schick, 2000: 92-3). Orientalist discourse has the ability to present contradictory statements as a fact, because its most fundamental product is its own credibility. In this fashion every

statement "fulfills a certain function in the colonial project and in the process of Europe's self-definition through othering" (Schick, 2000: 93).

On the basis of Schick's argument we can conclude: Oriental women are represented sexual and asexual to legitimize colonization, imperialism or any other Western intervention. Sexual Oriental woman – seducing, tempting, enjoying leisure and physical pleasure, presents the exact opposite of hardworking, assiduous in a way asexual European bourgeoisie woman. Their (Oriental) inveterate sexuality militated against their ability to self-govern and hence argued in favor of colonization. Asexual Oriental woman, on the other hand, expressed a difficult position Oriental women were (are) in, powerless and subjugated, living in constant fear, calling for help; what was (is) again justifying Western intervention in the Orient. Is this not exactly what was the essence of Laura Bush's first solo radio adresse in November 2001, when she supported the attack on Afganistan and "war on terror" to stop the mistreatment of women and children under Afghanistan's Taliban regime? "The fight against terrorism is also a fight for the rights and dignity of women," is what she said (2001).

TURKEY AS FANTASY. POSTCOLONIALISM, IMPERIALISM

As it was shown above Orientals are represented as merciless, violent and just the opposite of the West. This kind of representation in needed so the West can represent itself as superior. But we should not forget, that the West does not yearn only for cultural power, but for power overall, supported by economical and political supremacy. As Banarjee (2006) is saying, the capital is growing when human lives are being devaluated. Those lives are mostly lives of the Others, Orientals, as areas where human lives are most easily devaluated are the colonies. But as we are being warned by Banarjee (2006), not much has changed since accelerated colonization in 18th century till today. One of the reasons is never ending imperialism, even if the time of colonialism ended. Doyle defines empire as "a relationship, formal or informal, in which one state controls the effective political sovereignty of another political society. It can be achieved by force, by political collaboration, by economic, social or cultural dependence" (Doyle, 1986: 45). The end of empires and direct colonial rule did not mean the end of imperialism and its traces can be observed in "the general cultural sphere [...] in specific political, ideological, economic and social practice" (Said, 1993: 8).

Why are exactly the colonies a space, where life loses its value? "[...]The colony represents the site where sovereignty consists fundamentally in the exercise of power outside the law [...] and where "peace" is more likely to take on the face of a "war without end" (Mbembe, 2003: 23). The colonies are states of exception inhabited by "savages". The colonies are not organized in a state form and have not created a human world. [...] Colonies are zones in which war and disorder, internal and external figures of the political, stand side by side or alternate with each other. As such, the colonies are the location par excellence where the control and guarantees of judicial order can be suspended – the zone where the violence of the state of exception is deemed to operate in the service of "civilization" (Mbembe, 2003: 24). Mbembe took colonies as an example to show that notion of biopower is insufficient to account for contemporary forms of subjugation of life to the power of death. Moreover he emphasized the notion of necropolitics and necropower to account for the various ways in which, in our contemporary world, weapons are deployed in the interest of maximum destruction of persons and the creation of death-worlds, new and unique forms of social existence in which vast populations are subjected to conditions of life conferring upon them the status of living dead.

Banarjee developed, on the basis of the work of Agamben and Mbembe, idea of necrocapitalism, arising from the concept of nekropolitics, what Mbembe defined as "contemporary forms of subjugation of life to the power of death (Mbembe, 2003: 39). Banarjee believes that some contemporary capitalist practices contribute to subjugation of life to the power of death. If the symbol of past sovereignty was the sword, Banarjee wants to examine the effects of the sword of commerce and its power to create life worlds and death worlds in the contemporary political economy. Banarjee is connecting colonialism/ imperialism with systematic destruction, where violence, mutilation, slavery and death are the conditions of wealth of empires (2006). Benarjee understands necrocapitalism:

> *"[...] as a practice that operates through the establishment of colonial sovereignty, and the manner in which this sovereignty is established in the current political economy where the business of death can take place through states of exception. In this sense, it is necessary to read the manner in which colonial sovereignty operates to create states of exception conducive to the operation of necrocapitalist practices (2006).*

For Agamben sovereign is "who decides on the state of exception" (1998: 17) and through the state of exception, the sovereign "creates and guarantees the situation that

the law needs for its own validity" (1998: 25). Sovereignty thus becomes a decision on the value of life, ″a power to decide the point at which life ceases to be politically relevant″ (Agamben, 1998: 142). Even if life is sovereign and anshrined in the declaration of human rights, it becomes a political decision, an excercise of biopower (Foucault, 1980).

> *»However, it is not enough to situate sovereignty and biopower in the context of a neoliberal economy especially in the case of the war on terror. In a neoliberal economy, the colony represents a greater potential for profit especially as it is this space that, as Mbembe (2003: 14) suggests, represents a permanent state of exception where sovereignty is the exercise of power outside the law, where ″peace was more likely to take on the face of a war without end″ and where violence could operate in the name of civilization (Benerjee, 2006).*

Sovereignty over death worlds results in the application of necropower either literally as the right to kill or the right to ″civilize,″ a supposedly ″benevolent″ form of power that requires the destruction of a culture in order to ″save the people from themselves″ (Mbembe, 2003:22). This attempt to save the people from themselves has, of course, been the rhetoric used by the U.S. government in the war on terror and the war in Iraq (Banarjee, 2006). The same rhetoric was used in the time of colonialism in the 18th century. Then as well the colonies "needed" western conquerors. "Accumulation and acquisition were not the only actions of imperialism or colonialism. Their ideological formations assume that certain territories and people actually require and beseech domination, as well as forms of knowledge affiliated with domination (Said, 1993). This is what Said (1996) wrote about English conquering of Egypt and their ideas and thought about Egypt: Egyptians are subordinated race, dominated by a race, which knows them and knows what is best for them, better than they could ever know. English conquerors were convinced that they are saving Egypt from its backwardness. For them the division of people into the ones who rule and the one who are ruled over seemed normal and only correct. It gave them the right to occupy their land, supervise their internal affairs and use their blood and welfare as they pleased. All this was done in belief to help the Orient and its people, since ruled races were not able to know what is good for them.

Those kinds of ideas were supported by orientalist representation of the Orient and Orientals, confirmed as reliable and true. Uneducated, backwarded savages needed supremacy of the West, to supervise their progress and guide them in the right direction. This is how representation, visual or literal, contributed to general approval

of imperialism and Orientalist images were working as tools to set up appropriate atmosphere for colonial exploitations. Today not much is different. As Banarjee is saying, "the ideology of the new empire reflected the needs of colonial maternities where older justifications of empire through civilization were reconfigured by economic conceptions of progress and development resulting in a form of capitalist imperialism« (2006). This is how imperialism modernized itself. It became more than military conquest. Imperialism became an "economic system of external investment and the penetration and control of markets and sources of raw materials˝ (Williams, 1976: 159).

As we have seen orientalism and imperialism are deeply connected. Orientalism works as a tool of imperialism, producing a lens which blurs our vision of the Orient. Said described orientalism as a lens which separates the real Orient from the circle of representation, while its produced image, on the other side of the lens, grows and lives its own life. The image of the Orient that we see through the lens becomes the one and only Orient we know and as such timeless and unchangeable. An image of the Orient that was produced centuries ago in the times of Arab expansion, Ottoman incursions and colonization is an image on the imaginative side of the lens. This image was and is still being reproduced. Western colonialism became new imperialism without colonies, whose tools stayed unchanged. Orientalist representations, which are generating a precipice of differences between "us" and "them", are still present and needed; representations which are exaggerating otherness in a sense of backwardness and are despising and ridiculing cultural differences on the basis of stereotyping. Mohammed cartoons published in Denmark are the most know example in the last years. Their analysis showed "how visual representation of the Orient basically did not change since 16th century" (Cafnik, 2007: 89). Figures of oriental men are as in Mohammed cartoons as in paintings, drawings and graphics from history of art represented as dangerous, threatening, cruel, merciless, angry, aggressive and brutal. This is an image of oriental men produced, represented and comprehended as the only true image by the West for centuries. The analysis of Mohammed cartoons confirmed Said's theory of latent orientalism, which argues that orientalism is unconscious, untouchable, never-changing and constant persuasion about the Orient with imperishableness being its most important attribute. The main reason for the latency of orientalism lies in European or Western desire of overall superiority. When we talk about cultural superiority in western perspective, the Orient is always the Other and represented as such. At the same time the West represents itself by representing the Other, since the difference between "us" and "them" emphasizes our virtues and points out their weaknesses. This

is how the West, with the help of orientalist discourse, produced the Orient in the way most suitable for its political, economical and cultural intentions.

Everlasting imperialism assures political and economical superiority over the Orient and orientalist image of the Orient works as its tool. It is justifying the violence in the name of democracy, civilisation and developement. This is also one of the reasons for the latency of orientalism. As long as there will be imperialism and imperialst politics in the West ther will be orientalist representation of the Orient.

Whenever the West looks at the Orient it sees what it wants to see, erotic fantasy or help needed society; and Oriental women play a very important role in the creation of "Oriental mirage". Because we are dealing with a situation in Turkey, many times a part of orientalist fantasy, it is crucial to ask ourselves, if we can avoide orientalist perspective. Can we talk or write about foreign lands without a burden of our own cultural, historic or personal background? Is making a difference, between the West and the Orient, enough to call it Orientalism? On the other hand we should not forget that it is not necessary to be a foreigner, to be burdened with your own cultural background. Divisions do not exist only between cultures, but as well inside them. Turkey is just one typical example. Westerners are many times accused of alteristic approaches when dealing with foreign lands, while insiders too are hardly able to sustain unburdened stand, burdened with their own involvement. As we will see further on in the chapter on tolerance, one would have to be "kulturlos" not to be in any way limited.

CAN ORIENTALIST PERSPECTIVE BE AVOIDED?

Said differentiated three meanings of Orientalism. The first one is academic. Everyone who lectures about the Orient, writes about it or explores it, is an orientalist. The second has a general meaning. "Orientalism is a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between "the Orient" and "the Occident"" (Said, 1979: 2). The third meaning is Said's critical Orientalism. It is more historically and materially defined. Here "Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient – dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient" (Said, 1979: 3). For Said Orientalism is also everlasting and deeply rooted in Western thought. If contemporary media

representations confirm latency of Orientalism, can we say that whenever one talks about the Orient, he or she makes distinctions between the Orient and the Occident in dominating fashion? Is there a limit of Orientalism? When the Orient is only being talked about, one should be accused of Orientalism only if the third meaning of Orientalism is employed in his thought and expression. When one is accused of Orientalism, it is critical Orientalism one should be accused of and not academic or general Orientalism.

Ian Almond in his recent book, The new Orientalists, analyses some most influential personas of the last century and their discourse about Islam and the Orient. I would like to use his work to show how critical "liberal multiculturalist", as Žižek would have put it, analysis of texts can easily get too critical and nothing but critical.

Almond starts with reading Nietzsche. He accuses him of using Islam as "a barometer of difference", to show "alternative customs and values to undermine the universalist claims of both European Christianity and modernity" and because of his yearn "to acquire what Nietzsche called "trans-Europena eye" – one which would save him from the senile shortsightedness of most Europeans" (2007: 8). Almond blames Nietzsche for his fascination with extremities and difference and for using Islam as an ulterior, epistemological function, to better understand oneself and not to understand Islam (2007: 9). Does this really make Nietzsche an Orientalist?

What does bring him closer to Orientalist tradition are his observations about Arabs and Muslim in general – "that Islam is incapable of democracy, that it is fanatical and warlike, that is Frauenfeindlich and socially unjust, etc" (Almond, 2007: 11). His only difference is that he affirms these prejudices instead of lamenting them. Since he never visited a Muslim country, but he had a wish to, he had to rely on Orientalist canon for his information about Islam and Arab culture. Nietzsche's Islam is at some points stereotypically denoted but nevertheless positive. As Almond has put it, he expressed a sympathy for Islam "in unique and ultimately self-serving terms", to use it for "his own philosophical aims" (2007: 9).

Foucault's interest in and fascination with Islam is in many ways similar to Nietzsche's. One reason for this could be profound Nietzsche's influence on Foucault. Foucault's West is more mendacious than its Oriental counterpart, but also more complex (Almond, 2007: 25). Foucault's Orientals are also leaning towards collectivities, opposite to Occidental individuality (Almond, 2007: 26). These oppositions make Foucault's Orient a paradise. What Orient has to offer to Foucault is honesty and open

acknowledgement of sexuality and power. Foucault spent two years in Tunisia and he experienced it just the opposite of the Orientalist "West as Reality/Orient as Illusion" binary opposition; "the real – be it real feelings, real action, real danger, real beliefs – lies in the East" while West is "the parody of intellectual pretensions and academic ideologies" (Almond, 2007: 32).

When Almond continues with Baudrillar, the red line of his work is drawn. All "new Orientalists", as he named them, are using the Orient as an example to criticize modernity. His question is

> "what happens when, consciously or no, Western critiques of modernity invoke Orientalist/imperialist dualism in their very attempt at self-criticism? Should such side-effects be overlooked, forgiven, even read ironically? Or should they rather be diagnosed as unavoidable symptoms, genuinely problematic moments which occur whenever European critiques of modernity attempt to move outside their Western frameworks and use their terms in unfamiliar, non-western contexts?"

Where should we draw a line between non-orientalist and orientalist perspective? Almond decided to name such attempts "new orientalist" approach to criticism of modernity. I, on the other hand, believe that one should be more careful when using such determinations. The line obviously cannot be easily drawn, which should be one more reason for caution when accusing someone of Orientalizing.

When examining Žižek's work Almond resents him his lack of interest in Islam up till 9/11 attacks and war on terror politics, when Islam became a center of many academic debates. Almond claims that near-complete absence of attention Žižek has paid to Islam up to this point suggests "that it is the topicality of Muslim, rather than their well-being, that has provoked the theorist's interest" (2007, 180). What is more is Almond's qualitative objection, stating that Žižek uses Islam only as a setting to bring his Lacanian theories into play and to talk about the West rather than the Orient. It is true that Žižek himself wrote in his book Iraq: The Borrowed Kettle, that in the style of Mgritte's Ceci n'est pas une pipe, this is not a book about Iraq like the Iraqi crisis and war were not about Iraq either (2004: 8). Žižek's Iraq war is not about Iraq, but a "war about us". Even more, "the US-Iraq war was, in terms of its actual socio-political content, the first war between the USA and Europe" (Žižek, 2004: 36). Because of this Almond accused Žižek with eurocentrism and colonial "airbrushing out of Iraq from its own war" (2007: 181). Almond acknowledges that Žižek's eurocentrism is not blind imperialistic arrogance, but rather "a verdrängt eurocentrism", "which reveals itself

only in slips and omissions, [...], which can speak of a struggle between Western pragmatism and "oriental fatalism", or which sees a catastrophe in the Middle East as an opportunity to talk about US-European relations…" (Almond, 2007: 182-3). But is not the way Žižek uses Iraq in this case an example of philosophical thinking? Žižek expressed his trouble in the movie about him, Žižek!, when his audience has impossible expectations. As he said, they expect answers and solutions, when all he, as a philosopher, can offer is to show them that what they perceive as a problem is not really a problem, the problem is somewhere else. This is exactly what Žižek does in Iraq: The borrowed cattle, he borrows Iraq, as a fake, imaginary problem, to show where the real problem is. Nietzsche was blamed of the same egoistic usage of Islam for his own philosophical aims.

If Foucault, in Almond's words, understood the Orient as the real (real feelings, action, life) in some point Žižek, again claimed by Almond, comprehended the Orient as the Real. The Orient is not anymore an Orientalist fantasy, an illusion as in the time of Ingre's paintings. Media and contemporary politics brought it into our everyday lives. For Žižek the Orient is not a fantasmatic faraway land anymore, but "a traumatic kernel whose status remains deeply ambiguous [...] [and which] resists symbolization, but is at the same time its own retroactive product" (Wright & Wright, 1999: 41). Islam as the Real in Žižek's work assumes "a function facilitated by its irrepressible energy, iconoclastic resistance to the Symbolic, ambiguous relationship to the modernity and Kirkegardian circumvention of the rational in its direct passage to the act" (Almond, 2007: 186). Or as Žižek himself wrote in Iraq: The borrowed cattle: "It does seem as if the split between the First World and Third World runs more and more along this lines of the opposition between leading a long and satisfying life, full of material and cultural wealth, and dedicating one's life to some transcendental cause" (Žižek, 2002: 40), where real for him would be the purpose one finds in life, away from capitalist values of consumption and material property.

Where does Orientalism start and does it ever end? Is talking about the Orient, studying it or using it as an example enough to accuse someone of being colonially oriented Orientalist? Can a sharp line be drawn to separate "already Orientalist discourse" from "not really Orientalist discourse"? Probably not, this is why critics, like Almond, should not use their tools so lightly. It is true that Said's Orientalism still functions, it is latent and still very much present, but this does not mean that it is present in every statement one does or in every fascination one has. The Orient is not a victim just because it is used to stress differences. If it would be, we would have to claim that there are no

differences between the Orient and its counterpart, even more; we would claim that no differences exist in the world. Almonds criticism of Nietzsche's yearning for "trans-European eye" to better understand Europe and be critical about it has no real ground. The difference has to exist. Without it we would not be able to give meaning to things. Are we not saying that it requires a step back to see the whole picture and isn't Nietzsche's "trans-European eye" precisely this, a step back, far enough, to see Europe from outside? The question one should pose here is, whether is the Orient really being victimized or is it being used as a victim to support Almond's liberal multiculturalist view?

Criticism like Almonds accuses almost everybody, whoever writes about the Orient, fantasizes about it or uses it as an example of difference, of Orientalising. Such criticism leads to complete division with strict lines and borders, where only people from the Orient write about the Orient. If like this, it should not stop here. The Orient should also not be in any way involved in the West. It could even go so far as broader geographic areas segmenting into nations or ethnicities, where no one would be allowed to write anything about the other, without being accused of alterist discourse. What is more, as we already said before, everyone (looking from inside or outside discussed area) is to some point burdened with own cultural background or (political, ethnical, religious, etc.) position inside of it. This is why Orientalist, or any alterist, discourse should be limited with at least one attribute without it it could not exist: explicit dominance and superiority over the Other.

The reason that there are no strictly determined criteria which would make a statement Orientalist or not, should not be a good enough reason to prevent anyone from writing or studying the Orient, or broadly speaking, culture or geographical area different from one's own. What rash multiculturalist critics produce is fear of expressing any thought about the Other. More importantly, inner position is not enough to make one's statement more "real" or "true" since it is not possible to completely escape ideological determination, no matter if you are in or out the area of interest.

What will follow is analysis of Turkish phenomena of segregation through theoretical perspectives of psychoanalysis. This analysis is not trying to be in any case European "know-it-all" implication of its own theories in foreign environment. What I would like to do is to analyze Turkey, not because it is so much different, but because it is the same. Turkish phenomena of segregation is not specific only for Turkey, it is present everywhere. What is happening in Turkey is what Žižek (2002) calls "inner clash of civilizations". What is specific for Turkey is that their "clash" is much more visible and

clear, because of strong usage of symbols, and that is why it is a perfect example to analyze.

As Orientalist tradition invented women who served Western imperialist purposes, in the Near and Middle East women as well had (have) a very important symbolic role. In Turkey an image of a woman symbolizes political ideology, modernity and progress or tradition and religious appurtenance.   This is Turkey's own self-image. As we will see, it is an effect of Orientalism, what is more, tradition and modernity are never completely separated, no matter how much they are trying to be.

TWO TURKISH VISIONS

When expression "Turkish woman" is used, it rarely means just a woman living or being born in Turkey. ""The Turkish woman" is a cultural reference that has been engendered to describe the "ideal as well as the "pitiful"" (Arat, 2000:1)

Kemalists with Atatűrk were the first ones to talk about Turkish woman. They gave women "modern" function of a mother of the nation and secularized society. But all citizens did not completely identify with the new identity, which was, till some point, rejecting traditional views and religion. Islamists recognized the gap in 1980's and invented one more "new" identity of Turkish woman, this time "modern" Islamism woman. This is why Turkish woman is not only a cultural reference but also a construct of prevailing men discourse taking a form of a symbol of political ideologies.

KEMALIST CONSTRUCTION

Modernization of Ottoman empire and westernization tendencies started in 1860's with Young Turks movement. Bűker described them as "elite governing class, and although they were identified with the state [they] wished to save with it through reforms. They played a major role in shaping the Constitution of 1876, and attempted to fashion a synthesis of European liberalism and the Islamic tradition" (Bűker, 2002: 149). The movement separated in two fractions, and nationalists, who won the war with Greeks and Sultan, founded the republic in 1923. Their aim was to make Turkey into a modern Europe like nation-state, which was only possible with capitalist economy and newly created bourgeoisie as a foundation of the new republic.

Durakbaşa (2002) claims that are the so–called Middle Eastern societies connected with three characteristics: westernization, Islam and nationalism. Those societies have undergone "the impact of westernization for more than a century, and this is, in fact, the major characteristic of their social histories now". At the same time Islam functioned as "the ideological source for the definition of authenticity and authentic national identity". When Europe was inundated with nationalistic movements, the societies of the Middle East soon followed and "women's emancipation was considered an integral part of the nationalist resistance movements against colonialism and the economic and cultural hegemony of the West. It was formulated as central to the nationalist ideologies that fostered a new national and cultural identity for which the image of the "new woman" was a marker not only of cultural authenticity but also of being "civilized" as a nation". In Turkey's form on nationalism "the cultural reference for authentic national identity shifted from Islamic culture to the original culture of the Turks before they accepted Islam" (Durakbaşa, 2000: 139). This is why Turkish feminism became a part of Turkish nationalism and it was separated from Western feminist movements. Revolutionist like Helide Edib and Ziya Gökalp emphasized the idea that feminism was endemic to the Turkish national character and characterized the social life of pre-Islamic and early Islamic Turkish societies (Durakbaşa, 2000: 141). The progress Turkey wanted to achieve was not the one of Europe, but of ancient Turkey. They assumed sexual equality as a part of national identity and this is how new characteristics of gender were created and with it "new woman", a symbol of developed Turkey. But even if women's participation in public life became a base of development and transformation of society, their main and most important role stayed positioned in private sphere. The new woman was educated, active, beautiful and most importantly she was a mother of the new nation. Ayşe Durakbaşa described the constructed image of Turkish women as "the pragmatism of the Kemalist ideology", "a combination of conflicting images". While education and social activity mark a change in society, motherhood and beauty as a form of men entertainment "asserted a boundary that assured that the new roles would not alter a woman's subordinate position as a "female" in the male-female relationship" (2000: 147). The number of women active in public life was very low which made their visual appearance even more important. Men "formal" control of women's bodies with uniform-like clothes created asexual women, because only like this women could "equally" participate in men's world. Nonetheless, even limited rights were accepted well by Kemalist women, since they preferred to "emphasize their professional identities rather than their individuality and sexuality".

They "viewed themselves as prestigious representatives of the government" (Durakbaşa, 2000: 148).

New women clothes, introduced by Atatűrk were at the same time sexually decent and respectful and as such did not endanger patriarchal morality. New woman was determined within "an eclectic formula of a modernizing ideology combined with an extremely conservative, puritan sexual morality" (Durakbaşa, 2000: 149). Women did gain some level of emancipation; however the main normative categories of traditional patriarchy, such as family reputation and honor, were preserved. "Women were required to internalize strict self-discipline and adaptive strategies to cope with modernity and tradition at the same time" (Durakbaşa, 2000: 150). Even if Kemalists rejected traditional Ottoman past, they never doubted traditional (sexual) ethics, which preserved their control over women.

Kemalists woman was created to be a foundation of modernized society. She had to be educated so she could be a good wife and mother. She was a modern woman obeying patriarchal norms – an "ideal" woman. Kemalist image of Turkish woman is an ideological construct, made to carry out modernist political ideology. The new social role was, especially in elite bourgeois circles, well accepted no matter the difficulties women were faced with because of modern-traditional duality.

Islamist construction

Turkey went through many changes in the first years of its existence. While some changes were only welcomed and desired, as a change in women's clothing, others were legalized and demanded. In this way Kemalists enacted modernity. In the year 1925, soon after the establishment of republic, a law prohibiting traditional men headgear, as fez, was passed. At the same time modern, European headgear, like hat, was introduced. All the modernity enforcing changes were accepted in different manners. The urban middle class took them "to the point that it could place censorship upon itself". In spite of all that western culture did not have a stronger influence on whole society, "for the people, the governed, had little in common with the elite, who lived in their own world" (Bűker, 2002: 150). Because the countryside did not change dramatically, soon two parallel cultures existed inside the new country: westernized, secular culture of small but powerful elite and local, traditional culture of masses connected with Islam.

In the era between the years 1950 and 1960 hostile debate between republican elite and traditional liberalists emerged, with the traditionalists having strong popular support. The debate reached its peak in 1960 when the traditionalists tried to suppress the other side and the army executed coup d'état to protect republics modern roots. After the end of military rule in October 1961, republicans seized the power till the middle of 1960's, when people elected traditional liberal party they were used to. This shift in political power marks the beginning of Islamic revival. The religious groups were from the beginning of the republic and till the political shift imperceptible. But the influence of Islamic movement in Pakistan and Egypt ended long-lasting passivity with the emergence of religious activism. Political Islam became a part of Turkish political sphere, and it kept its position up till now, because it perceived and took advantage of elite nature of Kemalist politics.

When we talk about Islamist political movement, women and their image again play an important role. Here as well women and their attire take a form of a (political) symbol. Actually a dress always had a "symbolic value […] in assessing the "dose" of Westernization and the nature of Westernized Turkish identity (İlyasoğlu, 2000: 242). Westernization of women's clothing was becoming more and more visible in the late 19th century, while the years of the beginning of the republic brought many revolutionary changes. The earlier styles required covering the head with tulle and the body with capes; typically suits were worn under the capes. Later, overcoats replaced capes, and along with suits they became very popular, especially in big cities and among the wives of the bureaucratic elite (Teşcıoğlu, 1958). In fact, the suit became a symbol of the elite women, the "daughters of the Republic", who were educated, employed in professional occupations, and expected to serve their country. In line with the definition of women's role in the new society, wearing a suit embodied feelings of security and chastity. Moreover, as argued by Ayşe Dűrakbaşa, this almost gender-neutral outfit served as a "veiling of her sexuality" (1987: 90-93).

The changes in styles of clothing were gradual, even if the fashion was changing quite fast, the function of women attire was preserved. When a woman, modern or traditional, left her home, she became asexual and unapproachable for the outer world. It is important to emphasize that women clothing was never legally defined or sanctioned. But it was formally disapproved in everyday life. The government sanctioned veils only in public buildings and schools.

The reforms which should enable construction of the new Republic have not been completely successful. "The top-down strategy and monolithic approach of the

Republican leadership alienated some segments of the society, and the praxis of modernization reinforced differentiations within society and created an ideological center and peripheries" (İlyasoğlu, 2000: 243). This is when Islamists perceived an opportunity and offered a nativist response that defended authenticity. Besides that Islamism changed in Turkey in the last thirty years. It took a different form than in the past. We can talk about "new Islamism" which does not oppose modernity and is even encouraging a new kind of identity. New Islamism occupies the center of Turkish politics since the 80's and it introduced a new type of veiling, "the main instrument of identity politics" (İlyasoğlu, 2000: 243). New women's attire is symbolically showing the degree of modernity of the new movement. The new Islamic identity contradicts the Kemalist perception of the veil in the years of early Republic, when the veil meant the lack of modernity and was associated with peasantry.

Islamism, with its economical, political and ideological stands, became an urban-metropolitan phenomenon in Turkey with significant implications for identity politics. While men are creating the new identity, women are living and reinforcing it. New Islamists are trying to connect social behavior, as veiling and sexual segregation, with new connotations: urban/modern/educated, opposing old attributes: provincial/back warded/uneducated. The new kind of veiling is again separating elite circles from the rest.

Turkey has been witnessing the formation of a distinct Islamic female identity. This process has corresponded with the growth of Islamic movement and their opposition to hegemonic Republican regime. Groups that have never completely accepted hegemonic ideology found the new movement as an appealing answer to their identity formation problems. The new Islamism was leading the way (again) between modernity and tradition and "they have done this so successfully that they now appear as a counter-elite in mainstream politics" (İlyasoğlu, 2000: 241). For the new kind of veiling being effective marker of elite, it had to be completely distanced from the functions of veiling in non-elite environment. For this reason Islamist activists claim that is their own veiling "more conscious" and "more thought out"(White, 2002: 194). The Islamic dress code for women proclaimed by the current Islamist movement and ideology is called tesettűr. "It requires the complete concealing of the hair, the bosom, the arms, the legs, and the curvature of the body " and it is defined by three principle "Islamic precepts of women's attire, patriarchal codes related to the modesty of women, and the consumerist code of chicness" (lyasoğlu, 2000:244). With tesettűr women try to combine all three principles in their attire. Tesettűr is neither modern

nor traditional. It completely supports the intention of new Islamism; to refuse "assumed wrongs in society that are perceived as the consequence of the Western influence" and to modify "the prevailing "traditional woman image" and to elevate women's status" with education and employment (lyasoğlu, 2000:245).

New Islamism with its modernity is striving for education of women and their activity in the public sphere. This is why they also have women activists within their own ranks. Nonetheless, White points out "the Islamist paradox". "While the Islamist movement has made room, to some extent, for women to become activists, attend university and work outside the home, other women are denied these opportunities within the same movement. [...] At marriage, even educated Islamist women activists are often asked to stop working by their husbands" (White, 2002: 195). White is pointing out another observation, no matter how women, from elite or working class, understand veiling, their point of view always differs from the male view inside the Islamist movement. The male view in a way even contradicts with party's political program. White ascertained that veiling and segregation for women represented central political symbols, and they wanted to base their new social identity and opportunities on them. The new identity would let women to be veiled and be professionally and politically active and mobile. Male activists, on the other hand, understood veiling and segregation as a possibility to control women's sexuality and movement through space, as an assurance of virginity, control of male desire, and preservation of women's primary place as wife and mother in the home (White, 2002: 194-5). This paradox is supported by data that the percentage of employed women has fallen from 38% to 31% between the years 1970 and 1995, what coincides with the growth and development of Islamist movements in the country (Zeytinoğlu, 2000: 184).

Contradictory environment, where Islamist women found themselves in, fighting for their right to practice religion and their public display of religious beliefs with veiling on one hand, and education, professional life and political activism on the other, is still controlled by men. Because men created the new image of women, synthesis of modernity and tradition, symbolized by the new attire - tesettűr. Women are again a symbol of a political movement, their presence gives new Islamism democratic accent, that is many times forgotten in everyday life. Zeytinoğlu explained subordinated position of women with "cultural factors", "men's prejudices toward women and reluctance to give up their power over women (2000: 189). This "cultural factors" are not typical only for Islamist half of Turkey, but also for those who call themselves

"modern", Kemalists. Turkish women are, no matter which political side they belong to, trapped in paradoxicality of incompatible dualities of modernity and tradition.

MODERN AND TRADITIONAL

As we have placed Turkey in between two political spheres, both of the spheres place themselves, their values and norms, on a timeline. While Kemalists perceived themselves as modern, westernized, European, Islamists responded to the modernization ''from above'' with more traditional, even fundamental values - values closer to the population Kemalists left behind.

Even thought, strict division between modern and traditional does not simply apply to Turkey's spheres. As we will see, none of the spheres are strictly modern or traditional. While in traditional societies, primary group and social structure are identical, as are individual and collective identity, in modern societies differences between an individual and society arise. In modern societies personal identity differs from collective identity, abstract systems substitute local community, close family ties are losing its importance, while importance of an individual grows and religion is being substituted by science, reason and progress (Volčič, 2008).

> ''Science and religion have changed places: today, science provides security religion once guaranteed. In a curious inversion, religion is one of the possible places from which one can deploy critical doubts about today's society. It has become one of the sites of resistance. The ''worldless'' character of capitalism is linked to this hegemonic role of the scientific discourse in modernity. Hegel had already clearly identified this feature when he noted that for us moderns, art and religion no longer command absolute respect: we can admire them, but no longer kneel down before them, our heart is not really with them. Only science - conceptual knowledge - deserves this respect.'' (Žižek, 2008: 82).

Modernity is, in Žižek's terms, capitalism combined with the hegemony of scientific discourse. As he continues, ''no wonder modernity led to the co-called ''crisis of sense'', that is, to the disintegration of the link between, or even identity of, truth and meaning'' (Žižek, 2008: 82). The crisis is present, in more or less subtle way, in all societies, but there are some, where it erupted with extreme power. These are usually societies where modernization happened suddenly, as it has happened, to some extent, in Turkey. Many, mostly Turkish, historians and sociologists criticize modernity imposed

from above, dividing society into periphery and center, blaming it for nowadays existing bipolarity of the society. Žižek too, sees fast modernization as a reason for worldwide fundamentalist movements. Because some societies were exposed to the impact of modernization directly, not like in Europe, where modernization took place over several centuries, their symbolic universe was perturbed much more brutally and they had no time to establish new symbolic balance. ''No wonder, then, that the only way for some of these societies to avoid mental breakdown was to erect in panic the shield of ''fundamentalism'' (Žižek, 2008: 82, 83).

Some might argue that the process of modernization started in Turkey, long before the republican era, with the Tanzimat period. This is a period of reformation carried out by Sultan Abdűlmecid in the year 1839, a period of deliberate modernization of the Ottoman Empire. The reformers recognized that the old religious and military institutions no longer met the needs of the empire in the modern world. Many of the reforms were attempts to adopt successful European practices. Changes included universal conscription; educational, institutional and legal reforms; and systematic attempts at eliminating corruption. Tanzimat included the policy of "Ottomanism," which was meant to unite all of the different peoples living in Ottoman territories. In this period discourse about women position in the society became evident. First steps towards equality were made; women were getting educated and employed. Revolution of Young Turks in the beginning of the 20th century, as well, brought many modernist reforms into life.

As we have seen, Atatürk's revolution was not completely sudden; it followed the fashion of changes of the previous century. But it was, none the less, forced and successfully implied only in elite urban circles. What is more, centuries of modernization in Europe, starting with reformation period in the beginning of the 16th century, allowed European societies much smoother and gradual transformation.

Sayyid states more reasons why secular states turn their back to Islamization. Firstly we have to understand who an Islamist is in the first place. This is someone who places her or his Muslim identity at the center of her or his political practice. That is, Islamists are people who use the language of Islamic metaphors to think through their political destinies, those who see in Islam their political future (Sayyid, 2003: 17).

If Turkey is a secular country since 1923, why is it turning back to Islamism? Sayyid answers this question briefly, saying Islamism is a reaction to the failure to the liberalism and socialism (2003: 19). We will try to explain the failure of these political

systems in the case of Turkey and their contribution to the rise of Islamism latter on. Before let's take a look at the Sayyid's five main points about what has caused Islamic resurgence.

Sayyid states as the first reason the failure of nationalist secular elites. »Islamism is a reaction to the failure to the »naive liberalism« of the 1930's and Third World socialism in the1960's and 1970's. The emergance of Islamism is presented as a product of the inability of the secular elites, which succeeded the European colonial regimes, to meet the hopes and aspirations of their people« (Sayyid, 2003: 19). The second reason is the lack of political participation. As it was asserted by Ajami, a lack of public participation in the political process was a major factor in leading to the politicization of the mosque (Ajami, 1981: 171). This is why religious vocabulary is increasingly used to describe political problems in Islamist movements. The next reason is the crisis of petty bourgeoisie. The petty bourgeoisie had a very important role in the post-colonial era in the ranks of a greatly expanded administrative and coercive state apparatus. However they lacked power and wealth because of the continuing domination of the ruling elites. Thus, the expansion of the role of the petty bourgeoisie, and the inherent contradictions it implies, are responsible for Islamism (Sayyid, 2003: 20). On the other hand Islamism is also a reaction to the consequences of rapid economic growth and uneven economic development. ''The destruction of traditional patterns of life and the uncertainty which this implies lead people to assert or reassert their traditional way of life as a way of coping with changes'' (Sayyid, 2003: 20). It is the influx of rural folk into the increasingly politicized urban sub-proletariat and petty bourgeoisie which is responsible for the rise of Islamism (Fischer, 1982:102). Internal migration and rapid urbanization produce a large marginal population; the inadequacy of the urban infrastructure to cope with such a large influx leads to grievances caused by problems such as underemployment and exploitation (Sayyid, 2003: 21). The last reason are the effects of cultural erosion. The integration of Muslim societies into the world capitalist system, dominated by the west, led to the weakening of »Muslim« identities; in other words, Islamism is a nativist response to inclusion in a western-led global system (Sayyid, 2003: 22). To sum up »the cause of Islamism is either external force acting upon some notion of a significant Islamic presence, or Islamism is seen to be a super structural response to structural crisis« (Sayyid, 2003: 23).

Those are five reasons Sayyid states as most commonly deployed to explain the emergence of Islamism in general. In Turkey in particular, Islamism emerged as a response to Kemalism, a category to describe nationalist", or "secularist", or

"modernizing" movements in the post-colonial era. Islamism could only be the true opposition to Kemalist movement, because it was the Kemalist movement which ended Islamic union - Ummah. From the death of the Prophet (632) until 3 March 1924, there was always a caliph, Prophets successor. The caliphate was the link to the Prophet and his law, as well as being the nodal point around which a global Muslim identity was structured. Ottoman sultans were the last caliphs until 3 March 1924, when at the instance of Mustafa Kemal, the Grand National Assembly abolished caliphate. This is how Islam becomes decentred. The Kemalists, followers of Kemal's ideology, disrupted the sedimented relationship between Islam and state authority – a relationship over thousand years old - by abolishing the caliphate (Sayyid, 2003: 63). Islam was no longer linked with state power. The object of Kemal's government was to build "a new country, a new society, a new state … respected at home and abroad. Islam was only preserved as a private code of ethics" (Sayyid, 2003: 63). Islam had been officially removed from the state and according to this many reforms followed in the next years. All educational institutions were put under direct state control, religious courts were abolished, in 1925 the Hat Law prohibited the wearing of fez and restricted the use of the veil, the provision that mentioned Islam as state religion was abolished, the call to prayer, was ordered to be called in Turkish instead of Arabic, imams were ordered to preach in Turkish, the Qur'an was translated into Turkish and printed in the Latin alphabet. "The adoption of the Latin alphabet in 1928 took Turkey partially out of the Islamic cultural world and opened the doors to the Western cultural world. Similarly giving up sharia laws and adopting laws from Europe pulled Turkey closer to the Western world" (Balci, 2008).

New Turkey was built on four strategies, which all attempt to re-articulate Islam: secularism, nationalism, modernization and westernization. "For Kemalists, being modern meant being like the Europeans. The reform program was mimetic in that it took Europe as its specific model of adoption. Modernization could not be acquired without a social and cultural transformation" (Sayyid,, 2003: 68). Atatürk wanted to westernize new Turkey. "To westernize you had first to Orientalize" (Sayyid, 2003: 68). So Kemalists had to first represent Muslim society as being oriental, suffering from all the ills Orient is bringing, to be able to show the westernization as the cure. For Kemalists "it was only by removing the influence of Islam that they could cease to be part of the Orient and become truly western" (Sayyid, 2003: 69).

"The project of Kemalism failed fully to constitute all social relations and not all subjects within Kemalist regimes fully internalized the discourse of Kemalism" (Sayyid,

2003: 85). Many Muslim countries adopted Kemalism as their discourse, yet Kemalist regimes were not able to impose Kemalism totally. There are very few Muslim communities where Kemalism has been replaced by Islamism as the hegemonic discourse. Still in most Muslim communities Kemalism is having difficulties concealing the existence of an Islamist opposition" (Sayyid, 2003: 87). Why is it that Islamists and not others who seem to be the main beneficiaries of the misfortunes of the Kemalists? Sayyid explains that the conflict between Islamism and Kemalism is a battle between modernity and the "other" (2003:88). Islam as a symbol of the anti-modern is also one of the dominant constructions of the Kemalist discourses, which aligned Islam with "obscurantism", "superstition" and the rejection of modernity. If we can establish that that Islamists are in fact motivated by the desire to go against modernity, we could conclude that it is the anti-modern character of Islamism which distinguishes it from all other alternatives to Kemalism and Kemalism itself" (Sayyid, 2003: 88). On the other hand Zubaida's reading of Khomeini seems to suggest that there may be other ways of understanding modernization. Zubaida's general thesis is that, even though Khomeini conducts himself in terms of traditional Islamic rethorical practices, his conclusions cannot be understood without placing them in the context of modernity. Khomeini's political theory only makes sense in relation to a number of categories such as "people", "state", etc. that are the products of developments in western political theory. In other words, western political theory is the necessary precondition for Khomeini's Islamic government (Sayyid, 2003: 96).

If Islam and modernity are not external to each other, then what kind of relationship do they have? Conflict between Kemalists and Islamists could be seen as a conflict about which type of modernization strategy to pursue, rather than a conflict about whether or not to modernize. Islamism is different from other political systems of modern age because it distinguishes between modernity and the West. The Islamists' attack on westernization could be separated from questions about modernity; their rejection of westernization would not imply a rejection of modernization (Sayyid, 2003: 98). In other words the emergence of Islamism is based on the erosion of eurocentrism.

> *"Central to the success of Islamism is the way it is constructed in opposition to the West. The relative success of Islamist project is based on the combination of the deconstructionist logic of the postmodern critique with a nonwestern alternative. In other words, the proliferation of groups and movements declaring themselves to be Islamists highlights the inability of the logic of eurocentrism to police as effectively as before the fixity of its articulations" (Sayyid, 2003: 158).*

While talking specifically about Islamism and Turkish Kemalism, the question about why Islamists are replacing the position Kemalists had in Turkey, could be answered with Gellner's words: "Islam is unique among world religions, and Turkey is unique within the Muslim world. ... Turkey [is] the exception within the exception." (1997: 233, 236). The reason for this deference is because Turkey's Kemalist leadership has adopted secularization and Westernization from above. But for the same reason, as Gellner also observes, the army, regarded by all as the guardian of Kemalism, does not seem to hesitate to step in every time a democratic election results in Islamist victory (Gellner, 1994, pp.199-200). Hence secularization in Turkey seems to be a peculiar affair. While in the normative model, secularization is supposed to be associated with enlightenment and the freedom of thought, in Turkey it is imposed from above and protected in an authoritarian manner by state institutions, primarily including the military. This is why Islamist politics has also often been interpreted as a form of resistance to, rejection of, and withdrawal from, global trends and with other words they represented the salvation for those who felt oppressed, for whom Islam signified the frame of life.

DIVISION OF TURKEY: A CLASH WITHIN

Turkey is, in a very simplified description, as we have showed, internally bipolar. It is divided into two political halves, both very strongly presented among people. Its division separates people into "them" and "Others", but because the fight for superiority constantly takes place, because there is no strict supremacy, each of the groups can occupy the position of "them" or "Others" and shift the position anytime. Even if the Islamist half understands itself as Turkey's Other, we will try to show that the notion of the Neighbor describes Turkish bipolarity much more precisely. Nonetheless both notions arrive from the idea of alterity.

Alterity is signifying other or otherness in series of theoretical developments. "The significance of the other as a concept becomes that of attending to the function of otherness as both inside and outside of that to which it is other" (McGowan, 2007: 79). Otherness as cultural difference can operate in relation to universals and particulars of difference. In psychoanalytic accounts the subject is held in a dialectical relation to the other. "Without the possibility of recognition, the subject cannot maintain its sense of self in the imago of the Ideal I" (McGowan, 2007: 79). The other is also known as little other, distinguished from the big Other or the Other. The little other is defined as not really the other, but a reflection and projection of the ego and it can be entirely inscribed in the imaginary order. On the other side the big Other designates radical alterity, an otherness which transcends the illusory otherness of the imaginary it cannot be assimilated through identification. Hence the big Other is inscribed in the order of the symbolic. The Other is thus another subject and also the symbolic order which mediates the relationship with that other subject (Evans, 2006: 135-136). "The subject participates in the discourse of the Other in the interest of self as self-recognition, and it is in this participation that the subject is able to reflect on its own existence as such" (McGowan, 2007: 84). "A notion of self comes about in the Other as the symbolic order – but also from the other – as an effect of the dialectical relation between self and other, in which self is recognized in its own particular idealized form. [...] We need the other to define ourselves, but we need a particular other who will grant us recognition in the terms we demand" (McGowan, 2007: 86). When we talk about cultural differences the otherness plays a key role in identification.

> "If difference is foundational, as Lacan asserts, then the estrangement and subsequent anxiety to which it gives rise will manifest in subjects as they operate

in "socially elaborated situations". This pertains to everything from the foundation of nation-states to the policies and procedures which nation-states operate in relation to what in their foundation as such, becomes their "other"" (McGowan, 2007: 88).

Many thinkers were trying to find a solution against violence caused by cultural differences, but none of them (assimilation, multiculturalism, hybridity, or ambivalence) realizes the possibilities of harmonious, or just, relations of cultural difference. As McGowan points out, "one way of understanding this failure might be to think of it in relation to Lacan's proposition that there is no "Other of the Other" and that anywhere such an Other is posited, it is by definition an imposter. [...] All and any forms of cultural difference is one in which the desire for and to master the other is always inherent to the condition of being a subject in the world. Here, the ethics of psychoanalysis is the ethics of accepting and facing that condition rather than denying it" (McGowan, 2007: 93-94). Accepting the condition does not necessarily mean to stop being vigilant. What it means, is to understand the pretext of being vigilant itself.

THE POLITICS OF FEAR

Žižek defines today's predominant mode of politics as post-political bio-politics. Where post political mean politics which claims to have left behind old ideological struggles and instead focus on expert management and administration, and bio-politics denotes the regulation of the security and welfare of human lives as its primary goal. Bio-politics is also ultimately politics of fear; it focuses on defense from potential victimization or harassment (2008: 40). "Today's liberal tolerance towards others, the respect of otherness and openness towards it, is counterpointed by and obsessive fear of harassment. [...] My duty to be tolerant towards the Other effectively means that I should not get too close to him" (Žižek, 2008: 41). It is becoming very obvious that the central human right in late-capitalist society is a right not to be harassed, and multiculturalist liberal thought is putting the Other in a position where he is fine, as long as he doesn't come to close, as long as he is not really the Other.

Žižek is asking, why is today the over-proximity of the Other so frightening? Why do we have to deprive the Other of their raw substance of jouissance? The answer might lie in the fact that the whole world is "global information village", bringing Others closer to us, making Others our neighbors. As Žižek emphasized, "those who understand

globalization as an opportunity for the entire earth to be a unified space of communication, one which brings together all humanity, often fail to notice a dark since of their proposition" (Žižek, 2008: 59). Globalization makes Others our neighbors. Since a Neighbor is, after Freud, a traumatic intruder, someone whose different way of life (or rather way of jouissance materialized in its social practices and rituals) disturbs us when it comes too close, his presence might give rise to an aggressive reaction aimed at getting rid of this disturbing intruder (Žižek, 2008: 59). This is why Sloterdijk might even be right when saying that more communication means more conflict (2006). The multiculturalist attitude of understanding and respecting each other cannot work, if the Other comes too close, when the Other becomes the Neighbor. As we will see further on, multiculturalist notion of tolerance, as Žižek reads it, provides a solution. But let us firstly place the Other in Turkish condition, to understand Turkish ever present inner otherness.

TURKISH NEIGHBOR

To define the Other in Turkey, it is best to use the term of a Neighbor. Neighbor as a term is coming from the Bible.

> *"Thou shalt not avenge, nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people, but thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself: I am the Lord" (Leviticus 19:18).*

Freud in Civilization and its Discontents (1962) asked himself why would we love our Neighbor. Because if I love someone, this person has to be so much like me, that I can love myself in him or her, or even he/her has to be so much more perfect than myself, that I can love Ideal I in that person. What is more, the Neighbor is a perfect stranger. To love him or her would cause injustice to people close to me. Freud gets so far, that it is not even possible to give universal love to the Neighbor as inhabitant of the same planet. Because what I feel for this stranger, Freud says, is hostility and hatred. Because he doesn't show any love for me and I fear that if I will do him any good, he might without consideration injure me, since his gain is all he cares about, without ever considering my harm (1962). "Freud brings his reflection on neighbor-love to a provisional conclusion by appealing to the persistence, in human beings, of a fundamental inclination toward aggression, a primary mutual hostility" (Žižek et al., 2005: 2). Freud describes a relationship with the Neighbor with a Latin proverb homo homini lupus – the Neighbor tempts us to satisfy our aggression on him.

The notion of the Neighbor is also closely related to the multiculturalist notion of tolerance. The basic right in contemporary society is not to be harassed, which is at the same time a strategy to keep the intrusive Neighbor at a proper distance. The ideal Neighbor then in multiculturalist liberal society would be Kierkegaard's dead Neighbor (1994: 75). Because a corps cannot be harassed, it cannot enjoy, and what is more, disturb us with its enjoyment.

Reinhard brings, in his work, psychoanalytical commentary on the Neighbor in the work of Freud and Lacan into relation with the logic of political theology theorized by Carl Schmitt. Essential logic of the political lies between the opposition between the categories of "friend" and "enemy".

> *"The distinction of friend and enemy denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an association or dissociation. The political enemy needs not to be morally evil or aesthetically ugly; he needs not appear as an economic competitor, and it may even be advantageous to engage with him in business transactions. But he is, nevertheless, the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specifically intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible" (Schmitt, 1996: 26-27).*

The political has the characteristics of formal logic and very personal moments of recognition, understanding and judgment. "The Friend and the Enemy form twin images for the national and subjective ethos [...] by which the interior "we" (the "I" and its friends) is identified as such, as distinguished from the exterior "they"" (Reinhard, 2005: 16). Reinhard claims that today we live in a world from which the political may have already disappeared or it has mutated into a new form. The enemy has disappeared, which results in "something like global psychosis". Since the mirroring relationship between Friend and Enemy provides a form of stability, a world without enemies is much more dangerous than the one where one is surrounded by them (Reinhard, 2005: 17). Reinhard further suggests that such a political can be located in the figure of the Neighbor – "the figure that materializes the uncertain division between the friend/family/self and enemy/stranger/other (2005: 18). The Neighbor is "an identifiable enemy – that is, one who is reliable to the point of trachery, and thereby familiar. One's fellow man, in sum, who could almost be loved as oneself. [...] This adverstry would remain a Neighbor, even if he were an evil Neighbor against whom war would have to be waged" (Derrida, 1988: 83). This is why the Neighbor is a public enemy, not a private one, and why the term Neighbor (and not the Other) should be

implied into Turkish situation of bipolarity. Islamist, religious, traditional or fundamental Neighbor - all present a threat (as Kemalists would argue) to modern Republic and values established by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. They do not present harm to individuals but to what these individuals as a group represent: modernity.

A CLASH WITHIN A CIVILIZATION OR A NATION

Samuel Huntington's theory of the Clash of Civilizations is stating that world politics is entering a new phase, in which the great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of international conflict will be cultural. Civilizations, as he calls the highest cultural groupings of people, differentiate importantly in religion, history, language and tradition. These divisions are deep and increasing in importance. What is more, in Huntington's opinion, these cultural differences will cause many conflicts in the future. This is why he encouraged United States to forge alliances with similar cultures and spread its values wherever possible and to be accommodating with alien civilizations if possible, but confrontational if necessary (2002).

When Žižek compares some basic ideals of life perceived in, speaking in Huntington's terms, different civilizations, he agrees to a point.

> *''We, in the First World countries, find it more and more difficult even to imagine a public or universal Cause for which we would be ready to sacrifice our life. … It does seem as if the split between First World and Third World runs more and more along the lines of the opposition between leading a long and satisfying life full of material and cultural wealth, and dedicating one's life to some transcendental Cause'' (Žižek, 2002: 40).*

There is a strong difference separating ideological antagonism between the Western consumerist way of life and Muslim radicalism. "We in the West are the Nietzschean last Man, immersed in stupid daily pleasures, while the Muslim radicals are ready to risk everything, engaged in the struggle even up to their own self-destruction. […] This notion of the "clash of civilizations", however, must be rejected out of hand: what we are witnessing today are, rather, clashes within each civilization" (Žižek, 2002: 40, 41). The real life clashes are, more than anything, connected with global capitalism. The clashes are not only taking place within some "civilization", but are also and mostly related to the interplay of global economic interests. This is why we should focus the

economic background of the "clashes" – the clash of economic interests (Žižek, 2002: 41, 42).

Is this not exactly what happened in Turkey - a clash within a nation: a clash between modern and traditional values, a clash between strict and loosen religious beliefs (in some cases even atheism), a clash between consumerism and radicalism? What is more, is this not the clash we are faced with mostly everywhere where individuals or groups have rejected capitalist consumerist values? Is it not again true, that Turkey is not in any way special, that their clash within is only more visually emphasized and it is happening on a larger scale than in some Western countries?

Turkey's inner clash was brought to life in the beginning of 20th century with the foundation of the republic and fortified, till some extent even forced, modernization which broke down some traditional values. Atatürk's modernization politics was trying to take a step closer to modern Europe (Ahmad, 1993; Mardin, 1981). Atatürk's Turkey proves the existence of inner Orientalism, the very present idea at the time, when everything Ottoman was considered non-Turkish, backwarded, and undeveloped. We can understand Turkey's forced modernization as a reply to century's long Orientalist-imperialist thought making strong division between the "glorified" West and its counterpart – the Orient. A way to get out of the vice of separation was to step on the other, "modern", side. What caused the gap between the urban elite and rural population. The gap which was extending and growing till it finally produced two Turkish identities with its own attributes and symbols.

On the other hand, we cannot claim that inner division causes division overall. Lévi-Straussian zero institution, in the form of the nation, functions as a connecting factor. As in Winnebago tribe, which was divided into two subgroups and each group perceived the ground plan of their village differently. Lévi-Strauss understood the split as an imbalance in social relations that prevented the community from stabilizing itself into a harmonious whole. ''The two perceptions of the ground plan are simply two mutually exclusive endeavors to cope with traumatic antagonism, to heal its wound via the imposition of a balanced symbolic structure'' (Žižek, 2000: 113). Since both of the groups formed the same tribe, Lévi-Strauss expected a presence of some symbolic identity connecting the subgroups in one entity. He called it "zero-institution", an institution that enables all members of the tribe to experience themselves as members of the same tribe.

''Is not this zero-institution, then, ideology at its purest, that is, the direct embodiment of the ideological function of providing a neutral all-encompassing space in which social antagonism is obliterated, in which all members of society can recognize themselves? And is not the struggle for hegemony precisely the struggle over how zero-institution will be overdetermined, colored by some particular signification? Is not the modern notion of nation such a zero-institution that emerged with the dissolution of social links grounded in direct family or traditional symbolic matrixes that is, when, with the onslaught of modernization, social institutions were less and less grounded in naturalized tradition and more and more experienced as a matter of "contract"? (Žižek, 2000: 113, 114).

This is why both of the sides constructed an image of a perfect ''Turkish'' woman; an ideological image of a feminine national identity trying to overdetermine ''Turkish'' zero institution and to make final definition of ''Turkishness''. Both of the constructions were accepted widely enough to prevent other's hegemony and this is why their struggle has never ended.

SEGREGATION OF SPACE

Division of Turkey, despite of intentional segregation of space, forms constant conflict situations of encountering the Neighbor, the one from the opposite side of dual political separation. To avoid unpleasant encounters, new suburban areas are shaped, where being too close to the Neighbor is almost impossible. What is more, even already existing parts of the city are being divided between the halves. Ankara is, as a capital and "artificially" founded city, a very good example of such segregation of space. Ankara has a very brief history as an urban center. Until 1923 it was a provincial town with only 20.000 inhabitants when it suddenly became the capital. After that it has grown faster than any other city. By the year 1985 it had 2 and a half million inhabitants, today more than 4 million. The influx of migrants and its importance in the times of early republic, as a symbol of Turkey's modernization, is making Ankara very interesting. It has two centers, an old one, called Ulus, and a new one, Kızılay. The two centers differ architecturally, because of the difference in age, what is more, each is preferred by another political pole. A place strongly disliked by many is the Sıhhiye Bridge area situated on the main boulevard connecting the above mentioned centers, traditional business center Ulus with modern business center Kızılay. As Ayata, Sıhhiye area is

disliked because it is a meeting point of thousands of people coming from very diverse backgrounds (2002: 29). In Sıhhiye meeting A Neighbor is inevitable.

Fragmentation, stratification and heterogeneity are typical for many cities in the last decades, not only in Turkey. Suburban areas are emerging around all bigger cities, mainly with the same reason: to separate. Ankara's middle class is moving to suburbs to escape from pollution, street life, heterogeneity, vivid images of poverty and class polarization (Ayata, 2002: 26-28). When homogeneously connected in areas of "sameness" they distinguish themselves sharply from the crowd with its disturbing elements. The suburban areas prevent unnecessary contact with anything signifying a Neighbor: different class status, provincial background, religious attitudes and symbols.

> *"The urban masses also include politically reviled characters such as the Islamist woman wearing the "turban"* (headscarf in Turkish)*and the extreme nationalist with his long unkempt mustache" (Ayata, 2002: 28).*

It should be emphasized that the secularist middle class is not the only one moving away from the city. If we roughly divided Turkish political elites into secularist and Islamism, the last group too, has preferable areas to live.

> *"In Turkish context, a wide section of the middle class tends to distinguish itself from other classes through culturalized lifestyle choices; this involves strong secular values and a secular group identity defined in opposition to the Islamist middle-classes that lead their segregated existence in other parts of the city" (Ayata, 2002: 30).*

There are many arguments why such segregation occurs. Some would argue that it is because of a clash between modern and traditional values, while other would feel discomfort in such arguments claiming that such distinction should not be used as an organizing assumption, but rather as a topic for intense investigation (Bozdoɡan and Kasaba, 1997; Kandiyoti, 1997), "accepting that fragmentation and multiple combinations of forces of modernity and tradition are indispensable in considering Turkish social order" (Özyeɡin, 2002). This is what we, in the previous chapter, described and understood as inner clash of civilizations.

Segregation prevents the conflict with the Neighbor. Two main political poles are living in the same cities, but they do not as much cohabit, as they divide smaller geographical areas into parts. Not only that are suburban neighborhoods almost exclusively contributed with one or the other half, even the city center of Ankara is divided. Apart from "gray areas" of equality, where cohabiting outgrows into collegial relationship,

friendship and mutual respect, traditionalists and modernists live separately, tolerating each other in areas of perforce cohabitation and crossroads.

It would be over simplified to claim that Turkey's population divides into only two groups which never collide or if they do, it only happens in a way of conflict. So called gray areas always exist. But what we are interested in is the segregation and strict bipolar division that is visibly present in Turkey.

Segregation practiced in Turkey could be explained as an effect and problem of tolerance (the notion of tolerance will be discussed further on). Segregation is an effect of obliged tolerance as a way how liberal multiculturalist politics practice inclusion of the Others, while at the same time, they expect their "acclimatization". When this is not achieved, the Others are segregated, geographically removed. Segregation as such does not solve problems arising from inner clashes of civilization, it avoids them. Solution to avoid segregation could be alienation. The main distinction between segregation and alienation is that the latest is not special. Alienation enables coexistence. Here we could employ Sloterdijk's thesis "More communication means at first above all more conflict." (2006: 84.). As wrote by Žižek, Sloterdijk is right to claim that the attitude of understanding each other has to be supplemented by the attitude of "getting-out-of-each-other's-way", by maintaining an appropriate distance, by implementing a new "code of discretion" (2002: 59).

> *"One of the things alienation means is that distance is woven into the very social texture of everyday life. Even if I live side by side with others, in my normal state I ignore them. I am allowed not to get to close to others. I move in a social space where I interact with others obeying certain external "mechanical" rules, without sharing their inner world. [...] Sometimes alienation is not a problem but a solution" (Žižek, 2002: 59)*

Alienation brought us to the notion of tolerance, the notion that presents the base for liberalism. We will return to it in one of the following chapters after discussing the symbols of division between modern and traditional, secular and religious, left and right in Turkey.

Symbols of division

Since Atatürk's revolution attire always played an important role. Some pieces of clothes have become symbols of modernization while other, originating in the past, has symbolized traditional values. The veil seems to be the most obvious symbol, but it is not the only one. In 1925 the Hat Law prohibited the wearing of fez and restricted the use of the veil, latter on, following the veil ban, beards were prohibited inside universities as well. In this chapter we will focus on symbols worn by men. As Carol Delaney (1994) the beard has strong political connotations in Muslim societies. In some Muslim countries, the beard has become a sign of affiliation with some of the new conservative, fundamentalist Muslim groups (Gaffney 1982). However, leaning on Delaney's (1994) anthropological research on hair and their importance in Turkish society, this phenomenon was not so prevalent in Turkey during the late 1970s and early 1980s where a bearded youth was more often assumed to be a member of a leftist, Marxist group. The use of a trimmed beard by a Muslim man on the other hand is interpreted as resistance to the West. In both cases wearing a beard was seen as a threat to authority. This is why the veil ban was soon accompanied with the beard prohibition inside universities. The veil and the Muslim beard were interpreted as threats to the authority of the secular state, while the »leftist« beard was interpreted as a symbol of those who sabotage the order of the state.

As Delaney (1994), during 1970's mustaches too became a symbolic badge of political identity. "Certain styles of mustaches were classified as "leftist"--especially those that were bushy and turned down on the side of the mouth. This style was known as Stalin mustache. In contrast, those with the edges curved up recalled the styles of the Ottomans and were, at least in the 1960s, emblematic of the "rightist" nationalists" (Delanay, 1994: 168). Mustaches are occasionally tolerated in the Army, beards of any style, however, are not permitted.

Beards have many forms and according to their shapes people in Turkey are able to recognize each other's political orientation and/or religious believes. It is true that with younger generations, where fashion probably plays important role in outlook of an individual, distinctions based on the shape of the beard are less reliable. With older generations, on the other hand, length and shape of the beard or mustache signalize one's political orientation and religious believes. For this reason, beards (or some kind of beards) are not allowed for public workers and even in some private companies and

most of all no facial hair is allowed in the army. In a way the beard, like the veil, labels an individual till the point disturbing for the Other, and as such has to be removed.

Another, in this case leftist, symbol, widely practiced by young men are earrings. I would not have paid so much attention to it, if I was not involved in an incident considering male earrings. This symbol has not been academically discussed in a broader extent, none the less it does deserve our attention. It's symbolic importance will be presented with an anecdote which took place inside university campus in Ankara.

I was sitting in a student's cafeteria in the campus of a university in Ankara, which is known to be more nationalistic, Islamist and traditional, or at least the majority students going there would identify with these values and political beliefs. I was in a company of a man for whom I know is a Kemalist. He has his left ear priced twice and ha was wearing earrings that day. In the middle of a conversation we were disturbed by a student who politely but with obvious feeling of superiority called my friend away from the table. When I realized something strange was going on I started paying more attention to the surroundings. The cafeteria seemed normal on the first sight until I noticed interesting distribution of tables. Small square shaped tables with four chairs around them were placed randomly in the room, except three or four which were placed one next to another forming a longer rectangular table. This long table was placed next to the entrance, close to the wall and chairs were placed only on one side facing the room. Such position enabled total control over who was entering, leaving and dwelling in the cafeteria. Four or five male students in shirts and lounge jackets were sitting there and my friend was talking with one of them. I saw him taking his earrings out. They talked for some minutes more after they shook hands and greeted politely. As I found out later that day, men in lounge jackets were representatives of nationalist group which was the most powerful in the campus. My friend was asked to take his earrings out because he was disrespecting their rules with visible symbols of modernity, westernization, and Kemalist political determination. I was surprised by two facts, how polite and well mannered was this obvious clash of beliefs and how calm the reaction of my friend was. He did not seem angry or humiliated. He explained that we were in their territory, in reverse situation, on some other university campus, we (he had in mind Kemalists, leftists) would treat them the same. That is how things work, he said.

Because of lack of anthropological research considering symbolic value of male earrings in Turkey, presented anecdote serves as an example of political importance of symbols in the relations of power and it shows how these relations are spatially defined. What is more, the anecdote presents a political symbol that is not widely recognized as such and preliminarily researched.

As we have seen women are not the only ones carrying and publically displaying political symbols and their appurtenance, men too put their political identities on display.

All those symbols have sociologically and anthropologically speaking important meanings, one of them being self-identification. But when we have in mind the encounter with a Neighbor, do not these symbols function as a method of segregation and union? Do not these symbols, outside segregated neighborhoods, like suburban areas mentioned before, replace spatial segregation with segregation in places of necessary encounter, enabling instant recognition of "us" and "others"? When signs of identification are visible and understood by all, they are not only signifying the group one belongs to, but also groups where he/she does not belong. What is more, groups one does not want to have anything to do with, groups he/she is alienated from.

As was mentioned before, segregation is a result of a liberal notion of tolerance: when dislikes are ignored and kept away in order not to disturb. Modern notion of tolerance will be discussed in the following chapter. Further on, when veil, as the most discussed symbol of segregation, will be presented, we will see how (in Turkey) even tolerance works with repressive means. Like in the story of earrings, when political symbols are shown in the territory of the other, they become objects of envy and they have to be removed.

TOLERANCE. IDEOLOGICAL NOTION.

Tolerance as an important notion of modern world became a central multiculturalists discursive tool in the late twentieth century, as Third World immigration threatened the West, when ethical conflicts were causing international disorder, and finally with the intensification of Islamic religious identity. There are many potential objects of tolerance, such as cultures, races, ethnicities, sexualities, ideologies, lifestyles, political positions, religions and many more. In this chapter we will deal with critical understanding of tolerance as a tool to regulate aversion (Brown, 2006) and as

ideological category (Žižek, 2008). While Žižek, to some point, agrees with Brown, he makes a step further, proclaiming tolerance as a false problem.

Brown builds her argument on the meaning of the verb "to tolerate", which means to accommodate something one finds repugnant or threatening. As such tolerance always implies a power relation. The discourse of tolerance works to depoliticize social movements, reinforce hierarchies and support imperial violence. For her, tolerance is nothing but a strategy of coping with the disturbing Other and unique way of sustaining the threatened entity.

> *"Despite its pacific demeanor, tolerance is an internally unharmonious term, blending together goodness, capaciousness, and conciliation with discomfort, judgment, and aversion. [...] It involves managing the presence of undesirable, the tastless, the faulty – even the revolting, repugnant, or vile. In this activity of management, tolerance does not offer resolution or transcendence, but only a strategy of coping" (Brown, 2006: 25).*

What is more, discourse of tolerance is setting the norms. Tolerated individuals are and remain the deviators, the ones who never uphold the norm. The rules of tolerance are drawing the line between normal and odd, expected and unexpected, adequate and unfit. To be able to do so, tolerance can only work as a tool of dominant, hegemonic cultures. "Tolerance [...] is always a certain expression of domination even as it offers protection or incorporation to the less powerful [...]"(Brown, 2006: 178).

Both Brown and Žižek are relating the modern notion of tolerance with culturalization of politics, what Mamdani explained as tangible essence that defines a culture and then explains politics as a consequence of that essence. (Mamdani, 2004: 17).

> *"The culturalization of politics [...] eliminates colonialism, capital, caste or class stratification, and external political domination from accounts of political conflict or instability. In their stead, "culture" is summoned to explain the motives and aspirations leading to certain conflicts [...] as well as the techniques and weapons deployed [...]" (Brown, 2006: 20).*

Žižek on the other hand understands tolerance as a product of liberal multiculturalist's basic operations. He is against the notion of tolerance in a way it is perceived. For example, he says, racism is not a problem of intolerance, but a problem of inequality and exploitation. In the practice of culturalization of politics, political differences, political inequality or political exploitation are naturalized and neutralized into cultural differences, something that cannot be overcome, it can only be tolerated. For Žižek "this

demands a response in the terms Walter Benjamin offers: from culturalisation of politics to politization of culture" (2008: 140). The cause of this culturalisation is the failure of direct political solutions. Liberalist discourse presents existing problems as problems of intolerance to mislead the public from the problems of injustice and inequality. There are not only right and wrong solutions to problems; there are also right and wrong problems, tolerance being one of them.

Both authors also agree that the culturalization of politics is not evenly distributed across the globe. Culture is understood as a political drive of the Others to attack our culture. We (modern Westerns), on the other hand, are not driven by our culture, we only cherish and defend it. As Mamdani puts it, "The moderns make culture and are its masters; the premoderns are said to be but conduits" (2004: 18).

"The basic opposition on which the entire liberal vision relies is that between those who are ruled by culture, totally determined by the lifeworld into which they are born, and those who merely "enjoy" their culture, who are elevated above it, free to choose it" (Žižek, 2008: 141).

The division between those ruled by culture and those who simply enjoy it, Brown says, is a problem for which liberalism is the solution. She continues, not only that culture is political, liberalism is cultural. How is this possible, if liberalism should be (is believed to be) universal in its basic principles: secularism, the rule of law, equal rights, moral autonomy, and individual liberty. If this is so, liberalism cannot be a matter of culture, which is identified today with the particular, local, and provincial. What is more, liberalism is based on an individual, and as such, it represents itself as cultureless (2006: 21-23). Nonetheless Brown claims that both, the autonomy and the universality of liberal principles are myths, because powers of culture "that produce and reproduce subject's relations and practices, beliefs and rationalities, and that do so without their express choice or consent – are neither conquered by liberalism nor absent from liberalism" (2006: 22, 23). Liberalism is a hybrid, fused to values and cultural practices.

Such multicultural, liberal ideology of tolerance fits well in Christian motto already mentioned above: Love thy neighbor as thyself. For Žižek neighbor is primarily a Thing, a traumatic intruder, whose different way of life, or rather enjoyment, disturbs us. When the neighbor comes too close, this can provoke an aggressive reaction aimed at getting rid of this disturbing intruder (2006, 2008). Tolerance as such (combined with the notion of the neighbor) is closely related to harassment – the narcissistic notion of an individual who experiences proximity of others as an intrusion into his or her

private space – even thought tolerance in the Western world means its exact opposite. Tolerance means do not harass me, don not come too close to me. Tolerance means, I am intolerant towards your over proximity to me. This is why, Žižek explains, today's tolerant liberal multiculturalism is nothing but "an experience of the Other deprived of its Otherness (the idealized Other who dances fascinating dances and has ecologically sound holistic approach to reality, while practices like wife beating remain out of sight…)" (Žižek, 2002: 11).

Žižek proposes a solution. To overcome the problem of intolerance, one has to lose one's own culture, because the reason why we are intolerant towards other cultures is our direct identification with a particular culture. "Insofar as culture itself is the source of barbarism and intolerance, the inevitable conclusion is that the only way to overcome intolerance and violence is to extricate the core of the subject's being, its universal essence, from culture: in her core, the subject has to be kulturlos" (Žižek, 2008: 142).

The Turkish woman

This work considers Turkish women trough three perspectives and three levels where they occur as significant factors. As it was shown Turkish women were (are) used as carriers of national identity, as proofs of modernity and development, or as actors of resistance to the Western values and heralds of tradition. On the other hand, women with their attire are also symbols of leftist or rightist political movements. Further on we will focus on the third perspective: women as the second sex.

As we have already mentioned each of two main Turkish political poles constructed and ideal image of the Turkish woman. Because many Turkish academics lean their work on historicists' constructionist approach, we will oppose their standpoint with work of psychoanalyst Joan Copjec. Based on her opposition to Judith Butler we will try to define Turkish women and separate them from the ideal woman as an image constructed by Kemalists and Islamists. The two following chapters will discuss the question of sex and sexual difference with confrontation of two theoretical perspectives. Further on we will try to elucidate why is construction of a woman the core of constructing political and national identity.

Sexual difference

The phrase 'sexual difference', which has come into prominence in the debate between psychoanalysis and feminism, is not a part of Freud's or Lacan's theoretical vocabulary. One of the basic presuppositions underlying Freud's work is that just as there are certain physical differences between men and women, so also there are psychical differences. In other words, there are certain psychical characteristics that can be called 'masculine' and others that can be called 'feminine'. Freud limits himself to describing how a human subject comes to acquire masculine or feminine psychical characteristics. This is not an instinctual or natural process, but a complex one in which anatomical differences interact with social and psychical factors. Following Freud, Lacan also engages with the problem of how the human infant becomes a sexed subject. For Lacan, masculinity and femininity are not biological essences but symbolic positions, and the assumption of one of these two positions is fundamental to the construction of subjectivity; the subject is essentially a sexed subject. 'Man' and 'woman' are signifiers

that stand for these two subjective positions (Evans, 2006: 181). The psychoanalytic category of sexual difference was many times understood wrongly, as if it was rejected. While Copjec stresses out, the rejection of sexual difference takes place without due consideration of the theoretical complexity of the notion of sex as it is formulated by Freud and Lacan.

> *''For Lacan, sexual difference is not a firm set of "static" symbolic oppositions and inclusions/exclusions (heterosexual normativity which relegates homosexuality and other "perversions" to some secondary role), but the name of a deadlock, of a trauma, of an open question, of something that resists every attempt at its symbolization. Every translation of sexual difference into a set of symbolic opposition(s) is doomed to fail, and it is this very "impossibility" that opens up the terrain of the hegemonic struggle for what "sexual difference" will mean'' (Žižek, 2000: 110, 111).*

For Žižek sexual difference is a kind of zero-institution of the social split within the humankind, the naturalized minimal zero-difference, a split which, priori to signaling any determinate social difference, signals the difference as such. The struggle for hegemony is then, again, the struggle over how this zero-difference will be overdetermined by other particular social differences. And it is important to notice, that sexual difference (not nation, as another zero institution we mentioned above) is the immediate/natural presupposition later perlaborated/"mediated" by the work of culture – it is presupposed […] by the very "cultural" process of symbolization (Žižek, 2000: 114).

Sexual difference became problematic for gender theory because it was presumed to be heterosexist insofar as it divided subjects into two mutually exclusive categories and implied a necessary relation between them. They not only disagreed with the duality as such, division of people into men and women with all their culturally constructer roles, but more importantly because of all deviations, that did not fit into one group or another, individuals could even be punished.

Feminists proposed, or better demanded, multiplicity of gendered positions in order to respect the historical variability and constructedness of the subject. While psychoanalysis, on the other hand, rejects such multiplication. Although it was acknowledged that psychoanalysis did not understand sexual difference as biologically given, but rather as an effect of a language, they replaced ahistorical language with

historical machinery of social practices and knowledges, relations of power, norms and ideals – responsible for constructing gendered positions and relations.

If historicists claim there are multiple numbers of sexes, we could say that psychoanalysis makes a step further, being even more radical. For psychoanalysis there is more than one sex, yet less than two. Even if there is no sexual difference, a subject cannot completely escape his or her naturally given physical characteristics which are determined by social roles and expectations.

We will examine an idea of a construct inside two contradictory theories, psychoanalyses and historicism and bring the concepts of the Turkish woman into it.

CREATING A CONSTRUCT

Many Turkish theorists, as Arat and Durakbaşa, write about Turkish woman as a discursive construct, about Kemalist and Islamist women, products of two prevailing political discourses. They step aside Judith Butler, who defines sex as "performatively enacted signification […] one that, released from its naturalized interiority and surface, can occasion the parodic proliferation and subversive play of gendered meaning" (Butler, 1990: 33). Butler believes that sex is a construct of historically variable discursive practices. In the case of Turkey, this would mean that there are at least two Turkish women, Kemalist and Islamist, as products of political discourses.

Butler opposes essencialists' presumption about social roles we are assigned to being natural or innate. On the contrary, she claims that culturally defined sexual roles are basic source of identity of a man or a woman. All we understand as "nature" or "essence" of sex is actually a product of specific cultural deeds. Butler also rejects a division between biological (material) and culturally assigned sex, the division between sex and gender, because sex on its own is materialized through social and linguistic practices. Joan Copjec opposes Butler and essencialist theory, saying that sex is not simply a discursive construction as it is not a natural fact.

Main opposition between Butler and Copjec follows the differences between two important modern discourses: psychoanalysis and historicism. Lacanian and Foucauldian thoughts know two sorts of existence. An existence whose character and quality can be described and an existence based on a judgment, when we can say that it does or does not exist, without being able to say what it is. This brings us to metalanguage, which does not exist in the last case. "To say that there is no

metalanguage is to say, rather, that society never stops realizing itself, that it continues to be formed over time. [...] when we recognize the impossibility of matelanguage is to split society between its appearance [...] and its being [...]" (Copjec, 1995: 9). Psychoanalysis asserts that we have to interpret exclusivity of the surface or of appearance in a way that appearance always routs or supplants being, that being and appearance never coincide. This syncopated relation is the condition of desire. Historicism, on the other hand, wants to ground being in appearance. This is how desire separates psychoanalysis from historicism, as they are separated by the construction of a subject.

Joan Copjec mentions two constructions: psychological and historical, while psychoanalysis does not accept any of them. The problem of psychological construction is uncertainty of its evidence that is at the core of a particular construction. They pose more questions than answers (Copjec, 1995: 66). "The psychological fantasy constructs an inscrutable subject, a kind of obstacle to all archival work, a question that historical research will never be able to answer" (Copjec, 1995: 66). Psychoanalysis tries to disperse psychological construction reasoning that "the subject, affected by the facts of its life, is affected by meanings that it never lives, never experiences" (Copjec, 1995: 67). This is why psychological construction is the overdetermination of the subject.

"This does not mean that psychoanalysis renounces history to maintain a truth that no history can uncover. Psychoanalysis requires history; it can begin only by gathering the facts" (Copjec, 1995: 68). What it renounces is "historicist" construction. "Historicism is faulted not because it is, in fact, not possible to recreate historical experience (this is, again, a psychologist objection), but because this construction operates with the belief that it is experience that must be recreated, that the truthful and logical statements we make about a historical period are empirical generalizations about the ways in which people thought" (Copjec, 1995: 68).

When we are theorizing sex we are engaging in a "euthanasia of pure reason", the internal conflict leading into a despairing skepticism. Thinking about sex causes the reason's internal conflict with itself (Copjec, 1995: 201). Butler executes her theory from Freud's supposition that sexual difference is not unambiguously marked either anatomically, chromosomically or hormonally, concluding that it must be discursively or culturally constructed. But, as Copjec points out, Freud wanted to avoid this alternative and he based psychoanalysis on rejection of both, anatomy and convention (1995: 204). Sex, for psychoanalysis, is never simply a natural fact and it is also never reduced to sense. Saying that sex is not discursive, also does not mean it is

prediscursive or essential, Copjec does not deny that human sexuality is a product of signification, but she refines this position by arguing that sex is produced by the internal limit, the failure of signification. "It is only there where discursive practices falter – and not at all where they succeed in producing meaning – that sex comes to be" (1995: 204).

Butler herself also initiates limitations of discursive signification, as infinite process, but she understands it in a way that the term woman has no origin or end. This is why "it is never possible finally to become a woman" (Butler, 1990: 33), because sexual identity constantly changes and never stops becoming. It this point Butler and Copjec ultimately part. Copjec argues that we cannot argue that sex is incomplete and in flux because the terms of sexual difference are unstable". Butler is, Copjec continues, confusing a rule of language, discourse as an endless process, with a description of the thing-in-itself (Copjec, 1995: 204, 206). Sex is the impossibility of completing meaning, not a meaning that is incomplete. To put it differently sex is the structural incompleteness of language, it is not itself incomplete" (Copjec, 1995: 206).

Sex in psychoanalysis is not an incomplete entity, but an empty one, to which no predicate can be attached. If Butler's sex communicates itself to others and is in this fashion always perceived differently, psychoanalytical sex is not communicating itself, so it makes the subject unknowable. "Sex serves no other function than to limit reason, to remove the subject from the realm of possible experience or pure understanding" (Copjec, 1995: 207). This is how we can understand Lacan's "there is no sexual relationship" and this also brings us to conclusion that sex and sexual difference cannot be deconstructed, since deconstruction is an operation that can be applied only to culture, to the signifier. Copjec continues, the subject, who is an effect, but not a realization of a social discourses, is free of absolute social constraint, and at the same time not free to be a subject in any which way: within any discourse the subject can only assume either a male or a female position (1995: 210).

Considering Lacan's nonexistence of the woman. "Lacan is undoubtedly arguing that a concept of woman cannot be constructed because the task of fully unfolding her conditions is one that cannot, in actuality, be carried out. Since we are finite beings, bound by space and time, our knowledge is subject to historical conditions. Our conception of woman cannot "run ahead" of these limits and thus cannot construct a concept of the whole woman" (Copjec, 1995: 222).

To be able to understand the two images of ideal Turkish woman better, we should understand historical background and political atmosphere that we have already introduced. As we claimed in the beginning, is the term "the Turkish woman" cultural reference full of positive and negative connotations. As such it is not only one. Her image was constructed and reconstructed at least twice inside of Turkey, every time with intention to fortify political discourse or ideology.

Since the foundation of the Republic, Turks wanted to separate themselves from the Orient and make a step closer to the West. But as we saw, they were not the only ones trying to be modern, both sides were (are) searching for their own versions of synthesis between modernity and tradition. While Kemalists saw the right way in combining modernity and ancient tradition pre-Ottoman Turks, Islamists took the path between modernity and religion. This leads us to similar characteristics of both discourses: paradoxicality of tradition and modernity, where the Turkish woman emerges, no matter what the historical period or political views were. Besides that, patriarchal values shape their images equally in Kemalist or Islamist paradox. None the less, as Zehra Arat, it would be wrong to say that women are only passive victims of cultural and historical constructions. "On the contrary, they are involved as active agents. They do not only participate in constructing and sustaining their subordinate entity and roles, but they also establish various forms and fronts of resistance, even if they are not always conscious and purposeful agents in either of these processes" (Arat, 2000: 5). What we have to emphasize is a question of their power. As it was shown, basic attributes of "new", Kemalist or Islamist, Turkish woman is an outcome of "male discourse". Women might collaborate in it or fight against it, but they do not create it or change it dramatically. The construct of the Turkish woman is androcentric and patriarchal.

If we return to the construct as such, we established that in Turkey, in the period of last thirty years, two ideological constructs coexist. While historicists would claim that there are those two constructs, as culturally shaped roles, fundamental sources of women's identities, psychoanalyst's would oppose them saying that Turkish woman is not just a discursive construct. Review of political history showed that both discourses created an ideal image on their own model. Discursive constructs most definitely exist, but it would be a mistake to say that a Turkish woman can be nothing but Kemalist or Islamist woman. Discursive practices are not generating women as such but their "ideal" image. The ideal image is a product of two constructions, construction of a woman and construction of "Turkishness". Construction of political identity in Turkey

is leaned on sexual difference. Why is precisely the construct of a woman the core of political construction? Why did the Kemalists and the Islamists create their own Turkish woman? What is the connection between the two constructions?

When "Turkish" is added to "woman", a woman, as a construct which always fails, becomes defined with a meaningful and strictly determined adjective. "Turkish" tries to patch where the construction of sex fails. If a concept of a whole woman cannot be constructed, when this woman is defined as Turkish, the predefined ideals of what "Turkish" should be enable clearer definition. If the construction of a woman fails, the construction of "Turkishness" does not. Both political poles constructed their own ideal Turkish identity and they choose women to carry it. For Kemalists it had to be a woman, so they could show themselves as modern and progressive and most of all deny Orientalist perception of Turkey prevalent in the West. While creating the Turkish woman they wanted to prove feminist values of pre-Ottoman Turks. Islamists, on the other hand, responded to Kemalist's modernity with their own modernity and their own construct: new Islamist woman.

THE VEIL THAT SHOWS AND HIDES

"As much as the veil is a fabric or an article of clothing, it is also a concept. It can be illusion, vanity, artifice, deception, liberation, imprisonment, euphemism, divination, concealment, hallucination, depression, eloquent silence, holiness, the ethers beyond consciousness, the hidden hundredth name of God, the final passage into death, even the biblical apocalypse, the lifting of God's veil, signaling so-called end times. When veiling if forced-then enforeced-it is repression. Yet, as we see increasingly today, the veil is also a symbol of resistance-against ethnic and religious discrimination. When the veil is forcibly stripped from its wearer, that too, is subjugation, not emancipation'' (Heath, 2008: 3).

As already discussed, women's attire played a significant role in Turkey since the end of 19th century. Since then women have been burdened with the difficult task of defining the boundaries between tradition and modernity. Kemalist revolution of attire produced sexually decent, even asexual or gender-neutral outfits. Nevertheless it expected from women to unveil. Many did not. We have already introduced the so called "new Islamist's" dress code tesettür, but at this point we have to point out that there are many different types of veil still present in Turkey, each with its own significance.

In the following chapters we will discuss the veil and its significance and symbolism in Turkey. The veil ban in the 80's triggered a dispute that has not ended yet. Many students are still forced to choose between their education and religious belief. When I was in Ankara I made interviews with students who cover their hair or did so in the past. Each of them has a different story to tell, all are somehow bound together with anger and disappointment. We will show how different students cope with the ban and how they fight "the system" (as most of the interviewed students applied to the rules implied by the Kemalist elite in the early years of the republic and latter on by the army). Further on, we will try to explain the role of the veil in the contemporary Turkish society as an object of envy, an object that is not prohibited, where only the enjoyment it might bring is prevented. But first we have to understand historical and political changes that led to the veil ban and at the same time rose the importance of that garment.

The veil and Turkish political shift

At this point it is necessary to make an overview of Turkish historical and political events which marked the second half of 20th century. These events bear the veil ban following by the veil dispute. The overview is leaned on work of several academicians researching Turkish politics and history.

To veil, that is to wear a head covering and long, loose-fitting clothes, "refers to the political reappropriation of Islamic religiosity and way of life rather than its trivialization with established tradition. Fatima Mernissi, in her book, The Political Harem, defines three distinct functions of the concept of veiling. The first function is to conceal oneself from the look. The second is to set boundaries between the sexes. The third refers to a moral principle of limitation: veiling points out the forbidden sphere (1987, 119-120).

 What is more, from the Western or modernist perspective, the veil is a symbol of otherness. This is why, we can say that the veil, even more than it hides parts of the body, shows or symbolizes tradition, religion, a certain way of life, certain kind of values and even more, it connotes backwardness, suppression and submission. The veil does not only hide, it also shows. The veil, like any other item of clothing, or probably even more, relates many different ideas from an individual's social group, gender and social status. In many cases it can also be a sign of identity and resistance. Because of what it shows, not hides, "the veiling issue" once again triggered public debates in different international media, when French president Nicolas Sarkozy announced that "Islamic veils are not welcome in France". The proposal to reinforce republican ideas of secularism and to ban the full face veil was rejected by the parliament, but it raised a debate whether the veil symbolizes the repression of women or is it a free expression of their faith. Debates about the veil ban are not only a part of contemporary discussions in countries with Muslim minority. Turkey and Tunisia are both Muslim countries where veil is banned in schools and public buildings and where young women have to choose, between their freedom of expression and their right for education, every day.

As already mentioned, the issue of the Islamic veil in Turkey is not of recent origin. It has been a contentious issue since the founding of the Republic. Because of modern, Western tendencies, Kemalist discourse used Islam as one of its most potent symbols,

while the veil represented Ottoman past from which they wanted to escape. Women were exhorted to uncover (it was not demanded by law) and to take an active role in the public space. As Yeğenoğlu explains: "the unveiling of women became a convenient instrument for signifying many issues at once, i.e. the construction of modern Turkish identity as opposed to backward Ottoman identity, the civilization and modernization of Turkey and the limitation of Islam to matters of belief and worship' (1998: 132). The new woman was a symbol of progress and changes towards Westernization and secularism. Turkish "secularism" is not the equivalent of Western secularism, which includes the separation of church and state. Rather, it is a form called "laicism" in which religious practice and institutions are regulated and administered by the state. As interpreted by Turkish nationalists during this period, the aim of "laicism" was the modernization of all aspects of culture, state, and society that had their roots in traditional Islamic concepts and traditions (Olson, 1985: 163). This type of secularism seeks to remove all signs of religion from public and private life.

In the last 30 years the veil, once again, has been playing an important role. As Ahmad, after Kemalist reforms there were two cultures in Turkey: the westernized, secular culture of a tiny but influential minority associated with the bureaucracy, and the indigenous culture of the mass of the people associated with Islam (1993: 92). The Democratic Party, which was declared as traditional liberal party, recognized the alienation in 1950's and used it to sweep into power. In the next 30 years the military carried out three coups d'etat: in 1960, 1971 and 1980, to protect republican norms.

At this point we should examine the role of Turkish army. As we will see in the historical review of politics in Turkey, the military has had a record of intervening in politics. Indeed, it assumed power for several periods in the latter half of the 20th century. In the Turkish tradition the army is the ultimate guardian of national unity and secularism. Ever since Mustafa Kemal Atatürk founded the modern secular Republic of Turkey in 1923, the Turkish military has perceived itself as the guardian of Kemalism, the official state ideology, even though Atatürk himself insisted on separating the military from politics. The Turkish army still maintains an important degree of influence over Turkish politics and the decision making process regarding issues related to Turkish national security and as we will see from examples it has the power to dissolve the government, close down political parties and ban politicians from politics, if they work against secularism.

After the end of military rule in 1961, which was following the first coup d'etat, the republicans seized power until the next elections when people again elected traditionalists. Violence and instability plagued Turkey. An economic recession late that decade sparked a wave of social unrest marked by street demonstrations, labour strikes and political assassinations. Left-wing workers' and students' movements were formed, countered on the right by Islamist and militant nationalist groups. By January 1971, Turkey appeared to be in a state of chaos. The Islamist movement had become more aggressive and its party, the National Order Party, openly rejected Atatürk and Kemalism which infuriated the armed forces and led to the second coup d'etat. The party (NOP) was dissolved, but it was soon set up with a different name (*Milli* Salvation Party (MSP)) and with almost unchanged program. The party occupied the public scene through the sensational announcements of its politicians regarding alcohol, sculpture, and other allegedly un-Islamic practices that the Republic had legitimized (Tugal, 2005). At this time also the controversies with regard to wearing the headscarf in Turkey emerged as a result of an attempt to prevent a student with a headscarf from attending the university. Yet, they did not reach its full extent for 10 more years until the second coup d'etat.

MSP's decreasing electoral power throughout the 1970s might have led to the ultimate demise of the Islamist movement, if it had not been for the drastic political and economic global changes of the late 1970s. "In fact, the collapse of national developmentalism, the rise of flexible accumulation strategies, the revolution in Iran, the decline of the Left, and the partial delegitimization of modernity had created the conditions of possibility for stronger Islamist interventions in social and political life" (Tugal, 2005). After the Iranian revolution, the base of the party was radicalizing. What is more striking, some people did not stand up while the national anthem was being sung, which constituted one of the excuses for the military coup in 1980 (Albayrak 1990). However, this ideological shift alone would not have signified much if it had not combined with structural and political factors in Turkey, namely massive rural-to-urban immigration to de-industrializing cities and the forced defeat of socialism. Prior to 1980, 60 percent of the Turkish population lived in rural areas; after 1980 it was the reverse, 60 percent lived in urban areas (Toprak, 2001). In this environment, a transformed Islamism with more emphasis on social justice and resistance against power-holders had much to offer. In the time of military rule after the 12 September 1980 military coup, when the military tried to secure Republic's secularism, the headscarf ban spread out and moved onto a legal platform. Nonetheless Islamism soon returned as a ruling ideology. The RP (Welfare Party) (which had replaced the MSP

after it was closed down in 1980) embodied the transformed Islamism. Under the influence of radical ideas RP's program placed a strong emphasis on social justice. A world where morality dominated the market. Such a market bound by morality would allegedly enable small businessmen to operate without oppressing or exploiting the poor, who would also be explicitly protected by the state. These promises, brought with them immense urban poor support, winning the RP most metropolitan municipalities in the local elections of 1994, and then enabling it to come out as the first party out of the 1995 national elections. "Islamism became a creative response to global and local forces, rather than solely being a cultural reaction against the West or against Westernizing states" (Tugal, 2005). Because of RP's failed attempt to fight corruption even in its own ranks and because of some Islamist municipalities and civil organizations started to organize meetings with high public visibility to declare the RP's sympathy for Islamist regimes and organizations worldwide the army intervened again. The military intervention of February 28th 1997 restricted itself to giving "recommendations" to the government instead of disbanding the parliament as the Army did in 1980. It asked the government to increase obligatory secular education from five to eight years, restrict Kur'an schools and Imam-Hatip (religious) schools, and control religious orders. There was no way the RP could carry these policies out without estranging its base. The government itself resigned as a result of the RP's inability to satisfy both its followers and the Army. The impact of the military intervention was sustained by acts such as the closing down of the RP in January 1998 and the banning of its leader Erbakan from politics (Tugal, 2005). This culminated in the founding of the FP (Virtue Party), which was also kept under close scrutiny by the authorities, as it was perceived to be a replica of the RP. The FP toned down its criticism of the establishment, but also ventured to elect a veiled woman to the parliament. Although the RP had frequently implied that it would lift the headscarf ban in official places, it had not taken such a major step while in government, despite its more radical position when compared to the FP. One reason for this was that the ideologues of the FP had started to re-frame the veiling issue as a matter of democracy and human rights, which led them to expect the European Union to intervene on their behalf. Nevertheless, the elected veiled woman had to leave the parliament before she could be sworn in, under the pressure of nationalist and center-leftist parties which almost turned violent (Göçek 1999). This was one of the incidents that led to the closing of the party in 2001 (Tugal, 2005). Global events such as 9/11 terrorist attacks and" war on terror" pushed Turkish Islamists to turn to the European Union and to the discourse of universal human rights and democracy. "Certain actors within the Islamist

party in Turkey responded to this crisis by splitting from the party and denouncing Islamism, embracing neoliberalism, and establishing closer connections with the United States and the European Union through marketing themselves as "moderate Muslims" (Tugal, 2005). These changes enabled the new party AKP (Justice and Development Party) to remain in power without military interventions, as the Turkish Army was now restrained by the United States and the European Union, which found in the new party the ally they were seeking. "Although AKP fashioned itself as a new political party on a platform of human rights and liberal democracy, it is still recognized by voters as having links with its Islamic past. Although the party does not offer an Islamist platform, and indeed denies any mention of Islam and Islamism in its political projects, its leaders are still publicly known as practicing Muslims" (Gülalp, 2004). AKP is still recognized as a leading party in Turkey. Party's leader Tayyip Erdogan has been Turkey's prime minister since 2002. In the last local election in March 2009 AKP was an overall winner even if the party saw a decline in the number of votes from the last elections. Similar results are expected for national elections in 2011.

As we can see Islamization of politics has been to some extent present in Turkey since 1960's. Many parties have been established and dissolved and in all Islam has played an important role. Nonetheless parties' ties with the religion have been changing, sometimes being more radical, and other times, especially in the case of AKP, linked with religion in a democratic fashion. It seems important to understand Turkish political shift as a background of the veil ban dispute. Turkish political sphere is strongly divided around it. Even if the last 30 years have politically been colored with Islam, Kemalists and the left have remained strongly present, especially with the help of the military. Let us now closely examine the events following the second coup d'etat in 1980 which lead to the veil ban.

THE VEIL AND ITS BAN

After the military intervention in September 1980 the new government which had been installed by the military was to introduce the "Dress and Appearance Regulation". This regulation prohibited employees while on duty in public agencies, offices, and institutions from wearing, in the case of men, mustaches, beards, and long hair, and in the case of women, mini-skirts, low-necked dresses, and headscarves. This rule also applied to students, since all universities and most schools at the lower levels are public institutions. In late 1970s and early 1980s, the number of university students

wearing headscarves increased substantially and in 1984, the first widespread application of headscarf ban came into effect at the universities. Yet the ban does not apply to everybody, only for students, workers and public servants. Visitors, such as students' family members, can enter veiled. Similarly, at the courts of law, the ban only involves people employed in the institution. Wearing headscarves in photos on official documents like licenses, passports, and university enrollment documents is also prohibited. As Olson, the reason for such strict rules was extreme politicization of Turkish society by 1980. The conflict had escalated into acts of violence so frequent and destructive that commentators described the situation in such terms as "civil war" and "total anarchy" (Olson, 1985: 163). The authorities decided that the manipulation of dress as political symbol contributed to the tense situation. To some extent this was true. Islamization of Turkey's political and cultural sphere had gained visibility trough the veiling of women. As Göle pointed out, women serve as the emblem of politicized Islam" (1996: 83).

At this point, it seems reasonable to ask ourselves why has the veil, if it was present in Turkish society for centuries, become a problem only in the last 30 years. As we have seen, Atatürk did not demand the change of women's attire, this is why many did not follow his motion. As much as the urban elite loved to participate in the change, the majority living in the periphery did not. The country got divided, yet the division did not disturb anyone until extreme migrations to the cities in 1970's, when the daughters of Turkey's increasingly prosperous conservative hinterland sought education and careers. Many refused to remove their veils. Even if the number of covered women did not actually rise on a national level, their visibility did. The secular elite and the military felt frightened for their secular values. The result was the headscarf ban on university campuses in 1982. It was followed by demonstrations, where students and professors were participating. Some of them were even banned from universities, because they refused to obey the newly enforced rules of attire. For 30 years the veil has been an object of dispute between Kemalists and Islamists and the dispute does not seem to end soon. Both of the sides despise each other's values and are not able to make agreements. The ruling Islamists tried to lift the ban on several occasions, but their proposals were always rejected by the Left. Some, not extensive, changes did occur. The Higher Education Council (YÖK), an institution founded after the military coup of 1980 in order to regulate the higher education, tried to limit the veil ban with a new "invention" of covering called türban. The government supported this in 1984 as a way to find a middle way between YÖK and veiled students. But the turban was in actuality

unknown to Anatolia. It was a head garment used by older members of the elite class who wanted to cover yet also look modern. It left the hair above the forehead visible and the neck open, thus didn't really satisfy tesettür (Islamic code of covering) requirements. It was also a form students were not used to. In 1984, YÖK introduced a regulation allowing the türban to be worn by women studying theology in universities, and then extended it to other faculties. In 1987 this regulation was lifted and the turban was banned by YÖK. Later the notion of "türban" was "rediscovered". During the heightened discussions of the headscarf ban following the 28 February 1997 process, when during the National Security Council meeting the military seriously warned the Islamist political figures and threatened to intervene in political sphere where political Islam contradicts with secular structures of the Turkish state. This time it was acknowledged that the use of the traditional headscarf was widespread, whereas the word "türban" was used to refer to the woman veiled more tightly, covering every string of hair meticulously. The discourse was that the "türban" was objectionable and the "headscarf" was not. Using media to perpetuate it, a new line of thinking was created: "The shift from a headscarf to a turban reflects a politization of religiousness"" (Tuksal, 2007).

As we can see veiling does not represent only politicized Islam, or that there is only one way of veiling with one single meaning. Veiling is traditionally practiced in Turkey for centuries. Nowadays the difference among various styles of veiling represents the distinction between the traditional and Islamic women. Loosely two types could be defined: so called başörtüsü , which is traditional less strict type of head-covering, and türban, Islamic radical type of covering which emerged in the last thirty years (it is important to keep in mind that the meaning and signification of türban changed from tolerable to intolerable from 1980's to 1990's). The last one plays a significant role in the radical Islamist movement. For türban it is nowadays specific, that it is the veiling style of educated and urban Muslim women. As such, türban is the type of veiling least tolerable by the leftists and military. We will mostly concentrate on female university students and the veil ban in universities. Most of these students are wearing türban, and not başörtüsü. The main difference between the two is in the applied strictness to cover the hair and parts of the body. Başörtüsü is loosen, it shows some hair and it doesn't cover neck and chest. Türban on the other hand carefully hides the hair, it wraps the neck, covers the chest and shoulders or it is tucked under a coat. Besides the

obvious visual characteristics, the most important distinction between the başörtüsü and the türban is the political character of the latter. "The political Islamists represent a post-Kemalist, as well as an anti-Kemalist, current and are radically different from the pre-Kemalist traditionalists" (Kadioğlu, 1994: 648).

> *"Hence, the use of turban instead of headscarf (başörtüsü) and the semantic difference between the two designate the new profile of Muslim women. As distinct from the widespread use of the scarf, which is a reminder of traditional customs and habits in country provinces and urban ghettos, turbans draw the attention of people as a reminder of the threat of "fundamentalist movements" when the political and collective power of religion is used against traditionalism. Above all this moves Islam from the "periphery" to the "center". The phenomenon of Islam, on the one hand, geographically moved into urban settlements and, on the other, penetrated the central power apparatus where modern cultural values and symbols are created" (Göle, 1996: 92).*

Göle carried out a research during post-1983 period, when the veil dispute reached its peak. Veiled students were banned from universities, which caused them to mobilize, organize sit-ins and demonstrations. She is explaining that most veiled students come from Anatolian families, which practice Islam in its traditional forms. The conservative family background of these students was a decisive factor in their orientation toward Islam, nonetheless the way they practice Islam differs significantly from their parents "not only because of their higher educational level but, most important, because of the fact that they reject traditional interpretations of Islam. They embody the urban, educated, and militant new countenance of Islam". What is more, for the students, only türban is the true practice of veiling (1996: 88, 91). Because for them, it is necessary to veil so as not to become the object of men's gaze. These women have internalized the need to regulate their sexuality. As Göle, "a Muslim woman who prefers veiling is in fact the defender of her honor". (Göle, 1996: 93).

As we have already mentioned above, the traditional style of veiling (başörtüsü) is tolerated by many leftists, while türban, as a symbol of political Islam, should be banned from the public realm. The türban is, as a symbol, reminding others of the true identity of women wearing it, which is "evidently located within the private realm" (Kadioğlu, 1994: 658). Nonetheless, as we will see later on, since their true identity

cannot be changed, the veil in general and even more the türban in particular, have become a stumbling block, even an object of envy.

Türban as a style of veiling of educated women suggests a paradoxical situation (Göle, 1996). Veiled women are believed to be reactionary and ignorant, not progressive and educated. In the Turkish case, the educated women should be a product of modernization, thus, enlightened and freed of religion and tradition. Islamist female students who, on the other hand, are committed to Islam, subvert these categories. "The profile of educated veiled Muslims not only challenges the shift of civilization but also the power domain of Westernist elites" (Göle, 1996: 97). The paradox can be explained with colonial establishment and inner orientalism that lead Kemalists into modernization and Westernization. To be closer to Europe and the West, Kemalists had to cut the umbilical cord with Ottoman history, tradition and to some extent even religion. Such forced modernization produced a number of paradoxes. If the Kemalists had built the new Republic on Turkeys' own modernization, which would not follow Westernization and forget about Turkish roots, history and culture, but would respect them instead, veiled students would not be a paradox but a choice.

VEILED STUDENTS – TO STUDY OR NOT TO STUDY?

While staying in Ankara I met a small number of female students whose lives were extensively affected by the veil. This is not a representative sample and it never meant to be. I wanted to meet these students to be able to understand the veil ban and its effects better. In the following chapter I'll try to present their stories not to construct any kind of typical veiled university student but to offer a better overview and what is more, interviews with these students will help me further to employ various theories into the Turkish veil ban dispute and to deny some others. The extracts of conversations I will present bellow are chosen according their importance and contribution to my work and understanding of the veil ban.

Şeyda

Şeyda has already finished her studies in one of Ankara Universities. It took me by surprise that she came to the interview unveiled. She told me that she had decided to give up wearing the veil the year before for better job opportunities in public sector. Unveiling was for her one of the hardest decisions she had to make. She said that she

feels very different about herself now, she feels more masculine because of the change in attire, now she is wearing jeans and trousers when before she was in skirts and more feminine clothes. Here I have to emphasize, that even though Şeyda gave up her veil, she found her own way of "appropriate" clothing. She would never wear very tight clothes and no matter the temperature her arms and legs would always be covered. She told me that she never shakes hands with men as she wants to limit any physical contact. Nonetheless from my observation she was dressed nicely with style and her clothes did not seem in any way conservative. What is more she was wearing Converse All Start's – a phenomenon I encountered in Turkey among veiled students and will be explained latter on.

As we will also see from other examples, Şeyda comes from a traditional, religious family, but as she claims, to veil or not was her decision. Even though her mother veils, some other members of her family or friends do not.

Beyza

Beyza is a MA student in Ankara. She described her family as open minded as compared to the environment she grew up in. Her father prays daily while her mother is more relaxed about religion. She said she was not forced in religion but it was a natural step after watching her father practicing religion daily. She started veiling as a child when she was going to Koran courses and veiling became her daily habit around the age of 14 in Imam-Hatip high school (religious high schools). At that time she was for the first time confronted with the veil ban. In most Imam-Hatip schools girls are allowed (even expected) to veil, but the course on National Security was given by a teacher coming from the army and he insisted that girls should unveil during his lecture. The same happened when she entered the university. To be able to study she decided to unveil inside the campus, but to put her veil back on when she left. She explained the problem in Turkey with its "inbetweenness". Since Turkey does not belong to the East nor to the West it is in itself constantly in conflict. Even more than in the university she was disturbed in places that are somehow understood as elite cultural centers, like Theatre or Opera. Just because she entered those places veiled she was looked at with degradation, as if wearing a veil would mean that she does not belong to places of culture and education.

Mersey

Mersey too (in her own words) was never forced into religion and veiling, even more since she was a child her mother was dressing her in modern clothes, even short skirts.

But at some age she started resisting the clothes her mother wanted her to wear and she chose to wear clothes respecting her religious believes. She started veiling when she was 11, even before she started Imam-Hatip high school. When she started the university, like all others she had to remove her veil, but as she said, because of her clothes, nonetheless, everybody knew she was veiling. As she expressed, it is very hard to be a Muslim in the modern world: unveiling everyday just so you can enter the university campus is traumatic, there are not enough praying facilities on campuses this is why it is very hard for them to obey and respect their religious obligation to pray five times per day, what is more, the problem also previously exposed by Şeyda, if you are covered your employment options are very limited. You cannot work in a public sector and even some private would not employ women who cover their hair, or even men who are not trying to hide their religious believe.

At this point it has to be emphasized, that I have heard some complains like that coming from the Kemalist opposition as well. It is true that secularists have no problems in the public sector, while in private sector unwritten rules of selection apply to everybody depending only on the preference of the employer.

Hanife

Hanife's story touched me the most. Because she is some years older than other women I was talking with, her life was more brutally affected by the veil ban.

Her father died when she was 8 years old which was very hard for her mother who was a housewife and was suddenly left alone with 3 children. Even if they received help of the extended family, her mother had to do chores traditionally ascribed to men, as going to the bank, market, etc. Mother's experience in the "men's world" lead to the argument with Hanife about veiling. Hanife started veiling when she started university (before the veil ban in 1998), but her mother, who had been veiling all her life, strongly disagreed, because in her own experience, women who were veiled were treated as second-class citizens. Not obeying her mother's advice, Hanife decided to veil, because of her strong religious belief. When the ban started to be strictly applied she was in her second year of studies and suddenly she was not let into the university campus anymore. She once again did not give in, she took part in demonstrations against the veil and decided to continue veiling no matter the ban, and for that reason she was dismissed from the university. She got married, she has two children, but as she said, none of these can replace the education she lost and the feeling of powerlessness she still feels.

<u>Ayşe</u>

Ayşe is a MA student who decided not to give up her veil but to study in any case. She is strictly following tesettűr, Islamic code of attire, and she is fighting the veil ban with a wig or cap slapped over the veil. Because the wig is very uncomfortable Ayşe wears a cap over the veil most of the time. But some professors do not let her to wear it, since they believe any kind of headgear is not appropriate in the classroom. In that case she replaces the cap with a wig which obviously covers the veil enough no to violate the ban, and on the other hand, it is also not a headgear to disturb professors.

For her being veiled always meant being labeled with identity. Because her father worked for Turkish military her family spent most of their lives living inside military bases across Turkey. Because military is strictly secularist Kemalist oriented, so is most of its personnel. Ayşe decided to veil, as her mother did, what made her different from all other kids living in the base. All her family never fit in the social structure of the base because of their religious believes. With the university and the veil ban it is similar, but the number of people who share her believes has grown tremendously since the time she was living in the military base. She gave an example of an incident happening to her at the university where she was studying. It happened some time ago, when the new security guard started working in her faculty. Security guards are, besides assuring safety, also responsible to prevent veiled students entering into the faculty. She did just that. She entered into the building because she wanted to attach the wig in the bathroom and not to do so before the entrance. The old security guard was familiar with "the procedure of covering the veil" and he allowed the girls to walk from the entrance to the bathroom with their veil on. The new guard had just started working and this is why he was following the rules of the ban very strictly. He stopped Ayşe and prevented her from entering. When he saw that she was visibly upset while trying to explain to him that she only wanted to go the bathroom and attach her wig, he started apologizing. He told her that his wife was also covered and that he himself opposed the ban, but that it was his job and that he had only started working. Ayşe was smiling while explaining the story, adding how they are all forced by the system to follow the rules they disagree with.

<u>Esra and Gül</u>

Esra and Gül are cousins who have just started attending university. They are both veiling and their story is interesting because they have found another way to escape the veil ban and study. They are both attending university program carried on on-line by a

university in Kazkhstan. They both regret that they will miss "normal" student life because on-line study program limits human relationships to a minimum. But for them this is the only way to avoid humiliation they would feel if they had to remove their veil or wear a wig to hide it.

As we have seen in these examples, Turkish women choose different ways to fight with the veil ban. But the question Western or westernized critics of the veil ask, is if covered women actually choose the veil or are they forced to use it. For Žižek (2008) liberal notion of the freedom of choice always gets caught in a deadlock. How free was the choice of all these students if they all grew up in traditional, religious families? For anyone to have the freedom to choose, one should be torn out of one's own environment to have alternatives on disposal. The lesson we should learn is, as Žižek, that a choice is always a meta-choice , the choice of modality itself: only a woman not choosing a veil is actually choosing a choice (2007: 129). This means that a subject of free choice emerges only when forcefully extracted from his own life and separated from his roots. Following Žižek, does a student like Hanife, who chose a veil over her education, actually makes a choice if she decides to cover? Or Ayşe, who was grooving up in extremely secular environment (except her family), did she make a choice when she decided to cover and oppose military's secularity? Most of veiled students resist modernist values with their attire. None the less, this does not mean they choose the veil. As we have seen all the students are coming from traditional, religious families and as Beyza said, she was not forced in religion but it was a natural step after watching her father practicing religion daily. We could conclude that veiled students were neither forced to veil, nor they choose to, they did it, as Beyza, because it was a "natural" thing to do.

THE LOOK, THE GAZE AND SHAME

If the veil hides a woman from male looks and protects her honor, it is important to understand two terms, the look and the gaze, in Lacanian theory. When Lacan started writing about the gaze he refers to Sartre's theory. For Sartre, the gaze is that which permits the subject to realize that the Other is also a subject; 'my fundamental connection with the Other-as-subject must be able to be referred back to my permanent possibility of being seen by the Other' (Sartre, 1943:256). Later on Lacan develops his own theory of the gaze. "Whereas Sartre had conflated the gaze with the

act of looking, Lacan now separates the two; the gaze becomes the object of the act of looking, or, to be more precise, the object of the scopic drive. The gaze is therefore, in Lacan's account, no longer on the side of the subject; it is the gaze of the Other. And whereas Sartre had conceived of an essential reciprocity between seeing the Other and being-seen-by-him, Lacan now conceives of an antinomic relation between the gaze and the eye: the eye which looks is that of the subject, while the gaze is on the side of the object, and there is no coincidence between the two" (Evans, 2006: 73). When the subject looks at an object, the object is always already gazing back at the subject, but from a point at which the subject cannot see it. The gaze is the object motivating spectator's desire. Joan Copjec agrees, when she points out that psychoanalytic film theory based itself on a radical misunderstanding of Lacan's concept of the gaze, the one close to Sartre's understanding and not the one introduced later in The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis. In Lacan's Seminar XI the gaze is neither an image of a subject, nor the look by another. The gaze is a point of a failure in the visual field which makes the subject anxious, because he/she cannot see or be seen properly. Copjec illustrates Lacanian gaze by an autobiographical story told by Lacan about a sardine can in the sea, which catches the light and blinds the viewer. The flashing can is causing Lacan a feeling of discomfort, not only physiologically with a blinding effect, but more so because of a political guilt at his own privileged position in relation to the working class fishermen. The gaze as such produces a feeling of shame and self-centered anxiety about one's own identity. The gaze "may be thought of as an external point from which an anxiety provoking look assails the subject" (Krips, 2010: 93)., whereas the point is not neither an eye nor mirror. The gaze produces a feeling of anxiety which transforms the viewer's look into "a self-directed, passive "being looked at", [...] it surprises the viewer [...] disturbs him and reduces him to a feeling of shame" (Lacan, 1981: 96, 8). The radical point expressed by Copjec is that the gaze under which I feel myself observed in shame is my own gaze (2006: 26).

The veil and tesettűr (code of dressing which prescribes long overcoats) are in their strictest sense covering that obscures women from the sight of men, but in their widest sense, as hejab in Iran, they represent "the entire" system of modesty" that conceals the very shape of women, which always risks being revealed through gesture and movement" (Copjec, 2006: 11). The veil as such, as a necessary attire in the Islamic system of modesty, applies gestures of shame on its user, while on the other hand, in a strict Lacanian sense discussed above, produces shame in the unveiled observer (here I mean the observer who disagrees with the practice of veiling or is not practicing it

because of different cultural background). In a way both of them, the modesty system and shame of the observer, are associated. In both "a barrier is erected, a curtain drawn, looks are averted and heads bowed" (Copjec, 2006: 15). Nonetheless, it would be very superficial to assume that women who cover actually feel ashamed. More than anything else they follow the rules of their belief. When their heads are bowed it is because of the respect for these rules. As Copjec, "shame is not caused by prohibition or repression", what is more, "to experience shame is to experience oneself not as a despised or degraded object, but to experience oneself as a subject" (Copjec, 2006: 14, 15). This is why the system of modesty fails in producing shame. What it produces are modest gestures, modest outlook and modest behavior. In the case of Turkey and its bipolarity, covered women are neither ashamed when being looked at with disapproval produced in the other political half. Since, as Copjec, shame cannot be caused by prohibition or repression (2006: 14).

The desire to see what is behind the veil, behind the closed door, inside of a private sphere is typical for so called modern societies (which is also something Islamists accuse the West of). We are denying ourselves any privacy. While the veil, on the other hand, preserves privacy even in the public sphere and at the same time protects women from shame. The sentiment of shame is occasioned when one appears in the flesh in the exterior space of social existence. The exposure, the cast aside "veil" which reveals interiority and denies us privacy delivers an experience of our interiority outside us, in the midst of the world. "Our interiority is thus exposed as an event in the world; it is revealed as an exposure to others" (Copjec, 2006: 27). In this sense the veil enables subjects to experience their interiority, their privacy, as being in tact even while they are in a public place. For many women the veil is a solution. It replaces segregation and allows women to enter into the public sphere, while it, at the same time, safeguards shame as modesty and preserves honor of women and their families. Nonetheless, as Copjec pointed out, to some extent, when the system of modesty impedes any of its citizens access to publicity, and it strips them of the possibility of experiencing shame, it also creates conditions where no barrier will suffice to protect a citizens' modesty. "Rather than protecting women from exposure, the limitation of their access to public forums can only turn them inside out, externalize them completely" (Copjec, 2006: 28).

What about the unveiled observer, who is looking at a veiled woman, who gazes right back maybe even without returning a look? Not only in Turkey, but also in some European countries, such as France and Germany, veiled women cause, like Lancan's sardine can, the ones who see them, the feeling of discomfort. More they are veiled,

stronger gets the discomfort, reaching the peak with hejab. What is more, the veil does not only cause discomfort, it also attracts the views from the political/cultural counterpart. The veil is a bruise to the urban, modern, Western identity - a bruise constantly calling our attention with its disturbance of our visual field. But then again, every time we look at it, we feel ashamed of looking. The veil is the object of the act of looking and its gaze is motivating spectator's desire. Is the veil causing us discomfort because of our (so perceived) privileged position? Are the discomfort and shame cause by political guilt, as looking at homeless bagging on the street? Or is it because it interrupts our comforting circuit of recognition? If I lean my argument on Copjec's (2006) example of New York towers void and the feeling of shame Sedgwick expressed, we could say that in a case of the veil we too shape collective identities, if we put this in Turkey's situation: Kemalist and Islamist identities. In this way the veil (or better, a veiled woman, who obviously takes part in the other collective identity) ruptures an interpersonal bridge, it interrupts the comforting circuit of recognition by which my look sends back to me an image that confirms my identity.

As we will see further on the veil is not only a bruise and disturbance it can also be explained as the object of envy.

THE OBJECT OF ENVY

As we have shown till now, veiled women in "modern" Turkey are traumatic intruders, Neighbors, who are tolerated but never completely accepted, whose way of life bothers us to such extent that it provokes aggressive reactions. In the Turkish case, these reactions are not focused on eliminating the intruder, but on changing her. As already mentioned before, we can live with (close to) the Other only as long as her presence is not disturbing, when the Other is not really the Other. In other words, the Other does not disturb me as long as she does not visibly show her otherness. With the veil being the most tangible symbol of traditional, Islamist pole, it becomes an object that provokes the Kemalist opposition, an object that has to be removed. Yet, that has not happened. The veil has never been officially banned. It has only been disapproved and its usage was limited to private realm. Public space consists quite literally of places such as schools, parliament, courts, etc. – spaces defined as public under Turkish law and therefore covered by the ban on the headscarf. These actual places also constitute part of the public sphere which is a space where social relations are produced and

limits are demarcated as to who can belong and what is permissible (Göle, 2002: 185–6 v O'Neil). As Göle explains, 'the public sphere [in Turkey] is institutionalized and imagined as a site for the implementation of a secular and progressive way of life' (Göle, 2002: 176). So the presence of women wearing the headscarf and demanding a place in public spaces directly contests such a construction of the public sphere. V O'Neil 105

When the veil ban was strengthened in 1998, universities started to apply the rules differently. In some the ban starts working at the entrance of the campus, while in others women are allowed to cover in the campus area and in the campus restaurants, but not in the dormitories and inside faculties and classrooms. Combinations differ from one university to another, but all somehow create "on and off areas". This is how the rules applied to the veil did not only create "on and off areas" inside the country but in even smaller space, as university campus. A veiled student, who is living in student dormitories where she is not allowed to cover, for example, veils when she leaves the dormitories, unveils when she enters into the library, veils again when she goes for lunch and unveils once again when her lectures start. Some students avoid the absurdity and taunt the rules in their own way with wigs. Tragicomical wigs, which they carry over the veil, have double function: as a solution for absurd but constant veiling and unveiling while at the same time they are a sarcastic respond to the ban. Interestingly, dreadful wigs of carnival appearance do not seem to be disturbing for the ban implementing "modern" half. The students do not use wigs to hide their identity of the Other, nonetheless they hide the most obvious symbol of their otherness – the veil. For this reason the veil seems actually to be an object of envy. "The subject does not envy the Other's possession of the prized object as such, but rather the way the Other is able to *enjoy* this object, which is why it is not enough for him simply to steal and thus gain possession of the object. His true aim is to destroy the Other's ability/capacity to enjoy the object " (Žižek, 2008: 90). "On and off areas" and obvious approval of the wigs achieves exactly that: the veil becomes a burden for its user. Thus the veil in Turkey presents an object of envy.

UNIVERSALITY AND UNIVERSAL ETHICS

When we talk about universality, we have a notion in mind that can be applied to everything, which is true for all similarly situated individuals. In the coming chapter we will focus on liberalism and its universality while we will try to place it in the Turkish

situation considering veiling prohibition and capitalist values of consumption, that are present in both spheres of Turkish society.

The notion of universality stands for the shared space of understanding between different cultures, what actually means a constant reworking of one's own particular position. For Žižek the actual universality is not "the never-won neutral space of translation from one particular culture to another, but, rather, the violent experience of how, across the cultural divide, we share the same antagonism" (Žižek, 2002: 66). Today's hegemonic attitude is the one of "resistance" to the "mysterious central (capitalized) Power. Because everybody resists, Žižek is tempted to draw a conclusion that this discourse of resistance is the norm today. He most of all attacks hegemonic attitude, that is the notion "respect the Otherness", - the most elementary ethical axiom.

To start at the beginning, we could say that Turkish transformation of the society worked as a transformation into the universal, or better, what was believed to be the only way to take part in the modern world: to be modern, meaning Westernized with highly developed capitalistic values. Since deeply rooted traditions could not been changed over the night (as we have seen some have not been changed even in decades), what had to be done was to change the visual appearance of the country (this is why the attire played such an important role in the transformation). In this manner, re-Islamization works as a resisting force against the imposed universality and hegemony manifesting the Neighbor again with strongly emphasized symbolic visual appearance. Nonetheless, the new Islamism did not escape the universality of capitalist values and consumption completely. Navaro-Yashin (2002) talks about the market for identities with secularist and Islamist commodities. She argues that the veil and the portrait of Atatürk are central commodities and symbols of cultural identity in contemporary Turkey. What is more, secularist and Islamist identities are products of manufacture (Navaro-Yashin, 2002: 222). Even if Islamist movements have mostly represented themselves in reaction to commodity cultures so closely connected with Western lifestyle and values, Navaro-Yashin's (as also mine) observations of the Islamist movement in Turkey have been otherwise. Commodification seems to be a context and activity shared by both political spheres. "Commodification had much to do with reification of certain symbols, like "the veil" and "Atatürk", as emblems of identity" (ibid: 223). Both of the identities were constructed in distinction from previous mainstream identities. As much as the Kemalists tried to distinguish the modern Republic from its Ottoman roots, the Islamists too forged their identity in distinction from secularists. To do so they formed the market for believers which is supposed to be

moral from Islamic point of view: it follows dietary prescriptions of Islam, for example, their products are marked with a sticker "contains no lard"; such companies do not serve food to employees during Ramadan; they are reserving money for charity (zekat - one of the Five Pillars of Islam is the giving of a small percentage of one's possessions to charity); etc. Apart from their Islamic morality Navaro-Yashin talks about Muslim capitalists, profit driven multinationals. The veil is their most important good brought to the market because women are ready to spend on it. Young Islamist women, especially those who attend universities or have jobs outside the home, like more stylish models of headscarves and coats carefully matched in color (ibid: 225). What is more, patterns, colors and materials are dictated every season by the most spread Islamic brands which search their inspiration in world capitals of fashion, such as Milano, Paris and New York.

As we have seen, the commodity market is fully fledged for both mainstream identities in Turkey. Businesses began to craft and sell "Turkish authenticity", constructed by political oppositions, weather secularist or Islamist. As Navaro-Yashin, new Islamist women consume veils for themselves, rather than for what they stand for. This is why veils do not need to represent "Islamic morality" to be popularly worn. The veil has been interpreted by Islamists as a representation of "Islamic chastity", "the holy past", and "Turkish local culture". The representation, as we have seen, does not neatly pair up with the ideal. It appears, as Baudrillard would have noted, that the signifier (the veil) has taken on a life of its own, living by itself even beyond its problematic representation. The veil has a social life, it does not simply refer to religiosity or belief. It has gained meaning in and of itself, and almost independently of belief. It symbolizes itself, and in itself refers to the politics of identity, opposed to secularists and the state (2002: 247).

I have encountered another such phenomena: shoes, Converse All Stars in particular. While I was observing clothing habits of Turkish youth I have realized that Converse All Stars, a massively produced multinational brand of sport shoes, is equally popular between veiled and unveiled female students. To make this fact more interesting, Converse All Stars are probably one of the most Americanized, Westernized and globalized athletic footwear brands. Actually, Converse together with 4 other companies (Nike, Rebook, Adidas and Fila) controls over 60% of global athletic footwear market (Lock & Siteman). This is how consumption is not the only connecting factor of both sides, in some cases they consume the same products, what is more, products that signify consumerism and globalized market of goods. When I asked one

of the students, who was wearing All Starts in the time of the interview, about that, she told me that she is not preoccupied with what she is buying in a sense of symbolization, they were nice and cheap (she explained that they are imitation, this is why a low price), so she bought them.

On another occasion, when I was interviewing another group of students, I suddenly realized that I was dressed very similarly to one of the interviewees after she removed her overcoat (only women were present in the room). Under the overcoat she was wearing very tight clothes. When I asked her about that, she told me that she wears and buys what she likes and that she likes fashionable clothes, but she would cover the clothes, she finds inappropriate for the public, with more loosen clothes.

What I tried to show is universality of capitalism and consumerism and its successful implication into systems of belief which theoretically oppose these notions. As Žižek, capitalism is universal, it is no longer rooted in a particular culture or "world". The universality of capitalism resides in the fact that capitalism is not a name for a specific "civilization," for specific cultural-symbolic world, but the name for a truly neutral economic-symbolic machine which operates with all values worldwide (Žižek, 2008: 156). The same stands for Turkey, no matter the bipolar division, capitalism and consumption fit well into both. The reason why capitalism fits so well into all systems of believes is its quality to see and know no difference, as long as one is consumer. None the less, universality of capitalism points out the weak point of both identities. As much as they employ strong symbols to differentiate themselves, they are both part of a wider movement. The symbols they have built their identities upon are small differences between the two, leading to a bizarre denouement. The struggle between two political poles, two systems of belief, is only a struggle inside a wider politically and economically predetermined sphere.

Let us at the end once again return to the already mentioned terms and notions. As we have said before the notion of the Neighbor best describes Turkish situation and its bipolarity. We discussed the problem of intolerance and the need for a subject to be kulturlos to overcome it. Because liberalism privileges a certain, that would be the modern Western, culture, other cultures are tolerated as long as they are not disturbingly present. Even if liberalism is based on freedom of choice it expects certain amount of responsibility. "You are given freedom of choice, on condition that you make the right choice; you are given freedom, on condition that you will not really use it" (Žižek, 2008: 129). Than again, when (if) you decide "irresponsibly" to use your freedom of choice, for example your personal religious conviction you are in a

subordinated position. Even if you are allowed to maintain your belief, this belief is "tolerated" as idiosyncratic personal choice or opinion. The moment you present it publicly, you are accused of "fundamentalism". "What this is means is that the "subject of free choice" in the Western "tolerant" multicultural sense can emerge only as the result of an extremely violent process of being torn out of a particular lifeworld, of being cut off from one's roots " (Žižek, 2008: 146). The same goes for veiled Turkish women. As Göle explains, 'the public sphere [in Turkey] is institutionalized and imagined as a site for the implementation of a secular and progressive way of life' (Göle, 2002: 176). So the presence of women wearing the headscarf and demanding a place in public spaces directly contests such a construction of the public sphere (O'Neil, 2008: 105). As Žižek and O'Neil, it seems that religious people in secular Western societies are only welcome when they keep their belief to themselves. However, as in the case of the veil in Turkey, if one decides to expose hie/her believes publicly, even more so with symbols as strong as the veil, then the secular establishment vigorously defends what they see as their space.

Since Neighbor is the limit to ethical universality, does this mean we should just respect our Neighbors, without a need of universality? Should we only keep a distance (what tolerance is doing)? Žižek says no. For him there is a positive universal ethics which should be used instead of tolerance: ethics without morality. If morality is sentimental and it works as narcissistic self satisfaction: you do something because you feel good doing it; ethics are much more ruthless: you do something because it is absolutely needed. Žižek rejects and opposes multicultural liberal politics and tolerance as its ideology, because, as he puts it, to get to know and understand each other better, is an impossible task. We need new code of discretion. We need to learn to ignore each other.

Could we (once again) apply Žižek's theory to Turkish situation? Are universal ethics and ignorance possible, maybe even the only possible, solutions? No matter how harsh and radical it may seem, something has to be admitted at stance, nothing else seems to be working. What is more, as we have seen before, to some point, as Žižek calls it, the new code of discretion, based on Sloterdijk's thesis more communication/more problems, already works in Turkey with segregation of space (Ankara's two city centers, suburban areas mostly inhabited only with members of one or the other political opposition, etc.). In the case of Turkey, what would be the difference between tolerance and ignorance and what is the role of universal ethics? If the Neighbor is an intruder who is only tolerated as long as he does not disturb our way of life with his

otherness, to change (improve) his position in the society, we have to at first completely oppose the Christian motto love thy neighbor as thyself. As we have seen from Freud, it is impossible to love the Neighbor and also not necessary to do so. By tolerating the Neighbor, we are only emphasizing his otherness and increasing the distance (I tolerate you, but only as long as you stay away and keep the distance not to disturb me). When we ignore the Neighbor, we become much less aware of his presence and like that we are able to coexist even when our ways of life, sets of beliefs and ideas meet or cross. In a way this would mean, we all live our lives in ways most suitable to us without a need to discuss whose way is more correct, more true and overall better. In this way veiled women in Turkey would not be accused of fundamentalism and women in Western style of clothes, which show more than they hide, would not be accused of immorality and obscenity. Female students would be able to attend universities of their choice and they would not be forced to choose between their right to practice religion and be educated. Universal ethics allow just that, what is needed and for everybody.

CONCLUSION: MODERN AND TRADITIONAL

Turkish woman is something more. The same as the Orient, she is always something more than what is known about her. She is a fantasy and an illusion, part of Oriental mirage. What is more, the Turkish woman was created twice as a symbol of political ideology and movement and as an image of ideal. She is a product of inner-orientalism and a response to from above imposed modernization. The Turkish woman is an answer and a solution.

Even thought that Turkish scholars accuse both political poles with patriarchal values, Turkish women play a significant role in past and contemporary politics. If not as active members, as potent symbols of ideology. We could even say that they are used for political purposes of power shifts between Kemalists and Islamists. As we have seen, men are also "labeled" with symbols of appurtenance, but since the veil is the most visible and widely recognizable symbol of all, women's share in identity politics is considerably bigger.

This work tried to present two perspectives on women in Turkey: outer and inner, both based on Said's orientalism and closely connected with postcolonialism and imperialism. When in outer perspective we focused on Turkish women as phantasmatic objects, is inner perspective based on two constructs of ideal woman. Women in Turkey, as a part Oriental mirage, were represented as extremely sexual and seducing, while nowadays their representation almost completely lost the erotic charge. They are represented subjugated and powerless. Leaning on Shick's argument, we have realized that their image in the West is dialectic, sexual and asexual at the same time. They are represented sexual and asexual to legitimize colonization, imperialism and military or cultural interventions.

Nonetheless when accusing western representations of the Orient with orientalism, one should not be overwhelmed with criticism. Since everyone, coming from the Orient or not, is burdened with his own cultural, political, ethnical and religious background, any discourse should be characterized with expressed dominance and superiority over the Other, to make it alterist. Without it none should be accused of orientalism.

Turkey's own inner perspective was also defined with orientalism and Western contempt lasting for centuries. Atatürk was the first to construct an image of an ideal Turkish woman and the first to place that woman between modernity and tradition. As

we have seen, the new woman was determined with an eclectic formula of a modernizing ideology combined with conservative morality.

Islamists' reply to Kemalist modernization placed their women between modernity and tradition as well. Even though they describe themselves as religious and traditional, opposing modernization and globalized values of consumption societies, Islamists were not able to avoid universally applied commodification. What is more, the attire of new Islamist women symbolically shows the degree of movement's modernity. Another attribute we could link both spheres with is their elitness. Most of the scholars dealing with Turkey are deviding it in Kemalist center and Islamist periphery. Nonetheless, when the new Islamist movement tried to distinguish itself with tesettür from the rest, to be more urban, modern and educated and less provincial, backwarded and ignorant, the new elite was established, the Islamist elite. Turkish women are, no matter which side they belong to, trapped in paradoxicality of incomplete dualities of modernity and tradition.

We have showed how two constructs are closely connected: the construct of a woman and the construct of Turkish national identity, both producing the Turkish woman. Construction of political identity in Turkey is leaned on sexual difference, because "Turkish" tries to patch where the construction of sex fails.

Turkey's bipolarity could be understood as an inner clash of civilizations which produced a country of Neighbors. We have claimed that the notion of the Neighbor defines situation in Turkey much better then the notion of the Other (nonetheless, Islamists perceive themselves as Turkey's Others). The Neighbor is somebody living very close, but who is still a perfect stranger. The Neighbor is an intruder whose way of life disturbs us and what is more, the Neighbor is public, not private enemy. As in Turkey, both political halves are feeling threatened by the other's values and how they might enforce them as universal, in case of seizing power.

The veil is the symbol of otherness Kemalists feel most threatened by, because the veil is not only a piece of clothing, but a concept. The veil, more than it hides parts of a body, shows or symbolizes tradition, religion, a certain way of life, certain kind of values and even more, it connotes backwardness, suppression and submission. The veil is meant to safeguard modesty and preserve honor, nonetheless, as pointed out, the veil rather than protects women, limits their access to public forums. In Kemalist Turkey the veil is a bruise to the urban, modern, Western identity, it raptures the circuit of recognition, the circuit which would make Turkey Western. In some cases the veil also functions as

an object of envy. Since it has never been completely banned, only disapproved, and now allowed in public buildings and educational institutions, the Kemalists have tried to destroy other's ability to enjoy the veil. The veil is a burden even if it is worn with pride.

Multiculturalists' liberal notion of tolerance seems to fail solving the problem of the veil and its ban and problems of living or coexisting with Others and Neighbors, which are acute not only in Turkey but also in Europe and in the rest of the world. As Žižek, to get to know and understand each other is impossible, multiculturalits tried and failed. We need a new measurement, not to tolerate, but to ignore each other. For Turks to be able to share one country, nonetheless, as we have seen, both poles of the society have a lot in common, ignorance of their differences seems to be a solution. Only in this way none of the sides will feel threaten to be oust from more or less stable and equally powerful bipolar division. Only with ignorance both parts take their share without harming the other. Turkey has to step out of "inbetweeness" that defines it and occupy both: modernity and tradition.

Tančica, ki odkriva in zakriva.
Turška ženska med modernostjo in tradicijo.

Slovenian Abstract/Slovenski povzetek

Pričujoče delo se ukvarja z žensko kot stičiščem sodobnih težav in sporov v Turčiji. Ženske so temelj treh vidikov, vsak ima svojo logiko, kljub temu, so vsi tesno povezani. Gradnja "turškosti" skozi idealno podobo ženske, je temelj kulturne in nacionalne identitete Turčije. Ker sta bili proizvedeni dve taki idealni podobi, ženske igrajo pomembno vlogo pri razlikovanju leve politične ideologije od desne. Prav tako se ne moremo izogniti vprašanju ženske kot drugega spola. Predstavljeno delo uporablja stičišča problemov, ki zadevajo turško žensko, kot metodologijo.

Naloga je razdeljena na štiri tematske dele, strukturirane tako, da popolnoma zaobjamejo problem tančice in turške ženske, ki je ujeta v sporu. Rdeča nit, ki nas vodi skozi besedilo je "vmesnost" Turčije, ki je povzročila bipolarnosti v politiki in družbi. Obe, turški ženska kot podoba in tančica kot najvidnejši politični simbol, sta produkt stanja med modernostjo in tradicijo.

Prvi del naloge se osredotoča na zgodovinsko in politično ozadje, ki je vodijo do delitve v turški družbi. Delo razlikuje med dvema vidikoma: med zunanjim in notranjim. Oba vidika temeljita na orientalizemu Edwarda Saida, ki je tesno povezan s postkolonializmom in imperializmom. Ne glede na to, da Turčija ni bila nikoli kolonija, temveč je vzpon Osmanskega cesarstva označen z ekspanzionistično politiko, je bila zmeraj opazovana in opisovana v imperialistični duhu, kot zaostala in manj vredna. Naloga prikaže kako je imelo takšno razumevanje Turčije velik vpliv na modernizacijsko politiko Atatürka, s ciljem, da se ponese Turčijo bližje Evropi. Še več, Atatürkova Turčija je primer notranjega orientalizma, kot je razvidno v nadaljevanju naloge, je notranji orientalizem razlog za turški notranji spopad civilizacij. Ker je Kemalistični režim od zgoraj vsiljeval modernizacijo, je le majhna, vendar močna, elita sledila reformam in jih ponotranjila. Islamistično gibanje je izkoristilo delitev med elito in tradicionalno usmerjena množice in se tako povzpela na oblast. Islamisti so ustvarili svojo lastno identiteto, drugo turško žensko. Zato so nasprotja in bipolarnost posebej vidna v noši ženske, ki izraža politična in tudi verska prepričanja. Naloga pokaže kako so ženske igrale pomembno vlogo pri politiki identitet, saj sta obe nasprotni si smeri, Kemalisti in Islamisti, ustvarili svojo "idealno" podobo turške ženske. Kljub temu, ti dve ženski nista tako različni, kot njuni ustvarjalci želeli.

Razdelitev Turčije, kljub namerni ločitvi prostora, ustvarja stalno konfliktno situacijo srečanja z Bližnjikom. Drugi del naloge pokaže kako in zakaj pojem Bližnjik, in ne Drugi, veliko bolj natančno opisuje turškem notranje kulturne spopade. Naloga se ukvarja s tem kdo je Bližnjik, je to sovražnik ali prijatelj? Ali je zastopan v javnem ali zasebnem okolju? Da bi razumeli težave, ki nastanejo ob srečanju z Bližnjikom, se naloga naslanja na Žižkovo kritiko multikulturnega liberalizma in tolerance kot lažnega, ideološko ustvarjenega, problema. Za Žižka je toleranca postpolitični izraz, ki pravi "ne nadleguj me".

Naloga v nadaljevanju sooča dve teoretični stališči, historicizem in psihoanalizo in njun poglede na konstrukcijo spola. Za Judith Butler je spol zgolj konstrukt zgodovinsko spremenljivih diskurzivnih praks, medtem ko je za Joan Copjec spo produkt notranje omejitve, neuspele signifikacije. Naloga poskuša odgovoriti na vprašanje povezave dveh konstruktov: konstrukta ženske in nacionalne identitete.

Na koncu bomo skušali osvetliti problem tančice in njene prepovedi v Turčiji. Z razumevanjem zgodovinskega in političnega ozadja prepovedi, lahko trdimo, daso zakrite žensk v Turčiji travmatični vsiljivci. Kljub temu ti vsiljivci iz družbe niso odstranjeni, vendar je prisotna težnja po njihovi spremembi. Ker je tančica je najbolj viden simbol pripadnosti tradicionalni, Islamistični polovico družbe, le-ta izziva Kemalistično opozicijo in kot tako jo je treba odstraniti. V nekaterih primerih tančico celo postane predmet zavisti.

Pričujiče besedilo poskuša razsvetliti trenutnimi težave v Turčiji s koncepti postkolonialnih študij in psihoanalize. Najprej predstavi in opozari na sodobne konflikte s pomočjo postkolonialnih študij, ki so kasneje kritično obravnavali z psihoanalitičnim pristopom. Delo sooča teoretična nasprotja med psihoanalizo in historicizmom, psihoanalizo in liberalnim multikulturalizmom in na koncu še išče rešitev obstoječ bipolarnosti v Turčiji.

Delo pokaže, da je turška ženska nekaj več kot Orient, turška ženska je vedno nekaj več od tistega, kar je znano o njej. Je fantazija in iluzija, del orientalskega privida. Še več, turško žensko so ustvaril dvakrat kot simbol politične ideologije in gibanja in kot idealno podobo. Tako je turška ženska produkt notranjega orientalizma in odgovor na od zgoraj vsiljeno modernizacijo. Turška ženska je odgovor in rešitev.

Kljub temu, da turški strokovnjaki obtožujejo oba politična pola s patriarhalnimi vrednotami, turške ženske igrajo pomembno vlogo v pretekli in sodobni politiki. Če ne kot aktivne članice, kot močni simboli ideologije. Lahko bi celo rekli, da se uporabljajo v

politične namene premikov moči med Kemalists in Islamisti. Naloga pokaže, da so tudi moški "označeni" s simboli pripadnost, ker pa tančica je najbolj viden in široko prepoznaven simbol od vseh, je pomen, ki ga imajo ženske, v politiki identitete precej večji.

Kot že rečeno, to delo želi predstaviti dva vidika ženske v Turčiji: zunanji in notranji. Madtem ko zunanja perspektiva obravnava ženske kot objekte fantazije, notranja perspektiva temelji na dveh konstruktih idealne ženske. Ženske v Turčiji, kot del orientalega privida so bili predstavljene kot izjemno erotične in zapeljive, medtem ko pa je s njihova zastopanost dane skoraj popolnoma izgubila erotični naboj. Te ženske so predstavljene koti podjarmljene in nemočne. Delo se naslanja na Shickovo trditev, da je podoba žensk na zahodu dialektična, seksualna in aseksualna obenem. Ženske so predstavljene seksualno in aseksualno z namenom upravičevanja kolonizacije, imperializma in vojaških ali kulturne posegov na vzhodu.

Kljub temu, ko obtožujemo zahodne predstavitev Orienta z orientalizmom, ne smemo biti preobremenjeni s kritiko. Ker so vsi, ki prihajajo iz Orienta ali ne, obremenjeni s svojo kulturno, politično, etnično in versko pripadnostjo, bi moral biti vsak diskurz označen z jasno izraženo prevlado in premočjo nad drugim, da bi bil alterist, čen. Brez tega se je potrebno izogniti neutemeljenim kritikam..

Lastna notranja perspektiva Turčije je bila prav tako določena z orientalizmom in zahodnim prezirom. Atatürk je bil prvi, ki je ustvaril podobo idealne turške ženske in prvi, ki je postavil ženske med modernostjo in tradicijo. Nova ženska je bila določena z eklektično formulo modernizacijske ideologije v kombinaciji s konzervativno moralo.

Islamistični odgovor na kemalistično modernizacijo je postavil ženske prav tako med modernost in tradicijo. Čeprav se sami opisujejo kot verne in tradicionalne, ki nasprotujejo modernizaciji in globaliziranim vrednotam potrošniške družbe, se islamisti niso mogli izogniti vsesplošni komodifikaciji. Še več, nоše novih islamističnih žensk simbolično prikazujejo stopnjo modernosti gibanja. Še en atribut bi lahko obe sferi je elitnost. Večina znanstvenikov, ki se ukvarjajo s Turčijo, jo delijo na kemalistični center in islamistično obrobje. Kljub temu pa se je novo islamistično gibanjo poskušalao razlikovati z načinom povezovanja rute, ki se imenuje tesettür, od ostalih. Novo islamistično gobanje želi biti bolj urbano, moderno in izobraženoi in manj provincialno, zaostalo. Tako je nastala nova elita, islamistična elita.. Turške ženske, ne glede kateri strani pripadajo,so ujete v paradoksalnost nepopolne dvojnosti modernosti in tradicije.

Delo tudi pokaže, kako sta dva konstrukta tesno povezana: konstrukt ženske in konstrukt turške narodne identitete, kajti oba skupaj ustvarjata turško žensko. Konstrukcija politične identitete v Turčiji se naslanja na spolno razliko, kajti "turška" skuša zakrpati mesta kjer konstrukcija spola spodleti.

Bipolarnost Turčije je mogoče razumeti kot notranji spopad civilizacij, ki proizvajajo državo Bližnjikov. Naloga trdi, da pojem Bližnjika veliko bolje opredeljuje razmere v Turčiji kot pojma Drugoega (kljub temu, da se islamisti sami dojemajo kot Druge v Turčiji). Bližnjik je nekdo, ki živi zelo blizu, vendar je še vedno popoln tujec. Bližnjik je vsiljivec, katerega način življenja nas moti in še več, Bližnjik je javni, ne pa zasebni sovražnik. V Turčiji se oba politična pola počutita ogrožena s strani Drugega in njegovih vrednot ter možnosti, da Drugi vsilil svoje vrednote kot univerzalne, če bi se polastil popolne politične moči.

Tančica je simbol drugosti, ki najbolj ogroža Kemaliste, kajti tančica ni le kos oblačila, temveč je koncept. Tančica, bolj kot skriva dele telesa, kaže ali simbolizira tradicijo, vero, določen način življenja, določene vrednote, še več, tančica je konotacije zaostalosti, zatiranja in podložnosti. Tančica bi naj varovala skromnost in ohranjala čast, vendar kljub temu, tančica bolj kot ščiti ženske, omejuje njihov dostop do javnih forumov. V kemalistični Turčiji je tančica brazgotina urbane, moderne, zahodne identitete, lomi krog razpoznavanja, ki bi naredil Turčijo zahodno državo. V nekaterih primerih tančica deluje tudi kot predmet zavisti. Ker nikoli ni bila popolnoma prepovedana, le neodobravana in prepovedana v javnih stavbah in izobraževalnih ustanovah, so Kemalists poskušali uničiti sposobnost Drugega, da uživaja v tančici. Tančica je breme, tudi če jo nosijo s ponosom.

Liberalno multikulturalistični pojem tolerance ne uspe rešiti problema tančice in njene prepovedi in težav sobivanja z Drugimi in Bližnjiki, ki niso akutni samo v Turčiji, ampak tudi v Evropi in drugod po svetu. Kot Žižek, spoznati in razumeti drug drugega, je nemogoče, multikulturalisti so poskusili, a spodleteli. Potrebne so nove dimenzije sobivanja, ki ne temeljijo na toleranci, temveč na ignoranci. Za Turke, da bi lahko sobivali v eni državi, kljub temu da, kot pokaže naloga, imata oba pola družbe veliko skupnega, je potrebno ignoriranje razlik. Le na ta način se nobena od stranine ne bo počutila ogrožena, da bo izrinjenai iz bolj ali manj stabilne in enako močne bipolarne delitve. Samo z ignoranco se lahko družba deli na dva dela, ne da bi s tem škodovali drug drugim. Turčija mora izstopiti in "vmesnosti", ki jo opredeljuje, in tako zasesti tako modernost kot tradicijo.

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